98. MEMORY, SELF-IDENTITY, AND TIME DURATION.

Memory is described by psychologists as the faculty of conserving

and recalling events experienced in the past ; of recognizing them

as past, and locating them more or less definitely in the time

series of experienced events. Like consciousness, it is distin

guished into sensitive, and intellectual or rational, according to

the nature of the events or objects recalled. The distinction is

of minor importance for epistemology, inasmuch as in man

memory is always accompanied by intellectual activity, interpret

ing the recalled data, of whatsoever kind these may be. And we

include in memory, as understood here, this faculty of forming

immediate judgments or interpretations of these data. Many of

the truths brought to light by the psychology of memory, which

is both extensive and interesting, have only a remote bearing on

epistemology. But some of the facts and implications of memory,

especially those which bear on our apprehension of time and

of the self or Ego, are of the first importance in a general

theory of knowledge.

The process of remembering is itself a conscious process, a

1 It has been pointed out already (18) that " consciousness " is the name of

a state or condition of a conscious subject : it is not really " consciousness" that

apprehends anything : it is " I, the conscious subject," who apprehends by conscious

ness. We must not hypostasize "consciousness" any more than intellect or

reason.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND MEMORY \\

datum or fact of consciousness. It differs from consciousness in

this that while the latter reports its facts or objects as here and

now actually present, the former reports its objects as having

been experienced, or present to consciousness, in the past. In

other words, the act of memory brings into consciousness an

object or datum marked by a characteristic which is altogether

peculiar and sui generis, a characteristic which we interpret intel

lectually as indicating a datum or object experienced before, a feel

ing of familiarity * whereby we recognize the present content of

consciousness as being, in part at least, the reproduction or repeti

tion of a/<z.sY or previous content of consciousness. 2 And inasmuch

as memory reproduces in the concrete the past act as it occurred

in the concrete, it is clear that just as consciousness reveals the

subject as affected by the present conscious states, so, too,

memory reveals the same subject as affected both by the past and

by the present conscious states. The possibility of thus becom

ing aware of conscious data endowed with this quality of being

"remembered" acts, clearly involves that the subject of such

" reproduced " and " recognized " conscious acts apprehends itself

as having a real existence extended through time-duration, and

as remaining or abiding permanently self-identical throughout

all the changes which such time duration implies. 3 Just as we

immediately judge or interpret the direct data of consciousness to

imply the real existence, here and now, of an actual substantial

subject of the conscious states, so we immediately judge or inter

pret the direct data of memory to imply the reality of the succes

sion and change in conscious states, the reality and abiding

self-identity of the Ego or subject of those successive states,

and the real objectivity of our concept of time as the mode of

duration of the real existence of the ever-changing real data of

our conscious, cognitive experience.

Obviously there can be no question of demonstrating the

general trustworthiness of memory, in the strict sense of the

term demonstration. For every single step in the process of

demonstration, from premiss to premiss, and from antecedent

to consequent or conclusion, implies and rests upon the assumed

1 This is analogous to the feeling of externality which characterizes the data of

external sense perceptions. C/. 97, p. 9, n. 2.

2 For distinction between actually perceived, and merely imagined, and re

membered data, cf. LAHR, Cours de philosophie, p. 132, apud JEANNIERE, op. cit.,

p. 370 n.

a C/. Ontology, 74, 75, 85, 86.

1 2 THE OR Y OF KNO WLED GE

trustworthiness of memory. There can be question only ot

reflecting on the concrete data of memory, and on our immedi

ate intellectual interpretations of those data, and convincing our

selves that intellect, which we have already shown (chaps, viii.,

ix.) to be capable of attaining to objective reality through its

concepts and judgments, has adequate and cogent objective

evidence for the immediate judgments it forms, from those

data, concerning the real existence of an abiding Ego, sub

stantially self-identical throughout its really changing states,

and the reality of time-duration as a .real mode of existence of

these states, their subject, and their contents.

Memory is described by psychologists as the faculty of conserving

and recalling events experienced in the past ; of recognizing them

as past, and locating them more or less definitely in the time

series of experienced events. Like consciousness, it is distin

guished into sensitive, and intellectual or rational, according to

the nature of the events or objects recalled. The distinction is

of minor importance for epistemology, inasmuch as in man

memory is always accompanied by intellectual activity, interpret

ing the recalled data, of whatsoever kind these may be. And we

include in memory, as understood here, this faculty of forming

immediate judgments or interpretations of these data. Many of

the truths brought to light by the psychology of memory, which

is both extensive and interesting, have only a remote bearing on

epistemology. But some of the facts and implications of memory,

especially those which bear on our apprehension of time and

of the self or Ego, are of the first importance in a general

theory of knowledge.

The process of remembering is itself a conscious process, a

1 It has been pointed out already (18) that " consciousness " is the name of

a state or condition of a conscious subject : it is not really " consciousness" that

apprehends anything : it is " I, the conscious subject," who apprehends by conscious

ness. We must not hypostasize "consciousness" any more than intellect or

reason.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND MEMORY \\

datum or fact of consciousness. It differs from consciousness in

this that while the latter reports its facts or objects as here and

now actually present, the former reports its objects as having

been experienced, or present to consciousness, in the past. In

other words, the act of memory brings into consciousness an

object or datum marked by a characteristic which is altogether

peculiar and sui generis, a characteristic which we interpret intel

lectually as indicating a datum or object experienced before, a feel

ing of familiarity * whereby we recognize the present content of

consciousness as being, in part at least, the reproduction or repeti

tion of a/<z.sY or previous content of consciousness. 2 And inasmuch

as memory reproduces in the concrete the past act as it occurred

in the concrete, it is clear that just as consciousness reveals the

subject as affected by the present conscious states, so, too,

memory reveals the same subject as affected both by the past and

by the present conscious states. The possibility of thus becom

ing aware of conscious data endowed with this quality of being

"remembered" acts, clearly involves that the subject of such

" reproduced " and " recognized " conscious acts apprehends itself

as having a real existence extended through time-duration, and

as remaining or abiding permanently self-identical throughout

all the changes which such time duration implies. 3 Just as we

immediately judge or interpret the direct data of consciousness to

imply the real existence, here and now, of an actual substantial

subject of the conscious states, so we immediately judge or inter

pret the direct data of memory to imply the reality of the succes

sion and change in conscious states, the reality and abiding

self-identity of the Ego or subject of those successive states,

and the real objectivity of our concept of time as the mode of

duration of the real existence of the ever-changing real data of

our conscious, cognitive experience.

Obviously there can be no question of demonstrating the

general trustworthiness of memory, in the strict sense of the

term demonstration. For every single step in the process of

demonstration, from premiss to premiss, and from antecedent

to consequent or conclusion, implies and rests upon the assumed

1 This is analogous to the feeling of externality which characterizes the data of

external sense perceptions. C/. 97, p. 9, n. 2.

2 For distinction between actually perceived, and merely imagined, and re

membered data, cf. LAHR, Cours de philosophie, p. 132, apud JEANNIERE, op. cit.,

p. 370 n.

a C/. Ontology, 74, 75, 85, 86.

1 2 THE OR Y OF KNO WLED GE

trustworthiness of memory. There can be question only ot

reflecting on the concrete data of memory, and on our immedi

ate intellectual interpretations of those data, and convincing our

selves that intellect, which we have already shown (chaps, viii.,

ix.) to be capable of attaining to objective reality through its

concepts and judgments, has adequate and cogent objective

evidence for the immediate judgments it forms, from those

data, concerning the real existence of an abiding Ego, sub

stantially self-identical throughout its really changing states,

and the reality of time-duration as a .real mode of existence of

these states, their subject, and their contents.