LECT.

 From those various applications of the doctrine that

objective evidence is the supreme criterion of truth, and the

ultimate basis of certitude (149-52), there emerge a number of

important considerations which will help the student to appreci

ate the real meaning of the general thesis.

We have described objective evidence generally, whether

mediate or immediate, as consisting in certain real or ontological

exigencies of the datum presenting itself for interpretation to the

intellect. That is to say, in the presented datum taken in its

whole concrete context the intellect sees such nature or features

or characteristics as demand that the datum be represented by

the intellect through the affirmation or negation of some judicial

nexus between concepts. Whether the suggested judgment be

of the ideal order or the existential order, whether it be a judg

ment of science (based on the intrinsic character of the presented

datum : intrinsic evidence) or a judgment of faith (based on

testimony or authority extrinsic to the datum : extrinsic evid

ence), it will be evident if, and only if, the datum is apprehended

as such that it either compels the intellect to form the judgment

or else at least expels all prudent fear of error from the intellect

forming and assenting to the judgment

Hence it appears that the evidence for the judgment is not

really distinct from the reality which the judgment interprets. Nor

is it : it is this reality itself as revealing itself to the intellect ; or,

in other words, it is the ontological truth of this reality. Evid

ence, as a criterion of truth, is not really distinct from the truth

itself of which it is a criterion. Hence to say that evidence is

the criterion of truth is really to say that truth is its own

criterion : and this is in fact the force of the aphorism, Verum

index sui. The test of the truth of the judgment (logical truth),

the test of its conformity with the reality which it represents, is

ultimately this reality itself revealing itself to the mind (ontological

truth) as demanding such representation.

But while this disposes of the difficulty of the diallelus, urged

by Montaigne (39, B) against the possibility of finding any ulti

mate criterion, it seems to involve the equally serious difficulty

VOL. ii. 18

274 THE OR Y OF KNO WL EDGE

that evidence as a test of truth is practical!} useless. For to say

that the ultimate test of the truth of any judgment by which

we interpret or represent a reality is simply the clearness with

which this reality reveals itself as representable (so to speak) by

the judgment, is not this assigning as a test something which

itself needs to be tested ? What appears to be real evidence need

not be real evidence ; what appears to be a real exigency of a given

subject for a certain predicate need not be a real exigency : in a

word, evidence itself seems to need testing, and what we de

siderate is some instrument or means of testing it ; but evidence

itself cannot be this means, and hence cannot be the ultimate

criterion of truth or the ultimate motive of certitude (39, E).

This apparently serious difficulty is based largely on a mis

conception of the claim that is really made for evidence. The

scholastic thesis does not at all imply that evidence is a sort of

open sesame or magic charm lying ever ready at the disposal of

the intellect for the discrimination of true from false judgments.

It is no sort of automatic device which would exempt the intellect

from the task of scrutinizing closely and laboriously its real data,

of comparing, analysing, synthesizing, reflecting on these data,

in order to represent and interpret them faithfully. It is only by

such processes that the intellect can lay bare their real exigencies,

i.e. the grounds or evidence in them for the judgments which will

represent them rightly. " Evidence itself seems to need testing : "

yes, in the sense that appearances need to be scrutinized by

intellect to bring to light their real significance, their real exi

gencies as data for interpretation, and thus to suggest the judg

ments which will really and truly represent the realities which

have such appearances. Intellect is the only "judicial instru

ment " we have for testing appearances, for interpreting the real

significance of the modes in which, and the aspects under which,

the presented reality appears. Whether in doing so it is fallible

or infallible, is an intelligible question: in doing so, in en

deavouring to interpret or represent the given reality through

judicial acts which assert what this reality is or is not, the intel

lect is objectively determined, guided, influenced by the clearness

with which the appearing reality demands such representations,

i.e. by its evidence. But to talk of this evidence itself as being an

infallible test of truth, or infallible motive of assent, is really just

as unmeaning as to talk of the reality itself, or its ontological

truth, as being infallible. It is not really of the evidence, the

TRUTH AND EVIDENCE 275

objective determinant of the logical truth of the judgment, the

objective motive of assent to the judgment, that we can predicate

fallibility or infallibility ; but only of the intellectual faculty in

the process of forming its judgments in conformity with what the

presented reality, in so far as it is apprehended, really demands.

When it is said that " evidence itself needs testing," this may

mean that the presented reality needs to have all its appearances

in their whole concrete context scrutinized by intellect, so as to

determine what real evidence is contained in the "apparent"

evidence or "appearances "; and this, of course, is quite true. 1

Or it may mean that mediate evidence needs to be tested by

assuring ourselves that it is real evidence ; and this is equally

true. To accept a judgment on mediate evidence (intrinsic or

extrinsic), we must have immediate evidence (whether cogent or

reasonably sufficient) that its truth is involved in some other

judgment or judgments ; if these are only mediately evident

their connexion with other judgments must likewise be immedi

ately evident ; and so on till we come to self-evident judgments.

It is in such series of immediate evidences that mediate evidence

consists. Thus it is the intellect that tests and evaluates mediate

evidence, aided by logical canons of interpretation and inference,

canons which are already accepted by the intellect on their own

evidence. We shall examine later the reasons, repeatedly noticed

already, why the intellect is fallible or subject to error in carrying

on this process.

But what about immediate cogent evidence ? Is intellect

infallible in yielding to such evidence and judging reality

according to it ? Or do we really need some other criterion to

satisfy us as to the truth of the judgments to which it compels us

to yield our assent ?

We have already distinguished between immediate sense

evidence for judgments of the existential order, judgments which

interpret the immediate data of sense perception,- and immediate

1 We have already distinguished between the appearance of reality to sense and

its appearance to intellect (125, 128). The latter appearance of course depends on

the former. But intellect can scrutinize, and reflect upon, the sense appearance. It

is only by so doing that intellect can detect in the sense appearance real evidence,

i.e. the intellectual ground for interpreting what the sense datum really is. If the

intellect judges spontaneously, unreflectively, hastily, according to the sense im

pressions, it is of course liable to error.

2 To which we may add the evidence of consciousness for the existence of the

conscious self or Ego (chap. xiii.).

18*

276 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

intellectual evidence for abstract axioms of the ideal order. The

individual human intellect, judging spontaneously according to

immediate sense evidence, may err occasionally and even for the

time unavoidably in its interpretations of individual sense data

(151). But when it reflects on the relativity of sense data to the

perceiver s organic conditions, and to external, spatial conditions

(118); when it adverts to the consequent requirement that the

perception must be normal in order that the spontaneous in

tellectual interpretation be true (119), the individual intellect

has always the power, by such reflection, to avoid or correct mis

takes and so attain to true knowledge. Furthermore, when each

individual learns that there has always prevailed among men a

common, universal, unanimous assent to the spontaneous judg

ments that " an external material universe exists independently

of their minds"; that "it really possesses the qualities revealed

to them through their senses," etc., this observed fact is for each

individual an unquestionable confirmation of the truth of such

elementary, easy, and irresistibly formed spontaneous judgments

(122). In other words, it confirms the trustworthiness of im

mediate sense evidence and establishes as a reasoned certitude

the conviction that the human intellect is infallible in attaining to

the truth embodied in such judgments. We refer, of course, only

to the judgments which assert the broad fact of the mind-inde

pendent existence of the material universe and its qualities ; not

to the unreflecting judgments of "naif dogmatism" concerning

its nature in detail, some of which may be erroneous. And if

doubts are raised, as they have been raised by idealists, concern

ing the real truth-value of men s uniform, spontaneous verdict on

the broad fact itself, we have shown, by establishing the truth of

Realism, that a reasonably careful, cautious and unprejudiced

application of critical, reflective thought can dispel such doubts

as really groundless.

Secondly, we have held that in assenting to abstract axioms

of the ideal order the intellect is determined by immediate,

cogent, objective evidence ; that this is the supreme test of their

truth and the ultimate motive of our assent to them ; and that

intellect is infallible in yielding assent to them on this motive

(44 ; 68, III. ; 152). We have already shown that the objective

terms compared in such axioms are aspects of reality, that they

reveal reality to the mind ; furthermore, that they are simple,

ultimate, unanalysable. If, therefore, it is reality that so reveals

TRUTH AND EVIDENCE 277

itself, then the real or ontological exigencies which such aspects

involve, for the relations of identity or incompatibility expressed

by these axioms, secure eo ipso the truth of the intellectual repre

sentations of the reality through these axioms. For these real

exigencies of the objective terms constitute the real evidence of

the relations established by intellect between them. And this

real evidence is as clearly present to the intellect as the terms

themselves. Either, therefore, the intellect does not apprehend

the terms, i.e. the reality, at all, or it also and eo ipso necessarily

and infallibly represents the reality by apprehending the rela

tions.

 From those various applications of the doctrine that

objective evidence is the supreme criterion of truth, and the

ultimate basis of certitude (149-52), there emerge a number of

important considerations which will help the student to appreci

ate the real meaning of the general thesis.

We have described objective evidence generally, whether

mediate or immediate, as consisting in certain real or ontological

exigencies of the datum presenting itself for interpretation to the

intellect. That is to say, in the presented datum taken in its

whole concrete context the intellect sees such nature or features

or characteristics as demand that the datum be represented by

the intellect through the affirmation or negation of some judicial

nexus between concepts. Whether the suggested judgment be

of the ideal order or the existential order, whether it be a judg

ment of science (based on the intrinsic character of the presented

datum : intrinsic evidence) or a judgment of faith (based on

testimony or authority extrinsic to the datum : extrinsic evid

ence), it will be evident if, and only if, the datum is apprehended

as such that it either compels the intellect to form the judgment

or else at least expels all prudent fear of error from the intellect

forming and assenting to the judgment

Hence it appears that the evidence for the judgment is not

really distinct from the reality which the judgment interprets. Nor

is it : it is this reality itself as revealing itself to the intellect ; or,

in other words, it is the ontological truth of this reality. Evid

ence, as a criterion of truth, is not really distinct from the truth

itself of which it is a criterion. Hence to say that evidence is

the criterion of truth is really to say that truth is its own

criterion : and this is in fact the force of the aphorism, Verum

index sui. The test of the truth of the judgment (logical truth),

the test of its conformity with the reality which it represents, is

ultimately this reality itself revealing itself to the mind (ontological

truth) as demanding such representation.

But while this disposes of the difficulty of the diallelus, urged

by Montaigne (39, B) against the possibility of finding any ulti

mate criterion, it seems to involve the equally serious difficulty

VOL. ii. 18

274 THE OR Y OF KNO WL EDGE

that evidence as a test of truth is practical!} useless. For to say

that the ultimate test of the truth of any judgment by which

we interpret or represent a reality is simply the clearness with

which this reality reveals itself as representable (so to speak) by

the judgment, is not this assigning as a test something which

itself needs to be tested ? What appears to be real evidence need

not be real evidence ; what appears to be a real exigency of a given

subject for a certain predicate need not be a real exigency : in a

word, evidence itself seems to need testing, and what we de

siderate is some instrument or means of testing it ; but evidence

itself cannot be this means, and hence cannot be the ultimate

criterion of truth or the ultimate motive of certitude (39, E).

This apparently serious difficulty is based largely on a mis

conception of the claim that is really made for evidence. The

scholastic thesis does not at all imply that evidence is a sort of

open sesame or magic charm lying ever ready at the disposal of

the intellect for the discrimination of true from false judgments.

It is no sort of automatic device which would exempt the intellect

from the task of scrutinizing closely and laboriously its real data,

of comparing, analysing, synthesizing, reflecting on these data,

in order to represent and interpret them faithfully. It is only by

such processes that the intellect can lay bare their real exigencies,

i.e. the grounds or evidence in them for the judgments which will

represent them rightly. " Evidence itself seems to need testing : "

yes, in the sense that appearances need to be scrutinized by

intellect to bring to light their real significance, their real exi

gencies as data for interpretation, and thus to suggest the judg

ments which will really and truly represent the realities which

have such appearances. Intellect is the only "judicial instru

ment " we have for testing appearances, for interpreting the real

significance of the modes in which, and the aspects under which,

the presented reality appears. Whether in doing so it is fallible

or infallible, is an intelligible question: in doing so, in en

deavouring to interpret or represent the given reality through

judicial acts which assert what this reality is or is not, the intel

lect is objectively determined, guided, influenced by the clearness

with which the appearing reality demands such representations,

i.e. by its evidence. But to talk of this evidence itself as being an

infallible test of truth, or infallible motive of assent, is really just

as unmeaning as to talk of the reality itself, or its ontological

truth, as being infallible. It is not really of the evidence, the

TRUTH AND EVIDENCE 275

objective determinant of the logical truth of the judgment, the

objective motive of assent to the judgment, that we can predicate

fallibility or infallibility ; but only of the intellectual faculty in

the process of forming its judgments in conformity with what the

presented reality, in so far as it is apprehended, really demands.

When it is said that " evidence itself needs testing," this may

mean that the presented reality needs to have all its appearances

in their whole concrete context scrutinized by intellect, so as to

determine what real evidence is contained in the "apparent"

evidence or "appearances "; and this, of course, is quite true. 1

Or it may mean that mediate evidence needs to be tested by

assuring ourselves that it is real evidence ; and this is equally

true. To accept a judgment on mediate evidence (intrinsic or

extrinsic), we must have immediate evidence (whether cogent or

reasonably sufficient) that its truth is involved in some other

judgment or judgments ; if these are only mediately evident

their connexion with other judgments must likewise be immedi

ately evident ; and so on till we come to self-evident judgments.

It is in such series of immediate evidences that mediate evidence

consists. Thus it is the intellect that tests and evaluates mediate

evidence, aided by logical canons of interpretation and inference,

canons which are already accepted by the intellect on their own

evidence. We shall examine later the reasons, repeatedly noticed

already, why the intellect is fallible or subject to error in carrying

on this process.

But what about immediate cogent evidence ? Is intellect

infallible in yielding to such evidence and judging reality

according to it ? Or do we really need some other criterion to

satisfy us as to the truth of the judgments to which it compels us

to yield our assent ?

We have already distinguished between immediate sense

evidence for judgments of the existential order, judgments which

interpret the immediate data of sense perception,- and immediate

1 We have already distinguished between the appearance of reality to sense and

its appearance to intellect (125, 128). The latter appearance of course depends on

the former. But intellect can scrutinize, and reflect upon, the sense appearance. It

is only by so doing that intellect can detect in the sense appearance real evidence,

i.e. the intellectual ground for interpreting what the sense datum really is. If the

intellect judges spontaneously, unreflectively, hastily, according to the sense im

pressions, it is of course liable to error.

2 To which we may add the evidence of consciousness for the existence of the

conscious self or Ego (chap. xiii.).

18*

276 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

intellectual evidence for abstract axioms of the ideal order. The

individual human intellect, judging spontaneously according to

immediate sense evidence, may err occasionally and even for the

time unavoidably in its interpretations of individual sense data

(151). But when it reflects on the relativity of sense data to the

perceiver s organic conditions, and to external, spatial conditions

(118); when it adverts to the consequent requirement that the

perception must be normal in order that the spontaneous in

tellectual interpretation be true (119), the individual intellect

has always the power, by such reflection, to avoid or correct mis

takes and so attain to true knowledge. Furthermore, when each

individual learns that there has always prevailed among men a

common, universal, unanimous assent to the spontaneous judg

ments that " an external material universe exists independently

of their minds"; that "it really possesses the qualities revealed

to them through their senses," etc., this observed fact is for each

individual an unquestionable confirmation of the truth of such

elementary, easy, and irresistibly formed spontaneous judgments

(122). In other words, it confirms the trustworthiness of im

mediate sense evidence and establishes as a reasoned certitude

the conviction that the human intellect is infallible in attaining to

the truth embodied in such judgments. We refer, of course, only

to the judgments which assert the broad fact of the mind-inde

pendent existence of the material universe and its qualities ; not

to the unreflecting judgments of "naif dogmatism" concerning

its nature in detail, some of which may be erroneous. And if

doubts are raised, as they have been raised by idealists, concern

ing the real truth-value of men s uniform, spontaneous verdict on

the broad fact itself, we have shown, by establishing the truth of

Realism, that a reasonably careful, cautious and unprejudiced

application of critical, reflective thought can dispel such doubts

as really groundless.

Secondly, we have held that in assenting to abstract axioms

of the ideal order the intellect is determined by immediate,

cogent, objective evidence ; that this is the supreme test of their

truth and the ultimate motive of our assent to them ; and that

intellect is infallible in yielding assent to them on this motive

(44 ; 68, III. ; 152). We have already shown that the objective

terms compared in such axioms are aspects of reality, that they

reveal reality to the mind ; furthermore, that they are simple,

ultimate, unanalysable. If, therefore, it is reality that so reveals

TRUTH AND EVIDENCE 277

itself, then the real or ontological exigencies which such aspects

involve, for the relations of identity or incompatibility expressed

by these axioms, secure eo ipso the truth of the intellectual repre

sentations of the reality through these axioms. For these real

exigencies of the objective terms constitute the real evidence of

the relations established by intellect between them. And this

real evidence is as clearly present to the intellect as the terms

themselves. Either, therefore, the intellect does not apprehend

the terms, i.e. the reality, at all, or it also and eo ipso necessarily

and infallibly represents the reality by apprehending the rela

tions.