BERKELEY S IMMATERIALISM.

If, however, the distinction be

tween the " potential " and the " actual " reality of sense qualities

in the external domain be understood to mean that in this do

main, and apart from actual perception, some sense qualities, viz.

the proper sensibles, existing only potentially, have a less degree

of external reality, so to speak, than others, viz. the common

sensibles, as existing actually and with a fuller degree of external

reality, the distinction does not seem to .have any real ground

in the facts. For if the proper sensibles are partially relative to

or dependent on a subjective, organic factor, for the specific

characteristics wherewith they are presented in consciousness,

so too are the common sensibles which are unified complexes

of those: and this relativity or dependence can, when normal,

be ignored in the common no less than in the proper sensibles.

If, as perceptionists hold, the specific data of which we be-

io8 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

come directly aware in normal external perception are external

qualities presented through the functioning of the sense organs,

then these qualities, whether primary or secondary, exist in the

same way in this domain independently of actual perception :

if we say that the primary qualities exist "formally" or

" actually " in the external domain apart from perception, so do

the secondary qualities.

If, on the other hand, as representationists hold, the immedi

ate data of external sense awareness are in all cases conscious

impressions or representations produced in us by corresponding

external causes, then if such immediate data be said to exist in

the external domain apart from perception only " causally,"

" virtually," " potentially," when they are secondary qualities, the

immediate data which are primary qualities must also exist in this

way only, and not " formally " or " actually," apart from actual

perception. Jeanniere, for instance, defends the representationist

theory, that the senses do not attain to reality as it is, but only

to its appearances, 1 and that nevertheless we can know things as

they are in themselves so that we can attribute to them predicates

that are really intrinsic to them." But he also holds, and rightly,

as we think, that no distinction should in this respect be made be

tween primary and secondary qualities. And the reasons he gives

are sound : (a) because the grounds for admitting or rejecting

(the external reality of) both classes of qualities are the same ;

(b} because philosophers who reject the secondary qualities gener

ally proceed to reject the primary also ; 3 (c) because (even on

the representationist theory) " impressions " of colour, sound,

taste, smell, etc., demand corresponding external "causes" just

as much as extension, or the "primary" or "common" sense

percepts. The author adds that it is the duty of the epistemolo-

gist merely to show that the secondary qualities are real character

istics of external bodies independently of perception ; that what

these qualities are externally is a question between the cosmolo-

gist and the physical scientist. The same, however, is true of

the primary qualities.

1 " Sensibus attingi res non in se, sed in suis apparentiis " op. cit., p. 417.

211 Posse cognosci res ut sunt in se, ita sc. ut eis tribuere liceat praedicata quae

eis vere sint intrinseca " ibid. Query: How? if the predicates are abstract con

cepts of concrete sense appearances, and if these appearances, being intramental

impressions or representations, are obviously not intrinsic to the external realities ?

Cf. infra, 127.

* Ibid., 125.

BERKELEY S IMMATERIALISM 109

Berkeley s 1 Immaterialism, or Objective (or "Acosmic" or

Hyperphysical] Idealism, is an apt illustration of the tendency, to

deny the external reality of the primary qualities when that of

the secondary qualities has once been rejected. His theory, to

which we have already referred incidentally (V/! 102, ill), has

never failed to win adherents ; but perhaps none of these have

rivalled their master in the ingenuity with which he himself

defended his position and gave it such a peculiar fascination for

reflecting minds. It will be convenient to examine the theory

briefly in the present context.

The qualities perceived by our senses are only mental states

or " ideas ". Sight does not reveal extension to us, but only

colours mentally associated with the extension revealed by the

sense of touch. But extensional qualities are, like those of the

other senses, only mental states. All the sense qualities, primary

and secondary alike, are only mental states. In fact all the ob

jects of our direct awareness must be mental states, and only

mental states : partly imagination images, partly internal feelings

and emotions, and partly "sensations" or "perceptions" or

" ideas of the senses ". Their esse is percipi : they are essentially

mind-dependent entities : it is impossible to prove, and irrational

to believe, that they have or can have any extramental reality,

any being beyond the consciousness of the perceiver. If, then,

the sense qualities or " ideas of the senses " appear in stable, uni

form, clearly differentiated groups or aggregates, to each of which

we give a >name such as "apple," "oak," "rain," "horse,"

" house," " human body, " etc., and all of which make up the

domain of reality which we call the " sensible " or " material "

universe, the principle which groups these qualities into definite

wholes or sense-objects cannot possibly be the supposed extra-

mental, inert, lifeless, unconscious, and unperceiving thing which

philosophers have called " matter " or " material substance " : " 2

1 Berkeley was born in Co. Kilkenny, Ireland, in 1685, and was educated in

Trinity College, Dublin, where he studied the works of Locke and Descartes. He

travelled in Italy and France, visiting Pere Malebranche (in Paris, 1711) with whose

philosophical views he had strong sympathies. The memorable Bermuda project

(1723-31) of converting the American Indians is typical of his deeply philanthropic

character. Later he became Protestant Bishop of Cloyne, where he combined the

study of Plato with practical work for the amelioration of the hard lot of an oppressed

people. He died in 1752. His principal works are the New Theory of Vision (1709),

the Principles of Knowledge (1710), Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

(1713), and Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1731).

2 The influence of the perverted notions of substance expounded by Locke and

Descartes are here plainly noticeable. Cf. Ontology, 61-4.

1 1 o THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

for sense qualities, being mind-dependent ideas, can exist only

in a conscious, perceiving substance, i.e. in a mind or spirit. The

concept of matter is the concept of a mere abstraction ; and to

think of matter as a real, extramental substance or subject of

sense qualities is to think a contradiction in terms. Matter, in

the meaning of an extramental or mind-independent reality or

substance, is a mere figment of the mind s abstraction : no such

reality exists. What is called matter, or the material universe

(including, of course, our own bodies) is simply the system of

sense qualities or phenomena or ideas in individual, conscious,

perceiving minds or spirits : and each of these human minds or

spirits knows of the real existence of other similar minds or spirits,

really distinct from and independent of itself, by inference from

the presence in itself of other idea-aggregates similar to the idea-

aggregate which it has learned to designate as its own " human

body ". But the whole system of ideas in each human mind, and

which each one calls the external world or universe, is a system,

a cosmos, obviously permeated by law, order, regularity, uniform

ity. It clearly demands an explanation, and must have an ade

quate cause. But, just as clearly, it is not caused by the individual

perceiving human mind or spirit ; l and to suppose it to be caused

by an extramental something called " matter," which is a mere

figment and not a reality at all, is manifestly absurd ; therefore

it must be caused or produced or placed in each human mind or

created spirit by the Self-Existent, Divine, Uncreated Spirit, God.

Just as the mental idea-aggregates which we call " human bodies "

are mental symbols which reveal to us the real existence of other

human minds or spirits, so the whole constant, regular, orderly

panorama of ideas which each human mind apprehends as " the

universe " is for each such mind a symbol revealing the real ex

istence of the Divine Spirit. Matter, therefore, does not exist.

Only three orders of reality exist : (i) created spirits or human

minds, (2) the Uncreated Spirit, and (3) ideas caused or created

in human spirits by the Divine Spirit. The system of ideas,

moreover, which constitutes "the universe" for and in each

created spirit is a system of entities which are mere symbols :

their sole function is to teach us all we can infer from them about

our own nature as created spirits, and about God the Uncreated

Spirit. They are not themselves in any way active or operative ;

1 Cf. reasons given in in above.

BERKELEY S IMMATERIALISM in

they are not causes ; causality is an attribute of spirit only, not

of the " ideas " which constitute the " world of sense ".

Such are the broad outlines of Berkeley s philosophy. We

shall offer a brief criticism of the main points.

In the. first place, he fails utterly to give a rational vindication

of his knowledge of, and belief in, the existence of his own mind,

the human mind, as a substance, a spiritual substance : and his

own principles make such vindication impossible, and such be

lief inconsistent, and therefore irrational. For if the "material

substance " which men suppose to be the subject characterized

by sense qualities be an unreal figment of thought because it is

not an object of direct awareness, and having no percipi has there

fore no esse or reality, so apart the "spiritual substance" or

substantial " mind " or " soul " or " spirit " which men suppose

to be the conscious subject of mental images, emotions, feelings,

sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and mental states of all sorts,

is likewise only an unreal figment of thought inasmuch as it also

is not an " idea " l or object of direct awareness, and therefore,

having no percipi, it has no esse or reality. Hence, so far as we can

know, the mind is not a substantial reality, but simply " a heap

or collection of different perceptions united together by certain

relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with

simplicity and identity". 2 Thus, in the pan-phenomenism of

Hume, Berkeley s principles logically lead to an extreme scepti

cism which is the very antithesis of Berkeley s own beliefs and

intentions. 3

Secondly, this issue cannot be avoided by the plea that the

sense qualities imply a subject, no doubt, but, being " ideas " or

" mental " states, require a spiritual or mental substance, 4 though

not a material substance : for on Berkeley s principle that esse is

percipi it can be argued that the supposed " spiritual " substance

is just as extramental as the supposed material substance in the

l Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge (Philosoph. Classics, Kegan Paul, 1907),

p. 116 n.

2 HUME, Works, i., 534, a/wd TURNER, History of Philosophy, p. 520.

3 C/. Three Dialogues, etc. (Philosoph. Classics, Kegan Paul, 1906), p. 96:

"Hylas: . . . inconsequence of your own principles it should follow that you are

only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them " : to which

Berkeley can only reply, in the person of Philonous : " I know or am conscious of

my own being ; and that / myself am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking,

active principle, etc." : which is incompatible with the principle that knowledge is

only of " ideas," that all " esse is percipi ".

4 Cf. Principles^ etc,, 91, p. 83..

1 1 2 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

sense that the former is no more an object of direct awareness, or

has no more " per dpi" than the latter. And this brings us to

inquire what Berkeley can have meant by the contention that esse

\s percipi. 1 It is capable of at least two meanings : (i) that all

the objects of our direct conscious awareness are necessarily mind-

dependent entities or " ideas " 2 ; or (2) that all knowdble realities,

howsoever knowable, whether intuitively or inferentially, and

whether by sense or by intellect, are mind-dependent entities or

" ideas ". Moreover we may ask, in regard to both alternatives,

(a] of what mind is there question ? and (3) do they imply that

the only reality of the objects in question consists in their being

perceived or known by the mind in question, so that by ceasing to

be thus perceived or known they would simply cease to be?

Now if understood in the sense of the first alternative, the

principle, " esse \s per dpi" is recognized as limited, as not being

universal, and as admitting the possibility of our " knowing," and

therefore "becoming aware of" realities which are not mind-

dependent, whose esse does not consist in their percipi, in their

" being known ". Berkeley seems to have held that the indi

vidual mind can and does know the existence of itself* and of

other human minds 4 and of the Divine Mind, and yet that these

1 Cf. supra, loi, 102.

2 I.e. understanding " ideas " in the wide sense in which they include the mental

content of external and internal perceptions or sensations, images of the imagina

tion, emotions, etc.

3 Cf. supra, p. in, n. 3.

4 Cf. Principles, etc., 90, p. 82 : " We comprehend our own existence by inward

feeling or reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have

some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in

a strict sense we have not ideas." (For Berkeley an " idea," in the strict sense,

does not represent anything beyond itself: "ideas" are merely mental objects:

from which, however, interpreted as symbols and effects, we can infer the reality

of the Divine Spirit.) Again he writes (ibid., 140, p. 116) : " In a large sense, indeed

we may be said to have an idea ( or rather a notion, 2nd edit.) of spirit ; that is,

we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny any

thing of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other

spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them [i.e. of

the ideas in other spirits] ; so we know other spirits by means of our own soul

which in that sense is the image or idea of them ; it having a like respect to other

spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas perceived by others."

And again (ibid., 142, p. 118) : " Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different,

that when we say they exist, they are known, or the like, these words must

not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike

or common in them." Cf. also Three Dialogues, etc., p. 92 sqq. (Third Dialogue).

So, then, we have some notion or knowledge of created spirits and the Divine

Spirit, as well as of " ideas ". But it is hard to see, on Berkeley s principles, how

we can have any notion or knowledge of the former unless in so far as they are

BERKELE Y S 1MMA TERIALISM 1 1 3

realities are not mind-dependent, not mere ideas in the individual

mind "knowing" them, that their esse is not merely perdpi.

There are, then, it would appear, besides things (viz. " ideas ")

whose esse or reality \spercipi, other things (viz. " spirits," human

and Divine) whose esse or reality is not perdpi but rather percipere,

i.e. realities which are essentially conscious or cognitive, or, as

Berkeley would say, " spiritual ". If this is so, the principle " esse

is percipi" is accepted not in the universal sense of the second

alternative given above, which would lead to something like

Kant s phenomenism, but in the limited sense in which it applies

only to some knowable objects. But in that case the question

whether the sole reality of any given kind of perceived or known

object, for example, a sense quality, consists in its being per

ceived or known, i.e. the question whether it is essentially a mind-

dependent entity or " idea," cannot be decided by appealing to

the principle, " esse is perdpi" as of universal application, but

must be decided by consideration of the special kind of object in

question, to determine whether the principle applies to it or not. 1

And this in fact is the line taken by Berkeley. With a rare

ingenuity and wealth of subtle reasoning he endeavours to show 2

that the sense qualities are essentially mind-dependent entities

or "ideas," and that the concept of an extramental "material

substance," in which they would be supposed to inhere is self-

contradictory. But he does not succeed. If there are other

realities, viz. " spirits " or "minds," whose being does not consist

in their being actually perceived, but which are extramental or

independent of mind in the sense that their reality persists un

affected by my knowledge or perception of them, and which can

objects of conscious awareness or cognition, i.e. unless in so far as they are " mental

phenomena" or "ideas": any knowledge of what they are beyond this, and in

themselves, seems impossible.

1 Cf. PRICHARD, op. cit., pp. 121-2 : " We can only decide that a particular

reality depends upon the mind by appeal to its special character. We cannot treat

it as a reality the relation of which to the mind is solely that of knowledge. And

we can only decide that all reality is dependent upon mind by appeal to the special

character of all the kinds of reality of which we are aware. Hence, Kant in the

Aesthetic, and Berkeley before him, were essentially right in their procedure. They

both ignored consideration of the world simply as a reality, and appealed exclusively

to its special character, the one arguing that in its special character as spatial and

temporal it presupposed a percipient, and the other endeavouring to show that the

primary qualities are as relative to perception as the secondary. ... In order to

think of the world as dependent on mind, we have to think of it as consisting only

of a succession of appearances, and in fact, Berkeley, and, at certain times, Kant

did think of it in this way."

2 C/. Principles, etc., passim.

VOL. II. 8

1 1 4 THEOR Y OF KNO IVLEDGE

and do exist whether I know or perceive them or not, it is at

least not prima facie impossible that sense qualities may exist

extramentally in an extramental material substance whether I

perceive the qualities or know the substance or not. Berkeley

contends that the extramental existence of " matter " or " material

substance," a thing which would be neither a perceiving or know

ing reality on the one hand, but an "unthinking," 1 " unper-

ceiving," " senseless substance," 3 nor a mind-dependent,

"perceived" or "known" mental reality 4 on the other hand,

is impossible and self-contradictory. 6 But in the end all his

arguments in support of the contention come to this, that sense

qualities are ideas, that ideas can exist only in a mind, that

they cannot be produced in our minds by an inert, extramental

substance such as matter is supposed to be : " In the very notion

or definition of material substance there is included a manifest

repugnance and inconsistency. . . . That ideas should exist in

what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act,

is repugnant." 6 But if sense qualities are not ideas, and if matter

is not inert but active, the repugnance disappears. Now, Berkeley

simply took over from Descartes and Locke the erroneous notion

of matter as an inert, inactive substance. Such a notion of matter

cannot be defended as objectively valid : matter is active and does

produce in us perceptions of its sense qualities. And furthermore,

Berkeley has nowhere proved that sense qualities can be only

ideas. Of course, if he could prove that, then indeed it would be

contradictory to conceive them as existing in an unperceiving

substance such as matter. What he really does is to identify

and confound perceptions of sense qualities with sense qualities

themselves. 7 We have already referred (121) to the absurdity

of supposing that perceptions of the sense qualities exist in

extramental material things ; or that the sense qualities exist

in the same way in material things, when unperceived by us, as

1 Principles, etc., 24, 86. * Three Dialogues, etc., p. 94.

3 1 bid., 67.

4 The sense qualities being "ideas" in the perceiving mind, the concept of

matter has nothing real corresponding to it : it is nothing extramental ; and intra-

mentally it is not an " idea " distinct from the " ideas " which are the sense qualities.

5 " The absolute [i.e. mind-independent or extramental] existence of unthinking

things [other than " ideas " in a thinking or perceiving mind] are words without a

meaning, or which imply a contradiction." Principles, etc., 24, p. 43.

6 Three Dialogues, etc., p. 94.

7 For this common idealist confusion of the cognition, or cognitive act or pro

cess, with the thing known, cf. PRICHARD, op. cit., pp. 133-4 > supra, * 2r > 122.

BERKELEY S 1MMATERIALISM 115

they appear in the conscious act of perception, if we mean by

this latter expression that when being actually perceived they are

the objects or terms of vital, conscious, cognitive acts of a per

ceiving mind : for of course when unperceived they are not objects

or terms of any conscious act. Sense qualities, however, are not

acts of perception but objects of perception. They are not processes

or states of consciousness or awareness, but terms of awareness,

i.e. objects in which these processes or states cognitively " termin

ate ". Berkeley has failed to bring forward any a posteriori

or experiential ground for the view that these qualities, which

become objects or " intentional " terms of our perceptive acts, are

essentially, and in their own proper reality, mind-dependent

entities or "ideas"; and the only a priori ground of the view

that they must be so, that their esse is per dpi, consists simply in

the gratuitous idealist postulate that the mind cannot " transcend "

itself to become directly aware of anything which has reality

independently of mind. But we have already repeatedly shown

that such an assumption is unwarrantable. The position, then,

is this : Berkeley contends that the esse of sense qualities is their

percipi ; and there are only two conceivable ways of defending

this contention, (l) on the ground that they are realities simply,

and that all reality is essentially percipi ; or (2) on the ground

that they are realities of a special kind, to which actual perception

is essential. But the first line of defence inevitably frustrates all

knowledge of anything beyond the flow of conscious states in

the individual mind, and leads to subjective phenomenism and

agnosticism ; and the second line of defence can be sustained

only by gratuitously confounding objects of cognition with cogni

tions of objects. If all " esse " is " percipi," pan-phenomenism is

the unavoidable consequence; if all " esse " is either "percipi"

(" ideas ") or " percipere " (real " minds " or " spirits "), Berkeley

fails to show how we can attain to a genuine knowledge of these

latter as they really are, and not merely of " perceptions," " ap

pearances," " representations " of them ; and between these two

positions he is constantly wavering.

Thirdly, some of Berkeley s critics have rightly pointed out

that his theory involves the erroneous doctrine of Occasionalism,

at least in its less extreme form : the doctrine, namely, that

there is no efficient causality in the material universe ; * for on his

1 For analysis of Occasionalism, cf. Ontology, 105.

8*

1 1 6 THEOR Y OF KNO WL ED GE

theory this universe is only a system of " ideas " which are but

"symbols" and "occasions" of the activities of created spirits

and the Divine Spirit.

But some of his critics think that his theory cannot be successfully

refuted by any line of argument directly based on analysis of the data of our

experience : that it can be effectively disproved only by an argnmentum ad

hominem showing that the theory is incompatible with the attributes of

Wisdom and Veracity which Berkeley, as a Theist, admits and defends in

the Deity. Thus Maher writes a : " We have never seen any experiential

argument which, strictly speaking, disproves the hypothesis of hyperphysical

Idealism. God, without the intervention of a material world, could potentia

absoluta immediately produce in men s minds states like those which they

experience in the present order. The only demonstrative argument against

the Theistic Immaterialist is, that such a hypothesis is in conflict with the

attribute of veracity which he must ascribe to the Deity. God could not be

the author of such a fraud." And we find, among many scholastic writers,

Jeanniere, for instance, relying on an appeal to the Divine Wisdom and

Veracity against Berkeley.-

Now, of course God could potentia absoluta produce our actual experi

ence without a material universe ; and of course, also, He could not be the

author of such a fraud. But Berkeley s contention is that there is no fraud ;

that the plain man s belief in the absolute existence of a material universe

apart from all perception (if indeed the plain man really entertains such a

belief: for Berkeley contends that it is the imperfect reflection of philosophers,

mistaking mental abstractions and figments for realities, that is responsible for

such belief) can be seen by mature reflection to have been groundless. And

he can, moreover, point out that realist defenders of the tJicory of mediate

perception themselves hold the plain man to be wrong, mistaken, deceived, if

he believes (as he does) that the immediate object of his awareness is external

material reality (since on their theory it is a mental state) ; and that they do

not see in this anything inconsistent with the Divine Wisdom or Veracity. If

then, he might urge, a little further and deeper reflection can convince us (as

he himself contends that it can and ought to convince us) that the proper

inference from these consciously perceived states or objects, which we call

sense qualities, is not to the existence of a (superfluous and self-contradictory)

material reality existing independently of mind, but directly to the existence

of an Eternal, Intelligent, Divine Being, how can this conclusion, which

does not run so much more counter to the supposed common belief of the

plain man than does the position of the representationist, be fairly accused

of derogating from the Divine Wisdom and Veracity, or of making the Divine

Being the author of a fraud, since the illusion of the supposed common

belief is, at all events, in neither case an invincible illusion ? To meet this

retort the realist defenders of mediate perception must show (a) that on this

theory the plain man is not deceived as to what he perceives, but only as to

1 Psychology, p. 109, n. 6.

z Op. cit., pp. 104-3: " Causa impressionum extensionis non est Deus". Cf.

supra, in.

BERKELE VS IMMA TERIALISM \ \ 7

how he perceives, and this not invincibly ; and (b} that on Berkeley s theory

he would be invincibly deceived in regard to the very nature of what he

perceives. It is only by analysis of the experienced facts of perception he

can hope to establish the former point ; and he really cannot establish the

latter except indeed by showing, on other grounds revealed by a similar

analysis, that Berkeley s theory is false. For if the only possible refutation

of the theory lay in the contention that it makes God the author of a de

ception, in other words, if no exception can be taken to, or no defect found

in, the theory itself, i.e. in its interpretation of experienced facts, in its

principles, and its deduction from these principles, then this admitted in

trinsic soundness of the theory would eo ipso prove the plain man s illusion

to be not invincible, and would thereby show that the Divine Veracity is

not really touched by the theory. We prefer, therefore, not to rely on the

argument from the Divine Attributes, but rather to test Berkeley s theory by

facing it with the ultimate facts of consciousness, by examining its interpreta

tion of these, and analysing its assumptions in the light of them.

Fourthly, Berkeley s attempt to reach rational certitude of

the existence of an Eternal, Divine Spirit, from the supposed

essentially mind-dependent nature of the sense qualities, is a

failure; and thus, despite his intentions, his theory points to

wards agnosticism and subjectivism. Beyond the aspects of it

we have just examined there lies this larger issue, which we can

best approach by asking the question: If the material universe is

for each individual perceiving mind simply a system of ideas in

this mind, what becomes of the universe when it is not being

actually perceived by this individual mind ? Here Berkeley has

not, perhaps, made his position as clear as one might desire.

Either there are as many " material " or " sensible " universes as

there are minds, or there is only one " material " universe appre

hended in common, more or less fully from case to case, by all

minds. The first alternative would follow if the -esse of a sense

quality consisted in its perception by the individual mind : there

would be as many similar sense qualities, and similar systems or

"universes" of sense qualities, as distinct individual minds; and

the reality of each such universe would be measured by, and

dependent on, and co- extensive with, the ever-changing actual

content of the individual s consciousness : the general similarity

of the conscious sense experiences of all human minds being the

result of a Divinely established harmony between these minds,

and of the similarity of the " ideas " placed in them by the

Divine agency. In the second alternative the one universe or

system of " ideas " or sense qualities would be contemplated in

1 1 8 THE OR V OF KNO W LEDGE

varying degrees by all created minds, 1 so that when any one

individual mind ceases to be actually and consciously perceptive

the system ceases to exist relatively to it, but not absolutely, for

it is still being perceived by other created minds. In that case

the esse of a sense quality does not consist in its being perceived

by any particular mind : it has, after all, an cssc or reality which

is independent of its being perceived by this or that particular

mind. But whether we adopt the alternative of one sense uni

verse, or as many as there are created minds, the question still

remains: If there were no human mind, or if all human minds

were conceived to be non-existent, to cease to exist, would there

be still a " material " or " sense " universe?

Berkeley says of " all the choir of heaven and furniture of

earth " that " so long as they are not actually perceived by me,

or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit,

they must either have no existence at all, or subsist in the mind

of some Eternal Spirit ". 2 And again, " I conclude, not that

they have no real existence, but that, seeing they depend not on

my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived

by me, there must be some other mind wherein they exist".*

Hence he proves the existence of God to his own satisfaction,

" from the bare existence of the sensible world," in this wise :

" Sensible tilings do really exist ; and, if they really exist, they are

necessarily perceived by an infinite mind: therefore there is an in

finite mind, or God" .^ Now these passages seem to imply the

Ontologism of Malebranche, that "we see all things in God".

Berkeley, however, distinguishing between " ideas " and " arche

types " of ideas, 6 repudiates this ontologistic interpretation of

his position." If, therefore, we accept his disclaimer, he must

mean that the " ideas " which we see are creations according to

1 Does this involve area! difficulty against the distinct individual reality of each

created mind ? When the |; ideas " or sense qualities are said to be " in " each, or

" present to " each, these phrases have, of course, no spatial signification : space is,

for Berkeley, one of the " ideas " or sense qualities. But how one and the same

system of "ideas" could be dependent for its reali -y on its being perceived by

distinct minds is not very clear.

" Principles, etc., 6, p. 32. = Second Dialogue, etc., p. 64.

Ubid., p. 65.

5 " No idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a inind."-

Second Dialogue, etc., p. 66. " These ideas or things perceived by me, either them

selves or their archetypes, exist independently of my mind." Ibid., p. 6S.

fi " Mark it well ; I do not say, 1 see things by perceiving that which represents

them in the intelligible Substance of God." Ibid., p. 69.

BERKELE Y S IMMA TER1ALISM \ \ 9

the Divine Archetypes, that they are created by God, but are by

their nature dependent for their reality on their perception by

created minds. While created minds exist, God, of course,

sees in these minds the created " ideas " which constitute the

"material" or "sensible" universe. Therefore, were created

minds non-existent, or did they cease to exist, this universe

must likewise be non-existent or cease to exist : there would

remain only the possibility of them in the Archetype Ideas in

the Divine Mind, if such a Mind could be proved to exist.

But "from the bare existence of the sensible world," or

system of perceived sense qualities, we cannot infer the existence

of a Divine, Eternal Spirit merely on the ground that if no finite,

human mind existed, the system of sense qualities would continue

to exist (and require a Divine Mind in which to exist) : for if these

are dependent on human minds they cease to exist with the ces

sation of such minds, and we can neither know of, nor speculate

about, any " archetypes " whatsoever, until we have proved other

wise the existence of God. :

But perhaps the desired inference can be made on another and distinct

ground, on the ground, namely, that the system of perceived sense qualities

demands an adequate cause, and that the only adequate cause of them is

the Divine, Eternal, Self-Existent Being ? Undoubtedly ; but such inference

cannot proceed " from the bare existence of the sensible world " directly

to the Divine Being, in the way in which Berkeley has it. From a con

sideration of the nature of the "sensible world," and also of our perceiving

and thinking minds, as contingent, caused, mutable, finite realities, we can

infer the existence of a Necessary, Eternal, Self-Existent First Cause. But

Berkeley s direct inference, by way of causality, " from the bare existence of

the sensible world " to the Divine Being, assumes (i) that the sensible world

is merely a system of ideas or phenomena in our human minds, and (2) that

this system of ideas or phenomena cannot be caused by a universe of extra-

mental, material substances endowed with material qualities, forces, and

energies. But the perceptionist repudiates the former assumption (so that

for him the latter does not arise) ; and the representationist repudiates at

least the latter assumption ; and Berkeley s attempt to vindicate both as

sumptions amounts ultimately to this, that the notion of a reality which is

neither a knowing, perceiving reality ("Mind," "Spirit," essentially "con

scious," "perceptive," "cognitive") or a known, perceived reality (" Idea,"

"essentially mind-dependent," whose very esse or reality is being in, or pre

sent to, and apprehended by, Mind or Spirit) is self-contradictory? Now

l Cf. Ontology, 18, 19.

2 This idealist principle is sometimes called " the principle of immanence ". Cf.

JEANNIERE, op. dt., pp. 444-6.

1 20 THEOR V OF KNO IV LEDGE

this contention, which is at the very basis of all idealism, whether monistic

or theistic, will not stand the test of analysis.

Its plausibility lies in the fact that it is a misconception of a very pro

found truth, the truth, namely, that the whole knowable or intelligible uni

verse which falls within human cognitive experience can be proved to be

de facto dependent, for its reality, and therefore also for its intelligibility, on

an Eternal, Divine Mind. Not that there is anything self-contradictory in

thinking of an unconscious, inanimate, material universe having a real, extra-

mental existence independently of our cognition of it : we can without any

self-contradiction think of such an extrainentally real material universe, just

as we can likewise think of our own minds and other minds really existing

even when they are neither consciously thinking nor being thought of by any

human mind. But, when we reflect on the nature of our minds, and of the

universe of their direct experience, we can prove from the character of these,

as caused and contingent realities, the existence of a Necessary, Self-Existing

Divine Being. Then we can understand not only that their actual reality

depends on Him as Creator and Conservcr, but also that their intelligibility

depends on Him as their Intelligent Exemplar or Prototype. Thus we see

that if there are realities which can and do exist independently of their being

actually perceived or known by human minds, as, for instance, the material

universe, and indeed human minds themselves, and which therefore do not

depend on human minds either for their reality or for their intelligibility,

these realities must have their being from an Intelligent First Cause, in

Whose Mind, therefore, all material (and all created) reality is ideally re

presented in Eternal Divine Exemplars. It is only, however, when we have

thus proved that their contingent actuality implies and depends on the existence

of a Divine Creating Intelligence, that we can see it to be -not, indeed, self-

contradictory, but erroneous to conceive material reality as existing and as

not being known by any mind : for we then know that whether it is actually

perceived or not by human minds it is eternally known by the Divine Mind ;

and, further, that its intelligibility for human minds lies in the fact that both

the material universe and human minds are creatures which, according to the

measure of their finite natures, are intelligible expressions of the Divine

Essence as Exemplar and Prototype of all created or finite reality.

Now idealism may be said to have stumbled accidentally on this truth ;

for the idealist, while grasping the substance of it, wholly misconceives the

way in which the human mind can legitimately attain to it. For the idealist s

contention is that all reality, essentially and as such, involves its being actually

known by some mind, its being an object apprehended by some mind, its

being thus dependent by way of knowledge on some mind : J so that if it be

not considered essential to material reality to be known by, and essentially

dependent on, individual human minds, then there must be some Mind co

existent with it, which knows it : whether we conceive this Mind as immanent

in our minds and their objects, i.e. pantheistically, with Fichte, Schelling,

Hegel, etc., and human minds and material nature as manifestations of it ;

or as transcendent, i.e. theistically, with Berkeley, and finite minds and their

1 " Knower and known form an inseparable unity, and . . . therefore, any

reality which is not itself a knower, or the knowing of a knower, presupposes a

mind which knows it." PRICHARD, op. cit,, p. 116, interpreting Kant s position.

BERKELEY S IMMATERIALISM 121

objects as creations of this Transcendent Divine Mind. In other words,

idealists contend that being real essentially implies being known; and that

this is self-evident : so that if the material universe has a reality indepen

dent of finite human minds, and could have existed before there were any

human minds to perceive it, then there must evidently be a Universal, or

All-embracing, Eternal Mind, Whose knowledge of it is essential to its

reality.

The simple reply to all this is that being real is not evidently synony

mous with being known; that it is not at all self-evident that the former

implies the latter. Rather what is evident in regard to the knowledge which

the human mind has of reality is that this knowledge presupposes the in

dependent reality of its object, i.e. presupposes that the reality which is known

is not dependent for its reality on our knowing it. Even realities which are

dependent for their being on our minds are not dependent for this being on

our minds as knowing them. 1 Next, if there be a Mind other than human

minds, we must conceive Its knowing after the analogy of our own knowing ;

and if it be contended that reality as such is essentially dependent on It, the

essential dependence must be other than that of being known, for the know

ing of such a Mind must likewise, if considered merely as knowing, pre

suppose the known reality as being real independently of its being known ;

nor can the existence of such a Mind be inferred from the not merely gra

tuitous but erroneous assumption that reality, essentially and as such, evi

dently involves being known. The existence of such a Mind must, therefore,

be proved in some other and legitimate way, if at all.

Individual human minds are obviously finite, and the existence of each,

at least, its individual self-conscious existence, has had a beginning. Con

sidering, therefore, the relation of the perceived and known material universe

to those minds, we can see that if the reality of this material universe does not

essentially involve its being known by them, this assertion of science is quite

intelligible : that there was a time when the material universe really existed,

and when human beings or human minds did not as yet exist to perceive or

know it. But the idealist cannot so easily give an intelligible interpretation

of the assertion. Can he intelligibly " talk of a time a long way back in the

process of evolution, when consciousness as yet was not"? 2 " Mr. Spencer

thinks the idealist has no right so to speak, Mr. Sully thinks he has." a Mr.

Balfour also agrees with Spencer in subscribing to " the assertion, that if

idealism is true, then evolution is a dream . For evolution [and physical

science, apart from any theory of evolution] supposes a ... period during

which there was no consciousness in the universe. Such a universe, as an

existence, cannot have been ideal, and cannot be affirmed now by the idealist :

for it would once have been a universe out of all human thought, which Mr.

1 Cf. supra, 101, 102. PRICHARD, op, cit., p. 119 : " We should say that

an act of thinking presupposes a mind which thinks. We should, however, natur

ally deny that an act of thinking or knowing, in "order to be, presupposes that it is

known either by the thinker whose act it is, or by any other mind. In other words,

we should say that knowing presupposes a mind, not as something which knows the

knowing, but as something which does the knowing."

2 RICKABY, First Principles, p. 269. s lb!d.

1 2 2 THE OR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

Bain, on his principles, rightly concludes to be a manifest contradiction ." ]

Such hesitations and uncertainties at least show it to be very far indeed from

self-evident that the existence of a reality, as such, essentially implies either

its being known by human minds, or by some other Mind. The existence

of a material universe antecedently to the existence of human minds, cannot,

of course, be consistently asserted by the idealist unless he holds that besides

human minds there exists some other Mind by which it was then known. a

But, as we saw, he cannot infer the existence of any other Mind "from the

bare existence of the sensible world " through the unproven assumption that,

since it is manifestly not produced by and dependent on individual human

minds, its mere reality implies its being essentially an object of the thought

or knowledge of some other Mind.

Hence he is still face to face merely with the two sets of data, namely,

(i) human minds, and (2) their immediate objects, the material universe. If

he is to infer the existence of an Eternal Mind from them, it is not by con

sidering the mere existence of the material universe as a reality and claiming

that as such it essentially implies being known by such a Mind. It is, rather,

by considering the nature of human minds and material things that we can

prove the existence of a Necessary, Intelligent First Cause. We can, for

instance, argue on the following lines : If the material universe existed ante

cedently to human minds, and if these originated in it, they cannot have

originated from it. Nor can they have been always in it in a potential or

unconscious condition, and have been gradually evolved from it. For they

are realities of a higher order than matter. Hence they must have been

" introduced at some time or other into " the material universe, which is " of

a wholly different order " 3 from them. Human minds and material things

1 RICKABY, First Principles, p. 282.

2 For the individual idealist, time is, of course, like space and the sense qualities,

a mind-dependent entity, or, as Berkeley would describe it, an " idea". But if time

is only an idea placed in human minds by the Divine Spirit, and having its eternal

Exemplar in the Divine Spirit, another problem for Berkeley must be this, Is time

also a real mode of the real existence of human spirits, or does it only affect the

" notion " or " knowledge " we have of them ? And if the latter be the case, as

Berkeley s principles demand, does it not turn out after all that we know minds or

spirits (including our own mind) only as they appear, and not as they really arc?

3 PRiCHARD, op. cit., p. 127. The author rejects such "introduction" as im

possible. Observing that realism implies " not that the existence of the physical

world is prior to the existence of a mind, but only that it is prior to a mind s actual

knowledge of the world " (ibid., p. 128), he himself adopts the view that there must

always have pre-existed, with the physical universe, " a mind or minds " capable of

becoming actually "conscious " or " knowing". "A mind cannot be the product

of anything or, at any rate, of anything but a mind. ... In other words, knowing

implies the ultimate and unoriginated existence of beings possessed of the capacity

to know " (ibid., pp. 127, 128). But the view to which he thus briefly suggests his

adherence is not only less preferable than the doctrine of creation, which he refuses

to consider, but is rationally indefensible and metaphysically impossible. For it

assumes human minds to be uncaused, to have an " ultimate or unoriginated exist

ence," or at least to have been produced by, or evolved from, such uncaused beings

endowed with a "capacity to know"; and this involves the sell-contradictory

notions of (a) beings that would be necessarily existent and uncaused and eternal,

yet finite and imperfect, of (b) -A plurality of such beings, and of (c) the universe

BERKELEY S LMMATERIALISM 123

being, moreover, both alike contingent realities, imply the existence of a

Necessary First Cause, capable of producing them from nothingness, i.e. an

Intelligent, Eternal, Infinite Creator. Thus we see that the universe of mind

and matter, the universe of direct human experience, implies an Eternal

Mind, not formally as knowing, but formally as causing or creating, and con

serving this universe.

Having reached this conclusion, scholastics then see that the universe as

actual has an essential relation of dependence on the Divine Mind as Crea

tive ; and that as intelligible, as possible, it has likewise an essential relation

of dependence on the Divine Mind as Intelligent, i.e. that its being knowable

and actually known, its relation to Mind as knowing, its ontological truth, is

an essential or transcendental attribute of all reality : Omne Ens est Vcrum :

Ens et Verum convertuntur. 1 Hence we find scholastic writers, as for in

stance, Cardinal Zigliara, recognizing, in their criticisms of the monistic ideal

ism of Fichte and Schelling, that these authors are right in maintaining the

essential priority of Mind, though wrong both in the method whereby they

think we attain to knowledge of such a mind and in their interpretation of

the relation of this Mind to the universe of direct human experience. 2

itself as a collection of such beings. But there is a more obvious metaphysical im

possibility in the contention that the grade of actual being or perfection represented

by actually conscious, perceiving and knowing minds, can have been produced by,

or evolved from, and is adequately accounted for by, the lower and less perfect grade

of reality represented by beings supposed to be only capable of, or endowed with

the capacity of, knowing. For the actual is more perfect than the merely potential :

it cannot be adequately explained by the potential : the potential as such cannot

actualize itself: in the real or ontological order the actual must, by metaphysical

necessity, precede the potential. Cf. Ontology, chap, it., especially 9 and 10.

1 Cf. Ontology, 41-2 ; 18-20. The scholastic thesis that " ontological truth,"

or relation, as object, to the Divine Intellect as knowing, is essential to all

reality, presupposes as proved the existence of an Eternal Omniscient Intellect. It

is not directly derivable from the mere consideration of reality as such. " Reality "

is not one of those relative terms which essentially involve in their import and de

finition a relation to something else. Cf. PRICHARD, op. cit., pp. 132-3: " If we

consider what we mean by a reality, we find that we mean by it something that

is not correlative to a mind knowing it. It does not mean something the thought

of which disappears with the thought of a mind actually knowing it, but something

which, though it can be known by a mind, need not be actually known by a mind."

2 C/. ZIGLIARA, Summa Philosophica, ii., Psychologia (27), vii. : " Si quis recte

animadverterit, in exposita doctrina Fichtii latet implicite sed aperte hoc princi-

pium : Omnia quae sunt aut esse possunt in rerum natura continentur necessario

in subjecto cogitante, seu intellectu intelligente, qui proinde non se habet ad intel-

ligibile in tota sua latitudine ut patiens, sed ut forma omnium in ordine intelligi-

bili, ut principium efficiens in ordine reali entium quae ab ipso sunt diversa. Et

hoc principium est verissimum et concedendum est. Non enim concipi possunt ob-

jecta quaecunque realia, ut distincta ab intellectu, nisi antea ponantur existentia in

ordine intelligibili seu ut ideas ; nihil autem potest existere in ordine intelligibili

nisi in intellectu. In quo ergo fallitur Fichte ? In designatione subjecti cogitantis,

seu intellectus praecontinentis et efficientis intelligibilia ; nam ponit ilium intellec-

tum esse rb ego humanum, cum quo simul identificat non-ego, atque proinde panthe-

ismum psycho-egoisticum concludit. In hoc errat vehementer. . . ."

Similarly, criticizing Schilling s theory, he writes (ibid., ix.) : "Videre ex se

lector potest Schellingii principium esse illud ipsum quod in doctrina Fichtii latere

1 24 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

\Ve see, then, that Berkeley fails to establish a reasoned

human certitude of the existence of a Divine, Eternal Spirit from

consideration of the sense qualities as a special kind of reality,

inasmuch as he fails to prove his contention that their extra-

mental existence in a material universe is self-contradictor} .

Secondly, we see that the attempt to establish such certitude by

the contention that reality essentially and as such implies a

knower, that all reality is or implies u percipi" likewise fails,

inasmuch as this also is an unproven postulate so long as the

existence of a Divine, Eternal Mind is not independently estab

lished ; though, of course, when we know otherwise that such a

Mind exists we can see that all finite, created reality is de facto

essentially dependent on that Mind, dependent for its actuality

on that Mind as Creative, and for its intelligibility on that Mind

as Knozving or Intelligent. Finally, when Berkeley contends

that every reality must be either a " Mind " (" knowing," " per-

cipere"} or an "Idea" (" per -dpi" "mind-dependent"), we see

that his explanation of our knowledge of " minds " is no less un

satisfactory than his explanation of the nature of what he calls

" ideas ". For if he were consistent he should hold that our real

and genuine knowledge of " minds," even of our own mind,

reaches not to these minds as they really are in themselves, but

only to " notions " which, as objects of individual awareness, are

at most symbols of unknowable realities lying beyond conscious

ness : which is subjective or phenomenist idealism.

If, however, the distinction be

tween the " potential " and the " actual " reality of sense qualities

in the external domain be understood to mean that in this do

main, and apart from actual perception, some sense qualities, viz.

the proper sensibles, existing only potentially, have a less degree

of external reality, so to speak, than others, viz. the common

sensibles, as existing actually and with a fuller degree of external

reality, the distinction does not seem to .have any real ground

in the facts. For if the proper sensibles are partially relative to

or dependent on a subjective, organic factor, for the specific

characteristics wherewith they are presented in consciousness,

so too are the common sensibles which are unified complexes

of those: and this relativity or dependence can, when normal,

be ignored in the common no less than in the proper sensibles.

If, as perceptionists hold, the specific data of which we be-

io8 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

come directly aware in normal external perception are external

qualities presented through the functioning of the sense organs,

then these qualities, whether primary or secondary, exist in the

same way in this domain independently of actual perception :

if we say that the primary qualities exist "formally" or

" actually " in the external domain apart from perception, so do

the secondary qualities.

If, on the other hand, as representationists hold, the immedi

ate data of external sense awareness are in all cases conscious

impressions or representations produced in us by corresponding

external causes, then if such immediate data be said to exist in

the external domain apart from perception only " causally,"

" virtually," " potentially," when they are secondary qualities, the

immediate data which are primary qualities must also exist in this

way only, and not " formally " or " actually," apart from actual

perception. Jeanniere, for instance, defends the representationist

theory, that the senses do not attain to reality as it is, but only

to its appearances, 1 and that nevertheless we can know things as

they are in themselves so that we can attribute to them predicates

that are really intrinsic to them." But he also holds, and rightly,

as we think, that no distinction should in this respect be made be

tween primary and secondary qualities. And the reasons he gives

are sound : (a) because the grounds for admitting or rejecting

(the external reality of) both classes of qualities are the same ;

(b} because philosophers who reject the secondary qualities gener

ally proceed to reject the primary also ; 3 (c) because (even on

the representationist theory) " impressions " of colour, sound,

taste, smell, etc., demand corresponding external "causes" just

as much as extension, or the "primary" or "common" sense

percepts. The author adds that it is the duty of the epistemolo-

gist merely to show that the secondary qualities are real character

istics of external bodies independently of perception ; that what

these qualities are externally is a question between the cosmolo-

gist and the physical scientist. The same, however, is true of

the primary qualities.

1 " Sensibus attingi res non in se, sed in suis apparentiis " op. cit., p. 417.

211 Posse cognosci res ut sunt in se, ita sc. ut eis tribuere liceat praedicata quae

eis vere sint intrinseca " ibid. Query: How? if the predicates are abstract con

cepts of concrete sense appearances, and if these appearances, being intramental

impressions or representations, are obviously not intrinsic to the external realities ?

Cf. infra, 127.

* Ibid., 125.

BERKELEY S IMMATERIALISM 109

Berkeley s 1 Immaterialism, or Objective (or "Acosmic" or

Hyperphysical] Idealism, is an apt illustration of the tendency, to

deny the external reality of the primary qualities when that of

the secondary qualities has once been rejected. His theory, to

which we have already referred incidentally (V/! 102, ill), has

never failed to win adherents ; but perhaps none of these have

rivalled their master in the ingenuity with which he himself

defended his position and gave it such a peculiar fascination for

reflecting minds. It will be convenient to examine the theory

briefly in the present context.

The qualities perceived by our senses are only mental states

or " ideas ". Sight does not reveal extension to us, but only

colours mentally associated with the extension revealed by the

sense of touch. But extensional qualities are, like those of the

other senses, only mental states. All the sense qualities, primary

and secondary alike, are only mental states. In fact all the ob

jects of our direct awareness must be mental states, and only

mental states : partly imagination images, partly internal feelings

and emotions, and partly "sensations" or "perceptions" or

" ideas of the senses ". Their esse is percipi : they are essentially

mind-dependent entities : it is impossible to prove, and irrational

to believe, that they have or can have any extramental reality,

any being beyond the consciousness of the perceiver. If, then,

the sense qualities or " ideas of the senses " appear in stable, uni

form, clearly differentiated groups or aggregates, to each of which

we give a >name such as "apple," "oak," "rain," "horse,"

" house," " human body, " etc., and all of which make up the

domain of reality which we call the " sensible " or " material "

universe, the principle which groups these qualities into definite

wholes or sense-objects cannot possibly be the supposed extra-

mental, inert, lifeless, unconscious, and unperceiving thing which

philosophers have called " matter " or " material substance " : " 2

1 Berkeley was born in Co. Kilkenny, Ireland, in 1685, and was educated in

Trinity College, Dublin, where he studied the works of Locke and Descartes. He

travelled in Italy and France, visiting Pere Malebranche (in Paris, 1711) with whose

philosophical views he had strong sympathies. The memorable Bermuda project

(1723-31) of converting the American Indians is typical of his deeply philanthropic

character. Later he became Protestant Bishop of Cloyne, where he combined the

study of Plato with practical work for the amelioration of the hard lot of an oppressed

people. He died in 1752. His principal works are the New Theory of Vision (1709),

the Principles of Knowledge (1710), Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

(1713), and Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1731).

2 The influence of the perverted notions of substance expounded by Locke and

Descartes are here plainly noticeable. Cf. Ontology, 61-4.

1 1 o THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

for sense qualities, being mind-dependent ideas, can exist only

in a conscious, perceiving substance, i.e. in a mind or spirit. The

concept of matter is the concept of a mere abstraction ; and to

think of matter as a real, extramental substance or subject of

sense qualities is to think a contradiction in terms. Matter, in

the meaning of an extramental or mind-independent reality or

substance, is a mere figment of the mind s abstraction : no such

reality exists. What is called matter, or the material universe

(including, of course, our own bodies) is simply the system of

sense qualities or phenomena or ideas in individual, conscious,

perceiving minds or spirits : and each of these human minds or

spirits knows of the real existence of other similar minds or spirits,

really distinct from and independent of itself, by inference from

the presence in itself of other idea-aggregates similar to the idea-

aggregate which it has learned to designate as its own " human

body ". But the whole system of ideas in each human mind, and

which each one calls the external world or universe, is a system,

a cosmos, obviously permeated by law, order, regularity, uniform

ity. It clearly demands an explanation, and must have an ade

quate cause. But, just as clearly, it is not caused by the individual

perceiving human mind or spirit ; l and to suppose it to be caused

by an extramental something called " matter," which is a mere

figment and not a reality at all, is manifestly absurd ; therefore

it must be caused or produced or placed in each human mind or

created spirit by the Self-Existent, Divine, Uncreated Spirit, God.

Just as the mental idea-aggregates which we call " human bodies "

are mental symbols which reveal to us the real existence of other

human minds or spirits, so the whole constant, regular, orderly

panorama of ideas which each human mind apprehends as " the

universe " is for each such mind a symbol revealing the real ex

istence of the Divine Spirit. Matter, therefore, does not exist.

Only three orders of reality exist : (i) created spirits or human

minds, (2) the Uncreated Spirit, and (3) ideas caused or created

in human spirits by the Divine Spirit. The system of ideas,

moreover, which constitutes "the universe" for and in each

created spirit is a system of entities which are mere symbols :

their sole function is to teach us all we can infer from them about

our own nature as created spirits, and about God the Uncreated

Spirit. They are not themselves in any way active or operative ;

1 Cf. reasons given in in above.

BERKELEY S IMMATERIALISM in

they are not causes ; causality is an attribute of spirit only, not

of the " ideas " which constitute the " world of sense ".

Such are the broad outlines of Berkeley s philosophy. We

shall offer a brief criticism of the main points.

In the. first place, he fails utterly to give a rational vindication

of his knowledge of, and belief in, the existence of his own mind,

the human mind, as a substance, a spiritual substance : and his

own principles make such vindication impossible, and such be

lief inconsistent, and therefore irrational. For if the "material

substance " which men suppose to be the subject characterized

by sense qualities be an unreal figment of thought because it is

not an object of direct awareness, and having no percipi has there

fore no esse or reality, so apart the "spiritual substance" or

substantial " mind " or " soul " or " spirit " which men suppose

to be the conscious subject of mental images, emotions, feelings,

sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and mental states of all sorts,

is likewise only an unreal figment of thought inasmuch as it also

is not an " idea " l or object of direct awareness, and therefore,

having no percipi, it has no esse or reality. Hence, so far as we can

know, the mind is not a substantial reality, but simply " a heap

or collection of different perceptions united together by certain

relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with

simplicity and identity". 2 Thus, in the pan-phenomenism of

Hume, Berkeley s principles logically lead to an extreme scepti

cism which is the very antithesis of Berkeley s own beliefs and

intentions. 3

Secondly, this issue cannot be avoided by the plea that the

sense qualities imply a subject, no doubt, but, being " ideas " or

" mental " states, require a spiritual or mental substance, 4 though

not a material substance : for on Berkeley s principle that esse is

percipi it can be argued that the supposed " spiritual " substance

is just as extramental as the supposed material substance in the

l Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge (Philosoph. Classics, Kegan Paul, 1907),

p. 116 n.

2 HUME, Works, i., 534, a/wd TURNER, History of Philosophy, p. 520.

3 C/. Three Dialogues, etc. (Philosoph. Classics, Kegan Paul, 1906), p. 96:

"Hylas: . . . inconsequence of your own principles it should follow that you are

only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them " : to which

Berkeley can only reply, in the person of Philonous : " I know or am conscious of

my own being ; and that / myself am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking,

active principle, etc." : which is incompatible with the principle that knowledge is

only of " ideas," that all " esse is percipi ".

4 Cf. Principles^ etc,, 91, p. 83..

1 1 2 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

sense that the former is no more an object of direct awareness, or

has no more " per dpi" than the latter. And this brings us to

inquire what Berkeley can have meant by the contention that esse

\s percipi. 1 It is capable of at least two meanings : (i) that all

the objects of our direct conscious awareness are necessarily mind-

dependent entities or " ideas " 2 ; or (2) that all knowdble realities,

howsoever knowable, whether intuitively or inferentially, and

whether by sense or by intellect, are mind-dependent entities or

" ideas ". Moreover we may ask, in regard to both alternatives,

(a] of what mind is there question ? and (3) do they imply that

the only reality of the objects in question consists in their being

perceived or known by the mind in question, so that by ceasing to

be thus perceived or known they would simply cease to be?

Now if understood in the sense of the first alternative, the

principle, " esse \s per dpi" is recognized as limited, as not being

universal, and as admitting the possibility of our " knowing," and

therefore "becoming aware of" realities which are not mind-

dependent, whose esse does not consist in their percipi, in their

" being known ". Berkeley seems to have held that the indi

vidual mind can and does know the existence of itself* and of

other human minds 4 and of the Divine Mind, and yet that these

1 Cf. supra, loi, 102.

2 I.e. understanding " ideas " in the wide sense in which they include the mental

content of external and internal perceptions or sensations, images of the imagina

tion, emotions, etc.

3 Cf. supra, p. in, n. 3.

4 Cf. Principles, etc., 90, p. 82 : " We comprehend our own existence by inward

feeling or reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have

some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in

a strict sense we have not ideas." (For Berkeley an " idea," in the strict sense,

does not represent anything beyond itself: "ideas" are merely mental objects:

from which, however, interpreted as symbols and effects, we can infer the reality

of the Divine Spirit.) Again he writes (ibid., 140, p. 116) : " In a large sense, indeed

we may be said to have an idea ( or rather a notion, 2nd edit.) of spirit ; that is,

we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny any

thing of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other

spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them [i.e. of

the ideas in other spirits] ; so we know other spirits by means of our own soul

which in that sense is the image or idea of them ; it having a like respect to other

spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas perceived by others."

And again (ibid., 142, p. 118) : " Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different,

that when we say they exist, they are known, or the like, these words must

not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike

or common in them." Cf. also Three Dialogues, etc., p. 92 sqq. (Third Dialogue).

So, then, we have some notion or knowledge of created spirits and the Divine

Spirit, as well as of " ideas ". But it is hard to see, on Berkeley s principles, how

we can have any notion or knowledge of the former unless in so far as they are

BERKELE Y S 1MMA TERIALISM 1 1 3

realities are not mind-dependent, not mere ideas in the individual

mind "knowing" them, that their esse is not merely perdpi.

There are, then, it would appear, besides things (viz. " ideas ")

whose esse or reality \spercipi, other things (viz. " spirits," human

and Divine) whose esse or reality is not perdpi but rather percipere,

i.e. realities which are essentially conscious or cognitive, or, as

Berkeley would say, " spiritual ". If this is so, the principle " esse

is percipi" is accepted not in the universal sense of the second

alternative given above, which would lead to something like

Kant s phenomenism, but in the limited sense in which it applies

only to some knowable objects. But in that case the question

whether the sole reality of any given kind of perceived or known

object, for example, a sense quality, consists in its being per

ceived or known, i.e. the question whether it is essentially a mind-

dependent entity or " idea," cannot be decided by appealing to

the principle, " esse is perdpi" as of universal application, but

must be decided by consideration of the special kind of object in

question, to determine whether the principle applies to it or not. 1

And this in fact is the line taken by Berkeley. With a rare

ingenuity and wealth of subtle reasoning he endeavours to show 2

that the sense qualities are essentially mind-dependent entities

or "ideas," and that the concept of an extramental "material

substance," in which they would be supposed to inhere is self-

contradictory. But he does not succeed. If there are other

realities, viz. " spirits " or "minds," whose being does not consist

in their being actually perceived, but which are extramental or

independent of mind in the sense that their reality persists un

affected by my knowledge or perception of them, and which can

objects of conscious awareness or cognition, i.e. unless in so far as they are " mental

phenomena" or "ideas": any knowledge of what they are beyond this, and in

themselves, seems impossible.

1 Cf. PRICHARD, op. cit., pp. 121-2 : " We can only decide that a particular

reality depends upon the mind by appeal to its special character. We cannot treat

it as a reality the relation of which to the mind is solely that of knowledge. And

we can only decide that all reality is dependent upon mind by appeal to the special

character of all the kinds of reality of which we are aware. Hence, Kant in the

Aesthetic, and Berkeley before him, were essentially right in their procedure. They

both ignored consideration of the world simply as a reality, and appealed exclusively

to its special character, the one arguing that in its special character as spatial and

temporal it presupposed a percipient, and the other endeavouring to show that the

primary qualities are as relative to perception as the secondary. ... In order to

think of the world as dependent on mind, we have to think of it as consisting only

of a succession of appearances, and in fact, Berkeley, and, at certain times, Kant

did think of it in this way."

2 C/. Principles, etc., passim.

VOL. II. 8

1 1 4 THEOR Y OF KNO IVLEDGE

and do exist whether I know or perceive them or not, it is at

least not prima facie impossible that sense qualities may exist

extramentally in an extramental material substance whether I

perceive the qualities or know the substance or not. Berkeley

contends that the extramental existence of " matter " or " material

substance," a thing which would be neither a perceiving or know

ing reality on the one hand, but an "unthinking," 1 " unper-

ceiving," " senseless substance," 3 nor a mind-dependent,

"perceived" or "known" mental reality 4 on the other hand,

is impossible and self-contradictory. 6 But in the end all his

arguments in support of the contention come to this, that sense

qualities are ideas, that ideas can exist only in a mind, that

they cannot be produced in our minds by an inert, extramental

substance such as matter is supposed to be : " In the very notion

or definition of material substance there is included a manifest

repugnance and inconsistency. . . . That ideas should exist in

what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act,

is repugnant." 6 But if sense qualities are not ideas, and if matter

is not inert but active, the repugnance disappears. Now, Berkeley

simply took over from Descartes and Locke the erroneous notion

of matter as an inert, inactive substance. Such a notion of matter

cannot be defended as objectively valid : matter is active and does

produce in us perceptions of its sense qualities. And furthermore,

Berkeley has nowhere proved that sense qualities can be only

ideas. Of course, if he could prove that, then indeed it would be

contradictory to conceive them as existing in an unperceiving

substance such as matter. What he really does is to identify

and confound perceptions of sense qualities with sense qualities

themselves. 7 We have already referred (121) to the absurdity

of supposing that perceptions of the sense qualities exist in

extramental material things ; or that the sense qualities exist

in the same way in material things, when unperceived by us, as

1 Principles, etc., 24, 86. * Three Dialogues, etc., p. 94.

3 1 bid., 67.

4 The sense qualities being "ideas" in the perceiving mind, the concept of

matter has nothing real corresponding to it : it is nothing extramental ; and intra-

mentally it is not an " idea " distinct from the " ideas " which are the sense qualities.

5 " The absolute [i.e. mind-independent or extramental] existence of unthinking

things [other than " ideas " in a thinking or perceiving mind] are words without a

meaning, or which imply a contradiction." Principles, etc., 24, p. 43.

6 Three Dialogues, etc., p. 94.

7 For this common idealist confusion of the cognition, or cognitive act or pro

cess, with the thing known, cf. PRICHARD, op. cit., pp. 133-4 > supra, * 2r > 122.

BERKELEY S 1MMATERIALISM 115

they appear in the conscious act of perception, if we mean by

this latter expression that when being actually perceived they are

the objects or terms of vital, conscious, cognitive acts of a per

ceiving mind : for of course when unperceived they are not objects

or terms of any conscious act. Sense qualities, however, are not

acts of perception but objects of perception. They are not processes

or states of consciousness or awareness, but terms of awareness,

i.e. objects in which these processes or states cognitively " termin

ate ". Berkeley has failed to bring forward any a posteriori

or experiential ground for the view that these qualities, which

become objects or " intentional " terms of our perceptive acts, are

essentially, and in their own proper reality, mind-dependent

entities or "ideas"; and the only a priori ground of the view

that they must be so, that their esse is per dpi, consists simply in

the gratuitous idealist postulate that the mind cannot " transcend "

itself to become directly aware of anything which has reality

independently of mind. But we have already repeatedly shown

that such an assumption is unwarrantable. The position, then,

is this : Berkeley contends that the esse of sense qualities is their

percipi ; and there are only two conceivable ways of defending

this contention, (l) on the ground that they are realities simply,

and that all reality is essentially percipi ; or (2) on the ground

that they are realities of a special kind, to which actual perception

is essential. But the first line of defence inevitably frustrates all

knowledge of anything beyond the flow of conscious states in

the individual mind, and leads to subjective phenomenism and

agnosticism ; and the second line of defence can be sustained

only by gratuitously confounding objects of cognition with cogni

tions of objects. If all " esse " is " percipi," pan-phenomenism is

the unavoidable consequence; if all " esse " is either "percipi"

(" ideas ") or " percipere " (real " minds " or " spirits "), Berkeley

fails to show how we can attain to a genuine knowledge of these

latter as they really are, and not merely of " perceptions," " ap

pearances," " representations " of them ; and between these two

positions he is constantly wavering.

Thirdly, some of Berkeley s critics have rightly pointed out

that his theory involves the erroneous doctrine of Occasionalism,

at least in its less extreme form : the doctrine, namely, that

there is no efficient causality in the material universe ; * for on his

1 For analysis of Occasionalism, cf. Ontology, 105.

8*

1 1 6 THEOR Y OF KNO WL ED GE

theory this universe is only a system of " ideas " which are but

"symbols" and "occasions" of the activities of created spirits

and the Divine Spirit.

But some of his critics think that his theory cannot be successfully

refuted by any line of argument directly based on analysis of the data of our

experience : that it can be effectively disproved only by an argnmentum ad

hominem showing that the theory is incompatible with the attributes of

Wisdom and Veracity which Berkeley, as a Theist, admits and defends in

the Deity. Thus Maher writes a : " We have never seen any experiential

argument which, strictly speaking, disproves the hypothesis of hyperphysical

Idealism. God, without the intervention of a material world, could potentia

absoluta immediately produce in men s minds states like those which they

experience in the present order. The only demonstrative argument against

the Theistic Immaterialist is, that such a hypothesis is in conflict with the

attribute of veracity which he must ascribe to the Deity. God could not be

the author of such a fraud." And we find, among many scholastic writers,

Jeanniere, for instance, relying on an appeal to the Divine Wisdom and

Veracity against Berkeley.-

Now, of course God could potentia absoluta produce our actual experi

ence without a material universe ; and of course, also, He could not be the

author of such a fraud. But Berkeley s contention is that there is no fraud ;

that the plain man s belief in the absolute existence of a material universe

apart from all perception (if indeed the plain man really entertains such a

belief: for Berkeley contends that it is the imperfect reflection of philosophers,

mistaking mental abstractions and figments for realities, that is responsible for

such belief) can be seen by mature reflection to have been groundless. And

he can, moreover, point out that realist defenders of the tJicory of mediate

perception themselves hold the plain man to be wrong, mistaken, deceived, if

he believes (as he does) that the immediate object of his awareness is external

material reality (since on their theory it is a mental state) ; and that they do

not see in this anything inconsistent with the Divine Wisdom or Veracity. If

then, he might urge, a little further and deeper reflection can convince us (as

he himself contends that it can and ought to convince us) that the proper

inference from these consciously perceived states or objects, which we call

sense qualities, is not to the existence of a (superfluous and self-contradictory)

material reality existing independently of mind, but directly to the existence

of an Eternal, Intelligent, Divine Being, how can this conclusion, which

does not run so much more counter to the supposed common belief of the

plain man than does the position of the representationist, be fairly accused

of derogating from the Divine Wisdom and Veracity, or of making the Divine

Being the author of a fraud, since the illusion of the supposed common

belief is, at all events, in neither case an invincible illusion ? To meet this

retort the realist defenders of mediate perception must show (a) that on this

theory the plain man is not deceived as to what he perceives, but only as to

1 Psychology, p. 109, n. 6.

z Op. cit., pp. 104-3: " Causa impressionum extensionis non est Deus". Cf.

supra, in.

BERKELE VS IMMA TERIALISM \ \ 7

how he perceives, and this not invincibly ; and (b} that on Berkeley s theory

he would be invincibly deceived in regard to the very nature of what he

perceives. It is only by analysis of the experienced facts of perception he

can hope to establish the former point ; and he really cannot establish the

latter except indeed by showing, on other grounds revealed by a similar

analysis, that Berkeley s theory is false. For if the only possible refutation

of the theory lay in the contention that it makes God the author of a de

ception, in other words, if no exception can be taken to, or no defect found

in, the theory itself, i.e. in its interpretation of experienced facts, in its

principles, and its deduction from these principles, then this admitted in

trinsic soundness of the theory would eo ipso prove the plain man s illusion

to be not invincible, and would thereby show that the Divine Veracity is

not really touched by the theory. We prefer, therefore, not to rely on the

argument from the Divine Attributes, but rather to test Berkeley s theory by

facing it with the ultimate facts of consciousness, by examining its interpreta

tion of these, and analysing its assumptions in the light of them.

Fourthly, Berkeley s attempt to reach rational certitude of

the existence of an Eternal, Divine Spirit, from the supposed

essentially mind-dependent nature of the sense qualities, is a

failure; and thus, despite his intentions, his theory points to

wards agnosticism and subjectivism. Beyond the aspects of it

we have just examined there lies this larger issue, which we can

best approach by asking the question: If the material universe is

for each individual perceiving mind simply a system of ideas in

this mind, what becomes of the universe when it is not being

actually perceived by this individual mind ? Here Berkeley has

not, perhaps, made his position as clear as one might desire.

Either there are as many " material " or " sensible " universes as

there are minds, or there is only one " material " universe appre

hended in common, more or less fully from case to case, by all

minds. The first alternative would follow if the -esse of a sense

quality consisted in its perception by the individual mind : there

would be as many similar sense qualities, and similar systems or

"universes" of sense qualities, as distinct individual minds; and

the reality of each such universe would be measured by, and

dependent on, and co- extensive with, the ever-changing actual

content of the individual s consciousness : the general similarity

of the conscious sense experiences of all human minds being the

result of a Divinely established harmony between these minds,

and of the similarity of the " ideas " placed in them by the

Divine agency. In the second alternative the one universe or

system of " ideas " or sense qualities would be contemplated in

1 1 8 THE OR V OF KNO W LEDGE

varying degrees by all created minds, 1 so that when any one

individual mind ceases to be actually and consciously perceptive

the system ceases to exist relatively to it, but not absolutely, for

it is still being perceived by other created minds. In that case

the esse of a sense quality does not consist in its being perceived

by any particular mind : it has, after all, an cssc or reality which

is independent of its being perceived by this or that particular

mind. But whether we adopt the alternative of one sense uni

verse, or as many as there are created minds, the question still

remains: If there were no human mind, or if all human minds

were conceived to be non-existent, to cease to exist, would there

be still a " material " or " sense " universe?

Berkeley says of " all the choir of heaven and furniture of

earth " that " so long as they are not actually perceived by me,

or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit,

they must either have no existence at all, or subsist in the mind

of some Eternal Spirit ". 2 And again, " I conclude, not that

they have no real existence, but that, seeing they depend not on

my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived

by me, there must be some other mind wherein they exist".*

Hence he proves the existence of God to his own satisfaction,

" from the bare existence of the sensible world," in this wise :

" Sensible tilings do really exist ; and, if they really exist, they are

necessarily perceived by an infinite mind: therefore there is an in

finite mind, or God" .^ Now these passages seem to imply the

Ontologism of Malebranche, that "we see all things in God".

Berkeley, however, distinguishing between " ideas " and " arche

types " of ideas, 6 repudiates this ontologistic interpretation of

his position." If, therefore, we accept his disclaimer, he must

mean that the " ideas " which we see are creations according to

1 Does this involve area! difficulty against the distinct individual reality of each

created mind ? When the |; ideas " or sense qualities are said to be " in " each, or

" present to " each, these phrases have, of course, no spatial signification : space is,

for Berkeley, one of the " ideas " or sense qualities. But how one and the same

system of "ideas" could be dependent for its reali -y on its being perceived by

distinct minds is not very clear.

" Principles, etc., 6, p. 32. = Second Dialogue, etc., p. 64.

Ubid., p. 65.

5 " No idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a inind."-

Second Dialogue, etc., p. 66. " These ideas or things perceived by me, either them

selves or their archetypes, exist independently of my mind." Ibid., p. 6S.

fi " Mark it well ; I do not say, 1 see things by perceiving that which represents

them in the intelligible Substance of God." Ibid., p. 69.

BERKELE Y S IMMA TER1ALISM \ \ 9

the Divine Archetypes, that they are created by God, but are by

their nature dependent for their reality on their perception by

created minds. While created minds exist, God, of course,

sees in these minds the created " ideas " which constitute the

"material" or "sensible" universe. Therefore, were created

minds non-existent, or did they cease to exist, this universe

must likewise be non-existent or cease to exist : there would

remain only the possibility of them in the Archetype Ideas in

the Divine Mind, if such a Mind could be proved to exist.

But "from the bare existence of the sensible world," or

system of perceived sense qualities, we cannot infer the existence

of a Divine, Eternal Spirit merely on the ground that if no finite,

human mind existed, the system of sense qualities would continue

to exist (and require a Divine Mind in which to exist) : for if these

are dependent on human minds they cease to exist with the ces

sation of such minds, and we can neither know of, nor speculate

about, any " archetypes " whatsoever, until we have proved other

wise the existence of God. :

But perhaps the desired inference can be made on another and distinct

ground, on the ground, namely, that the system of perceived sense qualities

demands an adequate cause, and that the only adequate cause of them is

the Divine, Eternal, Self-Existent Being ? Undoubtedly ; but such inference

cannot proceed " from the bare existence of the sensible world " directly

to the Divine Being, in the way in which Berkeley has it. From a con

sideration of the nature of the "sensible world," and also of our perceiving

and thinking minds, as contingent, caused, mutable, finite realities, we can

infer the existence of a Necessary, Eternal, Self-Existent First Cause. But

Berkeley s direct inference, by way of causality, " from the bare existence of

the sensible world " to the Divine Being, assumes (i) that the sensible world

is merely a system of ideas or phenomena in our human minds, and (2) that

this system of ideas or phenomena cannot be caused by a universe of extra-

mental, material substances endowed with material qualities, forces, and

energies. But the perceptionist repudiates the former assumption (so that

for him the latter does not arise) ; and the representationist repudiates at

least the latter assumption ; and Berkeley s attempt to vindicate both as

sumptions amounts ultimately to this, that the notion of a reality which is

neither a knowing, perceiving reality ("Mind," "Spirit," essentially "con

scious," "perceptive," "cognitive") or a known, perceived reality (" Idea,"

"essentially mind-dependent," whose very esse or reality is being in, or pre

sent to, and apprehended by, Mind or Spirit) is self-contradictory? Now

l Cf. Ontology, 18, 19.

2 This idealist principle is sometimes called " the principle of immanence ". Cf.

JEANNIERE, op. dt., pp. 444-6.

1 20 THEOR V OF KNO IV LEDGE

this contention, which is at the very basis of all idealism, whether monistic

or theistic, will not stand the test of analysis.

Its plausibility lies in the fact that it is a misconception of a very pro

found truth, the truth, namely, that the whole knowable or intelligible uni

verse which falls within human cognitive experience can be proved to be

de facto dependent, for its reality, and therefore also for its intelligibility, on

an Eternal, Divine Mind. Not that there is anything self-contradictory in

thinking of an unconscious, inanimate, material universe having a real, extra-

mental existence independently of our cognition of it : we can without any

self-contradiction think of such an extrainentally real material universe, just

as we can likewise think of our own minds and other minds really existing

even when they are neither consciously thinking nor being thought of by any

human mind. But, when we reflect on the nature of our minds, and of the

universe of their direct experience, we can prove from the character of these,

as caused and contingent realities, the existence of a Necessary, Self-Existing

Divine Being. Then we can understand not only that their actual reality

depends on Him as Creator and Conservcr, but also that their intelligibility

depends on Him as their Intelligent Exemplar or Prototype. Thus we see

that if there are realities which can and do exist independently of their being

actually perceived or known by human minds, as, for instance, the material

universe, and indeed human minds themselves, and which therefore do not

depend on human minds either for their reality or for their intelligibility,

these realities must have their being from an Intelligent First Cause, in

Whose Mind, therefore, all material (and all created) reality is ideally re

presented in Eternal Divine Exemplars. It is only, however, when we have

thus proved that their contingent actuality implies and depends on the existence

of a Divine Creating Intelligence, that we can see it to be -not, indeed, self-

contradictory, but erroneous to conceive material reality as existing and as

not being known by any mind : for we then know that whether it is actually

perceived or not by human minds it is eternally known by the Divine Mind ;

and, further, that its intelligibility for human minds lies in the fact that both

the material universe and human minds are creatures which, according to the

measure of their finite natures, are intelligible expressions of the Divine

Essence as Exemplar and Prototype of all created or finite reality.

Now idealism may be said to have stumbled accidentally on this truth ;

for the idealist, while grasping the substance of it, wholly misconceives the

way in which the human mind can legitimately attain to it. For the idealist s

contention is that all reality, essentially and as such, involves its being actually

known by some mind, its being an object apprehended by some mind, its

being thus dependent by way of knowledge on some mind : J so that if it be

not considered essential to material reality to be known by, and essentially

dependent on, individual human minds, then there must be some Mind co

existent with it, which knows it : whether we conceive this Mind as immanent

in our minds and their objects, i.e. pantheistically, with Fichte, Schelling,

Hegel, etc., and human minds and material nature as manifestations of it ;

or as transcendent, i.e. theistically, with Berkeley, and finite minds and their

1 " Knower and known form an inseparable unity, and . . . therefore, any

reality which is not itself a knower, or the knowing of a knower, presupposes a

mind which knows it." PRICHARD, op. cit,, p. 116, interpreting Kant s position.

BERKELEY S IMMATERIALISM 121

objects as creations of this Transcendent Divine Mind. In other words,

idealists contend that being real essentially implies being known; and that

this is self-evident : so that if the material universe has a reality indepen

dent of finite human minds, and could have existed before there were any

human minds to perceive it, then there must evidently be a Universal, or

All-embracing, Eternal Mind, Whose knowledge of it is essential to its

reality.

The simple reply to all this is that being real is not evidently synony

mous with being known; that it is not at all self-evident that the former

implies the latter. Rather what is evident in regard to the knowledge which

the human mind has of reality is that this knowledge presupposes the in

dependent reality of its object, i.e. presupposes that the reality which is known

is not dependent for its reality on our knowing it. Even realities which are

dependent for their being on our minds are not dependent for this being on

our minds as knowing them. 1 Next, if there be a Mind other than human

minds, we must conceive Its knowing after the analogy of our own knowing ;

and if it be contended that reality as such is essentially dependent on It, the

essential dependence must be other than that of being known, for the know

ing of such a Mind must likewise, if considered merely as knowing, pre

suppose the known reality as being real independently of its being known ;

nor can the existence of such a Mind be inferred from the not merely gra

tuitous but erroneous assumption that reality, essentially and as such, evi

dently involves being known. The existence of such a Mind must, therefore,

be proved in some other and legitimate way, if at all.

Individual human minds are obviously finite, and the existence of each,

at least, its individual self-conscious existence, has had a beginning. Con

sidering, therefore, the relation of the perceived and known material universe

to those minds, we can see that if the reality of this material universe does not

essentially involve its being known by them, this assertion of science is quite

intelligible : that there was a time when the material universe really existed,

and when human beings or human minds did not as yet exist to perceive or

know it. But the idealist cannot so easily give an intelligible interpretation

of the assertion. Can he intelligibly " talk of a time a long way back in the

process of evolution, when consciousness as yet was not"? 2 " Mr. Spencer

thinks the idealist has no right so to speak, Mr. Sully thinks he has." a Mr.

Balfour also agrees with Spencer in subscribing to " the assertion, that if

idealism is true, then evolution is a dream . For evolution [and physical

science, apart from any theory of evolution] supposes a ... period during

which there was no consciousness in the universe. Such a universe, as an

existence, cannot have been ideal, and cannot be affirmed now by the idealist :

for it would once have been a universe out of all human thought, which Mr.

1 Cf. supra, 101, 102. PRICHARD, op, cit., p. 119 : " We should say that

an act of thinking presupposes a mind which thinks. We should, however, natur

ally deny that an act of thinking or knowing, in "order to be, presupposes that it is

known either by the thinker whose act it is, or by any other mind. In other words,

we should say that knowing presupposes a mind, not as something which knows the

knowing, but as something which does the knowing."

2 RICKABY, First Principles, p. 269. s lb!d.

1 2 2 THE OR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

Bain, on his principles, rightly concludes to be a manifest contradiction ." ]

Such hesitations and uncertainties at least show it to be very far indeed from

self-evident that the existence of a reality, as such, essentially implies either

its being known by human minds, or by some other Mind. The existence

of a material universe antecedently to the existence of human minds, cannot,

of course, be consistently asserted by the idealist unless he holds that besides

human minds there exists some other Mind by which it was then known. a

But, as we saw, he cannot infer the existence of any other Mind "from the

bare existence of the sensible world " through the unproven assumption that,

since it is manifestly not produced by and dependent on individual human

minds, its mere reality implies its being essentially an object of the thought

or knowledge of some other Mind.

Hence he is still face to face merely with the two sets of data, namely,

(i) human minds, and (2) their immediate objects, the material universe. If

he is to infer the existence of an Eternal Mind from them, it is not by con

sidering the mere existence of the material universe as a reality and claiming

that as such it essentially implies being known by such a Mind. It is, rather,

by considering the nature of human minds and material things that we can

prove the existence of a Necessary, Intelligent First Cause. We can, for

instance, argue on the following lines : If the material universe existed ante

cedently to human minds, and if these originated in it, they cannot have

originated from it. Nor can they have been always in it in a potential or

unconscious condition, and have been gradually evolved from it. For they

are realities of a higher order than matter. Hence they must have been

" introduced at some time or other into " the material universe, which is " of

a wholly different order " 3 from them. Human minds and material things

1 RICKABY, First Principles, p. 282.

2 For the individual idealist, time is, of course, like space and the sense qualities,

a mind-dependent entity, or, as Berkeley would describe it, an " idea". But if time

is only an idea placed in human minds by the Divine Spirit, and having its eternal

Exemplar in the Divine Spirit, another problem for Berkeley must be this, Is time

also a real mode of the real existence of human spirits, or does it only affect the

" notion " or " knowledge " we have of them ? And if the latter be the case, as

Berkeley s principles demand, does it not turn out after all that we know minds or

spirits (including our own mind) only as they appear, and not as they really arc?

3 PRiCHARD, op. cit., p. 127. The author rejects such "introduction" as im

possible. Observing that realism implies " not that the existence of the physical

world is prior to the existence of a mind, but only that it is prior to a mind s actual

knowledge of the world " (ibid., p. 128), he himself adopts the view that there must

always have pre-existed, with the physical universe, " a mind or minds " capable of

becoming actually "conscious " or " knowing". "A mind cannot be the product

of anything or, at any rate, of anything but a mind. ... In other words, knowing

implies the ultimate and unoriginated existence of beings possessed of the capacity

to know " (ibid., pp. 127, 128). But the view to which he thus briefly suggests his

adherence is not only less preferable than the doctrine of creation, which he refuses

to consider, but is rationally indefensible and metaphysically impossible. For it

assumes human minds to be uncaused, to have an " ultimate or unoriginated exist

ence," or at least to have been produced by, or evolved from, such uncaused beings

endowed with a "capacity to know"; and this involves the sell-contradictory

notions of (a) beings that would be necessarily existent and uncaused and eternal,

yet finite and imperfect, of (b) -A plurality of such beings, and of (c) the universe

BERKELEY S LMMATERIALISM 123

being, moreover, both alike contingent realities, imply the existence of a

Necessary First Cause, capable of producing them from nothingness, i.e. an

Intelligent, Eternal, Infinite Creator. Thus we see that the universe of mind

and matter, the universe of direct human experience, implies an Eternal

Mind, not formally as knowing, but formally as causing or creating, and con

serving this universe.

Having reached this conclusion, scholastics then see that the universe as

actual has an essential relation of dependence on the Divine Mind as Crea

tive ; and that as intelligible, as possible, it has likewise an essential relation

of dependence on the Divine Mind as Intelligent, i.e. that its being knowable

and actually known, its relation to Mind as knowing, its ontological truth, is

an essential or transcendental attribute of all reality : Omne Ens est Vcrum :

Ens et Verum convertuntur. 1 Hence we find scholastic writers, as for in

stance, Cardinal Zigliara, recognizing, in their criticisms of the monistic ideal

ism of Fichte and Schelling, that these authors are right in maintaining the

essential priority of Mind, though wrong both in the method whereby they

think we attain to knowledge of such a mind and in their interpretation of

the relation of this Mind to the universe of direct human experience. 2

itself as a collection of such beings. But there is a more obvious metaphysical im

possibility in the contention that the grade of actual being or perfection represented

by actually conscious, perceiving and knowing minds, can have been produced by,

or evolved from, and is adequately accounted for by, the lower and less perfect grade

of reality represented by beings supposed to be only capable of, or endowed with

the capacity of, knowing. For the actual is more perfect than the merely potential :

it cannot be adequately explained by the potential : the potential as such cannot

actualize itself: in the real or ontological order the actual must, by metaphysical

necessity, precede the potential. Cf. Ontology, chap, it., especially 9 and 10.

1 Cf. Ontology, 41-2 ; 18-20. The scholastic thesis that " ontological truth,"

or relation, as object, to the Divine Intellect as knowing, is essential to all

reality, presupposes as proved the existence of an Eternal Omniscient Intellect. It

is not directly derivable from the mere consideration of reality as such. " Reality "

is not one of those relative terms which essentially involve in their import and de

finition a relation to something else. Cf. PRICHARD, op. cit., pp. 132-3: " If we

consider what we mean by a reality, we find that we mean by it something that

is not correlative to a mind knowing it. It does not mean something the thought

of which disappears with the thought of a mind actually knowing it, but something

which, though it can be known by a mind, need not be actually known by a mind."

2 C/. ZIGLIARA, Summa Philosophica, ii., Psychologia (27), vii. : " Si quis recte

animadverterit, in exposita doctrina Fichtii latet implicite sed aperte hoc princi-

pium : Omnia quae sunt aut esse possunt in rerum natura continentur necessario

in subjecto cogitante, seu intellectu intelligente, qui proinde non se habet ad intel-

ligibile in tota sua latitudine ut patiens, sed ut forma omnium in ordine intelligi-

bili, ut principium efficiens in ordine reali entium quae ab ipso sunt diversa. Et

hoc principium est verissimum et concedendum est. Non enim concipi possunt ob-

jecta quaecunque realia, ut distincta ab intellectu, nisi antea ponantur existentia in

ordine intelligibili seu ut ideas ; nihil autem potest existere in ordine intelligibili

nisi in intellectu. In quo ergo fallitur Fichte ? In designatione subjecti cogitantis,

seu intellectus praecontinentis et efficientis intelligibilia ; nam ponit ilium intellec-

tum esse rb ego humanum, cum quo simul identificat non-ego, atque proinde panthe-

ismum psycho-egoisticum concludit. In hoc errat vehementer. . . ."

Similarly, criticizing Schilling s theory, he writes (ibid., ix.) : "Videre ex se

lector potest Schellingii principium esse illud ipsum quod in doctrina Fichtii latere

1 24 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

\Ve see, then, that Berkeley fails to establish a reasoned

human certitude of the existence of a Divine, Eternal Spirit from

consideration of the sense qualities as a special kind of reality,

inasmuch as he fails to prove his contention that their extra-

mental existence in a material universe is self-contradictor} .

Secondly, we see that the attempt to establish such certitude by

the contention that reality essentially and as such implies a

knower, that all reality is or implies u percipi" likewise fails,

inasmuch as this also is an unproven postulate so long as the

existence of a Divine, Eternal Mind is not independently estab

lished ; though, of course, when we know otherwise that such a

Mind exists we can see that all finite, created reality is de facto

essentially dependent on that Mind, dependent for its actuality

on that Mind as Creative, and for its intelligibility on that Mind

as Knozving or Intelligent. Finally, when Berkeley contends

that every reality must be either a " Mind " (" knowing," " per-

cipere"} or an "Idea" (" per -dpi" "mind-dependent"), we see

that his explanation of our knowledge of " minds " is no less un

satisfactory than his explanation of the nature of what he calls

" ideas ". For if he were consistent he should hold that our real

and genuine knowledge of " minds," even of our own mind,

reaches not to these minds as they really are in themselves, but

only to " notions " which, as objects of individual awareness, are

at most symbols of unknowable realities lying beyond conscious

ness : which is subjective or phenomenist idealism.