PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY.

The question how we pass from

a reasoned intellectual conviction of the real existence of the

Ego (which has been already vindicated against Kant 1 ) to a

similar conviction concerning the existence of a material

universe really distinct from and independent of the Ego (or

of a material universe including the individual perceiver s own

body, distinct from and independent of the latter s own mind),

and the question whether the latter conviction (which exists

in all men spontaneously) can be rationally justified, and, if so,

how? is it by reasoning from the implications of the former

conviction ? or by showing that the real existence of an external

material universe is as immediately evident to the knowing

subject (in and through external sense perception) as his own

real existence is evident to him in and through all his conscious

processes? these are questions which can be answered only by

1 Cf. vol. i., 77, 89; supra, s 97, 99, 100.

EXTRAMENTAL REALITY. EXTERNAL UNIVERSE 25

the closest scrutiny of our cognitive processes, both intellectual

and sentient, of their respective data, and of the implications of

these data.

Nor do those who defend as rationally justifiable men s

spontaneous conviction that they have knowledge of the exist

ence and nature of a material universe really distinct from and

independent of their own minds, justify this conviction on the

same lines. For some of them, holding that the really existing

Ego is not merely the first but the only reality directly and

immediately apprehended and known by the individual mind

as real, and convinced that the immediate data of external

sense perception, the data characterized by "extensity" and

"externality," can be themselves only intramental states of

the Ego, justify our belief in the mind-independent existence

and reality of an external material universe by interpreting

those data of external sense perception as representing, and

essentially involving the existence of, such a universe beyond and

distinct from the Ego. In their view the transition from know

ledge of the real Ego to knowledge of the universe as a reality

other than and distinct from the Ego, while grounded in external

sense perception, is effected and justified only by thought. They

effect the transition by the following line of argument :

It is by intellect, by thought, that we apprehend, in and through the

data of consciousness, the self as really existing, and judge the self to be an

existing reality. It is through and from these data (all of which are within

the domain of the Ego) that we form the concepts of substance and accident,

subject and states, permanence and change, agent and action, cause and

effect, unity and plurality, identity and distinction, the possible and the actual,

essence and existence, being and knowing, etc., and find the objects of these

concepts verified in the Ego. Reflecting on the judgments we form by means

of these and other derivative concepts, we find that these judgments are

objectively grounded (chap, viii.) in the nature of the conceived objects, and

that the conceived objects themselves represent what is given (chap, ix.) in

the concrete, individual data of consciousness. In the concrete Ego, there

fore, including its whole conscious content, our thought apprehends the exist

ence, and in some measure the nature, of reality. Among the intuitions

it has of the nature of reality are the principles of identity, contradiction,

sufficient reason, causality, etc. The first three of those enumerated, the Ego

sees to be of necessary and universal application to whatever really is,

the fourth to whatever really becomes or happens (64, 66, 93). Reflecting, in

the light of this latter principle, on the conscious data of external sense

perception, data which men spontaneously judge to be external to, and

other than, and independent of, the perceiving Ego (because of their peculiar

feature of "externality"), but which cannot themselves be really anything

26 TIJEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

other than the Ego variously affected, we rationally infer, by the principle

of causality, that those data, so characterized by the feature of "external

reference," must have an adequate cause ; that this adequate cause cannot be

the Ego; that they are therefore partially caused by an extramental reality

beyond the Ego, i iz. the material universe represented by those data of

external sense perception or sense consciousness.

It is obvious, these philosophers point out, that if there be a reality beyond

and distinct from the Ego, this reality, in order to be known, must be some

how really related to the Ego, must be cognitivcly identified with the Ego,

must be somehow (" intentionaliter") reproduced in the Ego. 1 This union

is originated in sense perception or sense consciousness. But the objects

given in external sense perception, its data, are not identically the reality or

realities beyond the Ego, but are only products of the former in the latter,

products which are likewise representations or appearances of the former in

the latter. So that, although we may be said, by and in sense perception,

virtually to effect the transition from Ego to -non-Ego by becoming aware of

appearances of the latter in the Ego, and by means of this awareness perceiv

ing (though not directly and immediately apprehending) the non-Ego (for to

perceive " " pcr-capere " is to apprehend something through, or by means

of, something else) ; nevertheless, since perception merely makes us aware of

an appearing datum, and does not interpret its nature, or judge of its origin,

or distinguish Ego from non-Ego, it is thought alone, judging, interpreting,

reasoning on and from those data, that formally and by deliberate reflection

effects the transition from knowledge of the Ego to knowledge of a real non-

Ego or external universe. And while thus justifying, through the aid of the

rational principle of causality, our spontaneous conviction that we have

genuine knowledge of the existence and nature of a real, material universe

beyond consciousness and distinct from the Ego, our reason at the same time

corrects the erroneous spontaneous conviction of what is called "naif" real

ism, the conviction, namely, that external sense perception reveals directly

and immediately to the Ego what sort that material universe is in itself, in

stead of merely revealing, as it merely does, the various representations or

appearances produced by that material universe in the consciousness of the

Ego.

The question how we pass from

a reasoned intellectual conviction of the real existence of the

Ego (which has been already vindicated against Kant 1 ) to a

similar conviction concerning the existence of a material

universe really distinct from and independent of the Ego (or

of a material universe including the individual perceiver s own

body, distinct from and independent of the latter s own mind),

and the question whether the latter conviction (which exists

in all men spontaneously) can be rationally justified, and, if so,

how? is it by reasoning from the implications of the former

conviction ? or by showing that the real existence of an external

material universe is as immediately evident to the knowing

subject (in and through external sense perception) as his own

real existence is evident to him in and through all his conscious

processes? these are questions which can be answered only by

1 Cf. vol. i., 77, 89; supra, s 97, 99, 100.

EXTRAMENTAL REALITY. EXTERNAL UNIVERSE 25

the closest scrutiny of our cognitive processes, both intellectual

and sentient, of their respective data, and of the implications of

these data.

Nor do those who defend as rationally justifiable men s

spontaneous conviction that they have knowledge of the exist

ence and nature of a material universe really distinct from and

independent of their own minds, justify this conviction on the

same lines. For some of them, holding that the really existing

Ego is not merely the first but the only reality directly and

immediately apprehended and known by the individual mind

as real, and convinced that the immediate data of external

sense perception, the data characterized by "extensity" and

"externality," can be themselves only intramental states of

the Ego, justify our belief in the mind-independent existence

and reality of an external material universe by interpreting

those data of external sense perception as representing, and

essentially involving the existence of, such a universe beyond and

distinct from the Ego. In their view the transition from know

ledge of the real Ego to knowledge of the universe as a reality

other than and distinct from the Ego, while grounded in external

sense perception, is effected and justified only by thought. They

effect the transition by the following line of argument :

It is by intellect, by thought, that we apprehend, in and through the

data of consciousness, the self as really existing, and judge the self to be an

existing reality. It is through and from these data (all of which are within

the domain of the Ego) that we form the concepts of substance and accident,

subject and states, permanence and change, agent and action, cause and

effect, unity and plurality, identity and distinction, the possible and the actual,

essence and existence, being and knowing, etc., and find the objects of these

concepts verified in the Ego. Reflecting on the judgments we form by means

of these and other derivative concepts, we find that these judgments are

objectively grounded (chap, viii.) in the nature of the conceived objects, and

that the conceived objects themselves represent what is given (chap, ix.) in

the concrete, individual data of consciousness. In the concrete Ego, there

fore, including its whole conscious content, our thought apprehends the exist

ence, and in some measure the nature, of reality. Among the intuitions

it has of the nature of reality are the principles of identity, contradiction,

sufficient reason, causality, etc. The first three of those enumerated, the Ego

sees to be of necessary and universal application to whatever really is,

the fourth to whatever really becomes or happens (64, 66, 93). Reflecting, in

the light of this latter principle, on the conscious data of external sense

perception, data which men spontaneously judge to be external to, and

other than, and independent of, the perceiving Ego (because of their peculiar

feature of "externality"), but which cannot themselves be really anything

26 TIJEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

other than the Ego variously affected, we rationally infer, by the principle

of causality, that those data, so characterized by the feature of "external

reference," must have an adequate cause ; that this adequate cause cannot be

the Ego; that they are therefore partially caused by an extramental reality

beyond the Ego, i iz. the material universe represented by those data of

external sense perception or sense consciousness.

It is obvious, these philosophers point out, that if there be a reality beyond

and distinct from the Ego, this reality, in order to be known, must be some

how really related to the Ego, must be cognitivcly identified with the Ego,

must be somehow (" intentionaliter") reproduced in the Ego. 1 This union

is originated in sense perception or sense consciousness. But the objects

given in external sense perception, its data, are not identically the reality or

realities beyond the Ego, but are only products of the former in the latter,

products which are likewise representations or appearances of the former in

the latter. So that, although we may be said, by and in sense perception,

virtually to effect the transition from Ego to -non-Ego by becoming aware of

appearances of the latter in the Ego, and by means of this awareness perceiv

ing (though not directly and immediately apprehending) the non-Ego (for to

perceive " " pcr-capere " is to apprehend something through, or by means

of, something else) ; nevertheless, since perception merely makes us aware of

an appearing datum, and does not interpret its nature, or judge of its origin,

or distinguish Ego from non-Ego, it is thought alone, judging, interpreting,

reasoning on and from those data, that formally and by deliberate reflection

effects the transition from knowledge of the Ego to knowledge of a real non-

Ego or external universe. And while thus justifying, through the aid of the

rational principle of causality, our spontaneous conviction that we have

genuine knowledge of the existence and nature of a real, material universe

beyond consciousness and distinct from the Ego, our reason at the same time

corrects the erroneous spontaneous conviction of what is called "naif" real

ism, the conviction, namely, that external sense perception reveals directly

and immediately to the Ego what sort that material universe is in itself, in

stead of merely revealing, as it merely does, the various representations or

appearances produced by that material universe in the consciousness of the

Ego.