QUALITIES.

 That all the sense qualities alike are extramental,

that the proper sensibles no less than the common sensibles (115)

are real characteristics of a domain of reality which exists inde

pendently of the perceiver s mind, a domain which he apprehends

as "material reality" and distinguishes into two parts, viz. the

"external universe" and "his own body or material organism,"

we consider to be as certain as the already established extra-

mental existence of this material domain itself. Of this domain

he becomes aware by becoming aware of the sense qualities. If

these are not really in it and do not really characterize it, how

can he be certain even of its extramental existence ? And if

they are not extramentally real how can they be in an extra-

mental reality or characterize it or reveal it to him ?

But when they appear to him in actual perception as affect

ing the external or extra-organic or non-self domain of reality, can

he be sure that they are really in this domain notwithstanding

the fact that for the specific determinations with which they are

presented to his consciousness they are partially dependent on

the subjective or self factor which is his own organism ? The

answer is that he can, provided that this organic, subjective or

self factor is normal : and this he can determine with certitude

by experience. He attributes the particular taste, or smell, or

colour, or sound, or temperature, or texture and resistance, to

the datum which he apprehends as external. He is right in doing

so provided he knows, as he can know by comparison of his ex

periences with those of other perceivers, that the sense organ

through the function of which the particular quality is reported

to him is normal. For then he knows that the determining in

fluence of the sense organ on the presented sense quality is a

104

REALITY OF SENSE QUALITIES VINDICATED 105

normal, uniform influence essentially involved in all perception,

affecting in the same way for all normal perceivers the externality

of the external sense quality in its presentation to consciousness,

and therefore in no way falsifying the judgments by which he

pronounces the various normally perceived sense qualities and

their differences to be in the external domain of reality, to be

real determinations of this domain, and to be properly and form

ally predicable of it. When, for instance, the normal perceiver

apprehends snow as white, and spontaneously asserts that " snow

is white," he means not that the colour-quality in question is

wholly independent of the nature, structure, and conditions of

his visual sense organs for its specific character as present to his

consciousness ; nor that the external or extra-organic element of

the whole presented datum, considered apart from actual percep

tion, is the same as this element //iw the organic element in the

whole concrete datum as presented per modum unius in actual

perception ; but that, abstracting from the normal and uniform

subjective or organic element, the external or extra-organic

element which he calls " whiteness" and which is what he means

by "whiteness" is really in the snow whether he perceives it or

not, is immediately apprehended by him in actual perception,

and, being external to and independent of him, is in no way

altered by his actual perception of it. He understands " white

ness," therefore, to be a quality, not of the actual perception as

a psychic or conscious process ; nor of the perception as an organic,

brain and nerve process ; nor of the psychic or conscious modifica

tion, or the organic, brain and nerve modification, resulting from

either process ; nor of the specific element contributed by the

brain, nerves, and visual organs to the total presented datum ; *

1 There is a school of writers who, with M0LLER (1801-58), make all qualita

tive differences in sense data depend exclusively on the different " specific energies "

resulting from variety of nature and structure in the sense organs (cf. JEANNIERE,

op. cit., pp. 415, 427-8). According to these the external reality, in itself homo

geneous, is subjectively discriminated by virtue of its being apprehended through

differently constructed and differently functioning sense organs : it is apprehended

by the eye as colour, by the ear as sound, by the sense of temperature as heat, etc.

No doubt, the proximate and partial reason why the data, e.g. of the eye and the

ear, are consciously different, is because these sense organs differ in structure and

function. But this is only a partial reason, and, in so far as it operates uniformly,

should be taken for granted, and should be understood to leave unaltered and un

affected the specifying influence of the external, extra-organic elements of the pre

sented data. It is these that ultimately determine the consciously perceived variety

in our sense data ; it is these that are denoted by the names of the various sense

qualities, and not any condition or energy of the sense organs ; without these the

1 06 TflEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGR

but of the external or extra-organic element specifically determined

by the nature of the external reality itself and immediately pre

sented to consciousness in actual perception.

And what thus applies to " whiteness " applies in its proper

measure to all the sense qualities. The names of the various

proper or secondary sense qualities, of colours, sounds, tastes,

smells, tactual and temperature qualities, are not names of

mental states, or of organic states, conditions or qualities, of the

perceiver : they are names of qualities of external or extra-

organic bodies. 1 But Aristotle, St. Thomas, and the scholastics

generally, while holding that these qualities are really in ex

ternal bodies independently of our actual perception of them,

realized the necessity of distinguishing between the unperceived

reality of these qualities, and the characters which their reality

assumes in our actual perception of them : between these qualities

in actu (e v evepyeia) and in potentia (ev Swa/iei). 2 In the untasted

sugar there is real sweetness but not the sensation or perception or

taste of sweetness, or actually perceived sweetness; in the unseen

snow there is real whiteness but not the vision of whiteness, or actu

ally perceived whiteness ; in the unheard tempest there is real

sound* but not the hearing** or actual sensation or perception of

sound ; in the unsmelt violet there is real perfume but not the actual

smell or perception of the perfume ; and so on. In other words,

if we understand the name of the sense quality to denote this

quality as actually perceived, and thereby to connote as part of its

meaning the actual conscious perception process or state itself,

then of course the quality so named cannot be in the unperceived

external domain actually (inasmuch as the sensation or percep

tion process is absent from the unperceived domain) ; but never

theless the unperceived quality is really there, and we can say it

is there potentially or virtually, meaning thereby, not that the

specific structures and energies of the latter would be unintelligible ; nor can any

useful purpose be served by transferring the spontaneously judged " external " sense

qualities to the perceiver s own organism, and wresting the recognized meaning of

the names of the various sense qualities so as to make these names signify states or

conditions of the perceiver s organism : any more than by making them signify con

scious or mental "ideas "or "representations". Cf. supra, 121, p. 101 ; infra,

124.

1 And, of course, of the organism itself as an object of sense perception.

- Cf. MAHER, op. cit., pp. 153, 159-61.

3 "sowMS," " sonatio " ARISTOII.K, De Aiiima, L. III., lect. 2; ST. THOMAS,

Conitn. de Anima, in loc. apud MAHHR, op. cit., p. 160, n.

4 " auditus," " uuditio," ibid.

REALITY OF SENSE QUALITIES VINDICATED 107

quality is any less really there when unperceived than when per

ceived, but that as unperceived it is a potential or virtual percept

or term of a conscious perceptive process ; in other words, that it is

a reality capable of being perceived though not actually per

ceived. This is the perfectly intelligible sense in which, as

explained above (121), we can say that sense qualities are not

in external bodies " formally " or " in the way in which they

are perceived " : apart from actual perception they are in those

bodies "as unperceived," or "virtually" or "potentially," not

as actual but as potential " percepts " or terms of conscious per

ception.

However, although the ambiguity which prevails as to the

proper application of the names of the secondary sense qualities

calls for this distinction in the interests of clearness, it is never

theless true that in ordinary usage these names are understood to

denote qualities really in external bodies independently of actual

perception ;, and even when reflection has convinced us that the

external qualities are partially influenced in their actual presenta

tion, by the structure and condition of the perceiver s sense

organs, to appear as they do, we see no sufficient reason in this

for including the subjective, organic element (when normal and

uniform) in the meaning of the names whereby we designate the

external or extra-organic qualities.

 That all the sense qualities alike are extramental,

that the proper sensibles no less than the common sensibles (115)

are real characteristics of a domain of reality which exists inde

pendently of the perceiver s mind, a domain which he apprehends

as "material reality" and distinguishes into two parts, viz. the

"external universe" and "his own body or material organism,"

we consider to be as certain as the already established extra-

mental existence of this material domain itself. Of this domain

he becomes aware by becoming aware of the sense qualities. If

these are not really in it and do not really characterize it, how

can he be certain even of its extramental existence ? And if

they are not extramentally real how can they be in an extra-

mental reality or characterize it or reveal it to him ?

But when they appear to him in actual perception as affect

ing the external or extra-organic or non-self domain of reality, can

he be sure that they are really in this domain notwithstanding

the fact that for the specific determinations with which they are

presented to his consciousness they are partially dependent on

the subjective or self factor which is his own organism ? The

answer is that he can, provided that this organic, subjective or

self factor is normal : and this he can determine with certitude

by experience. He attributes the particular taste, or smell, or

colour, or sound, or temperature, or texture and resistance, to

the datum which he apprehends as external. He is right in doing

so provided he knows, as he can know by comparison of his ex

periences with those of other perceivers, that the sense organ

through the function of which the particular quality is reported

to him is normal. For then he knows that the determining in

fluence of the sense organ on the presented sense quality is a

104

REALITY OF SENSE QUALITIES VINDICATED 105

normal, uniform influence essentially involved in all perception,

affecting in the same way for all normal perceivers the externality

of the external sense quality in its presentation to consciousness,

and therefore in no way falsifying the judgments by which he

pronounces the various normally perceived sense qualities and

their differences to be in the external domain of reality, to be

real determinations of this domain, and to be properly and form

ally predicable of it. When, for instance, the normal perceiver

apprehends snow as white, and spontaneously asserts that " snow

is white," he means not that the colour-quality in question is

wholly independent of the nature, structure, and conditions of

his visual sense organs for its specific character as present to his

consciousness ; nor that the external or extra-organic element of

the whole presented datum, considered apart from actual percep

tion, is the same as this element //iw the organic element in the

whole concrete datum as presented per modum unius in actual

perception ; but that, abstracting from the normal and uniform

subjective or organic element, the external or extra-organic

element which he calls " whiteness" and which is what he means

by "whiteness" is really in the snow whether he perceives it or

not, is immediately apprehended by him in actual perception,

and, being external to and independent of him, is in no way

altered by his actual perception of it. He understands " white

ness," therefore, to be a quality, not of the actual perception as

a psychic or conscious process ; nor of the perception as an organic,

brain and nerve process ; nor of the psychic or conscious modifica

tion, or the organic, brain and nerve modification, resulting from

either process ; nor of the specific element contributed by the

brain, nerves, and visual organs to the total presented datum ; *

1 There is a school of writers who, with M0LLER (1801-58), make all qualita

tive differences in sense data depend exclusively on the different " specific energies "

resulting from variety of nature and structure in the sense organs (cf. JEANNIERE,

op. cit., pp. 415, 427-8). According to these the external reality, in itself homo

geneous, is subjectively discriminated by virtue of its being apprehended through

differently constructed and differently functioning sense organs : it is apprehended

by the eye as colour, by the ear as sound, by the sense of temperature as heat, etc.

No doubt, the proximate and partial reason why the data, e.g. of the eye and the

ear, are consciously different, is because these sense organs differ in structure and

function. But this is only a partial reason, and, in so far as it operates uniformly,

should be taken for granted, and should be understood to leave unaltered and un

affected the specifying influence of the external, extra-organic elements of the pre

sented data. It is these that ultimately determine the consciously perceived variety

in our sense data ; it is these that are denoted by the names of the various sense

qualities, and not any condition or energy of the sense organs ; without these the

1 06 TflEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGR

but of the external or extra-organic element specifically determined

by the nature of the external reality itself and immediately pre

sented to consciousness in actual perception.

And what thus applies to " whiteness " applies in its proper

measure to all the sense qualities. The names of the various

proper or secondary sense qualities, of colours, sounds, tastes,

smells, tactual and temperature qualities, are not names of

mental states, or of organic states, conditions or qualities, of the

perceiver : they are names of qualities of external or extra-

organic bodies. 1 But Aristotle, St. Thomas, and the scholastics

generally, while holding that these qualities are really in ex

ternal bodies independently of our actual perception of them,

realized the necessity of distinguishing between the unperceived

reality of these qualities, and the characters which their reality

assumes in our actual perception of them : between these qualities

in actu (e v evepyeia) and in potentia (ev Swa/iei). 2 In the untasted

sugar there is real sweetness but not the sensation or perception or

taste of sweetness, or actually perceived sweetness; in the unseen

snow there is real whiteness but not the vision of whiteness, or actu

ally perceived whiteness ; in the unheard tempest there is real

sound* but not the hearing** or actual sensation or perception of

sound ; in the unsmelt violet there is real perfume but not the actual

smell or perception of the perfume ; and so on. In other words,

if we understand the name of the sense quality to denote this

quality as actually perceived, and thereby to connote as part of its

meaning the actual conscious perception process or state itself,

then of course the quality so named cannot be in the unperceived

external domain actually (inasmuch as the sensation or percep

tion process is absent from the unperceived domain) ; but never

theless the unperceived quality is really there, and we can say it

is there potentially or virtually, meaning thereby, not that the

specific structures and energies of the latter would be unintelligible ; nor can any

useful purpose be served by transferring the spontaneously judged " external " sense

qualities to the perceiver s own organism, and wresting the recognized meaning of

the names of the various sense qualities so as to make these names signify states or

conditions of the perceiver s organism : any more than by making them signify con

scious or mental "ideas "or "representations". Cf. supra, 121, p. 101 ; infra,

124.

1 And, of course, of the organism itself as an object of sense perception.

- Cf. MAHER, op. cit., pp. 153, 159-61.

3 "sowMS," " sonatio " ARISTOII.K, De Aiiima, L. III., lect. 2; ST. THOMAS,

Conitn. de Anima, in loc. apud MAHHR, op. cit., p. 160, n.

4 " auditus," " uuditio," ibid.

REALITY OF SENSE QUALITIES VINDICATED 107

quality is any less really there when unperceived than when per

ceived, but that as unperceived it is a potential or virtual percept

or term of a conscious perceptive process ; in other words, that it is

a reality capable of being perceived though not actually per

ceived. This is the perfectly intelligible sense in which, as

explained above (121), we can say that sense qualities are not

in external bodies " formally " or " in the way in which they

are perceived " : apart from actual perception they are in those

bodies "as unperceived," or "virtually" or "potentially," not

as actual but as potential " percepts " or terms of conscious per

ception.

However, although the ambiguity which prevails as to the

proper application of the names of the secondary sense qualities

calls for this distinction in the interests of clearness, it is never

theless true that in ordinary usage these names are understood to

denote qualities really in external bodies independently of actual

perception ;, and even when reflection has convinced us that the

external qualities are partially influenced in their actual presenta

tion, by the structure and condition of the perceiver s sense

organs, to appear as they do, we see no sufficient reason in this

for including the subjective, organic element (when normal and

uniform) in the meaning of the names whereby we designate the

external or extra-organic qualities.