IDEALISM AGAINST THIS BELIEF.

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Before confirming this con

clusion by appeal to the principle of causality (103), or attempt

ing other conclusions which will raise certain difficulties in detail,

we may here examine briefly one broad difficulty against the

argument by which we have reached the conclusion just formu

lated.

How can a datum of conscious perception or awareness be

really external to or really other than the conscious self or sub

ject? If there be such a reality, a reality which has an existence

or esse beyond, outside, independent of, and apart from percep

tion, apart from what has presence or esse in consciousness, is it

not clearly impossible for the conscious, sentient self to perceive,

or become conscious or aware of, such independent esse or

existence? All that we become aware of must be present in

consciousness, and we can become aware of it only in so far as it

is present in consciousness. To speak, therefore, of perceiving

or becoming aware of any existence, or thing existing, outside

and beyond and independently of consciousness, is a contradiction

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 47

in terms. Whether or not the only " esse" of "things" is their

" percipi" at all events their only perceivable or knowable "esse"

is their perceived " esse," i.e. the " esse" which they have in and

for the consciousness of the perceiver : and whatever this " per

ceived being " is, it certainly appertains to the perceiver ; it is

certainly something in and of and for the perceiver ; and it cer

tainly is not a "being" or "esse" beyond and distinct from and

independent of the perceiver. This latter sort of being, if there

be such, must be by its very terms unperceivable and unknow

able. Therefore the concretely felt feature of " externality " or

"otherness" in certain sense data must be itself something in

the perceiver, and cannot prove those data to be really other

than, and independent of, the perceiver.

Idealists, both " subjective " and " objective," ring the changes

on this objection indefinitely. 1 It is at the root of the idealist

theory of the relativity of all knowledge, according to which the

object of knowledge is necessarily immanent in the knowing sub

ject, and the latter cannot possibly become aware or cognizant

of any reality transcending the conscious self or subject. We have

met it more than once already (17, 19, 35, 75, 101). It rests

partly on a confusion and partly on a gratuitous assumption.

When we say that we perceive a datum which is really ex

ternal to and other than the self, we do not mean that this datum,

when being perceived, stands out of all relation to the perceiver.

To say so would indeed be a contradiction in terms. 2 The

datum must be cognitively related to, or cognitively one with,

the perceiver (20). If there be a reality external to, and in

dependent of, the perceiver, then in order to be perceived it

must become cognitively present to, or one with, the perceiver.

It is therefore a misconception of the realist s position to re

present this as involving the contention that a thing can be

perceived out of all relation to the perceiver, or known out of all

relation to the knower, or, in other words, that we can perceive

an unperceived thing or know an unknown thing. This would

indeed be a contradiction ; " but there is no contradiction or

absurdity in the proposition A material world of three dimen

sions has existed for a time unperceived and unthought of by

1 C/. infra, 123; MAKER, op. cit., pp. in, 157-9; PRICHARD, op. cit., pp.

115-18, 125 ; JEANNIERE, op. cit., pp. 444-6.

2 Cf. MAKER, op. cit:., p. 158, n. 26.

48 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

any created being, and then revealed itself to human minds ". 1

And this is the veritable attitude of the realist.

The condition that the external or non-self reality, in order

to be perceived, must become cognitively present to, or one with,

the perceiving self, obviously renders not the reality itself, but the

perception of the reality, dependent on and relative to the per-

ceiver. That such an external, non-self reality can reveal itself,

or become present, to the perceiving self, has never yet been

disproved : and we hope to indicate later how we may conceive

this revelation to take place (cf. 75). But we do not hope to

show thereby how the fact of conscious cognition takes place.

For the fact of any conscious being becoming aware of anything,

or perceiving or knowing anything, whether this perceived or

known thing be the reality of the perceiver or a reality other

than the perceiver, is an absolutely ultimate and unanalysable

fact which must be simply accepted as such and which cannot

possibly be " explained," or resolved into any terms or stated

in any terms which do not themselves involve and assume the

fact which they are purporting to explain. 2

This brings us to the gratuitous assumption which, in addi

tion to the misconception of the realist s position, is involved in

the objection we are considering : the assumption, namely, that

whatever is an object of awareness or cognition 3 must be im

manent in the conscious subject in the sense of being a determina

tion of the latter as conscious, in the sense that its reality must

be mind-dependent or a manifestation of the conscious subject,

and cannot be anything transcending, or existing beyond and

independently of, the latter. Thus understood, the assumption

appears to be a misconception of the true principle that whatever

is perceived or known in any way, whatever is an object of aware

ness, must be in cognitive relation or union with the perceiver or

knower, as an apprehended object of the conscious, cognitive

subject. This is universally true : and it is just as true of the

reality of the knower (as object of self-cognition) as it is of reality

1 MAHER, op. cit., p. in, n. 7. Cf. MERCIER, op. cit., 148, p. 405.

5 C/. PRICHARD, op. cit., p. 124.

8 To hold that the direct and immediate objects or data of conscious sense aware

ness or cognition are cntitatively immanent in the Ego as percipient subject, but that

they represent realities other than the Ego, so that the latter can mediately or in-

ferentially perceive the non-Ego (106, 108), and can through objectively and really

valid concepts attain to a reasoned intellectual knowledge of a real, external universe

(103-5), this position is of course not idealism, but a form of critical realism.

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 49

other than the knower (19, 20). But to say that a reality, in

order to be known, must be relative to, or dependent on, the know

ing subject in this sense, is to say not that the reality itself, bu 1

its becoming known, its becoming present to the knower, its actuat

cognition by the knower, is dependent on the knower : that in

order to be known the reality must be actually related to the

knower by becoming cognitively present to and cognitively one

with the latter. Now this is very different from saying that a

reality, in order to be known, must be relative to the knower in

the sense that the reality itself, and not merely its presence to

the knower or its cognition by the knower, must be immanent in,

and dependent on, and determined by, and therefore in ultimate

analysis be partially identical with, and be a partial phase or mani

festation of, the identical reality which is the knower. This

latter is the position of the subjective idealist. As we have

pointed out already (101) it seems to spring from the latent

assumption that there is some special and peculiar difficulty in

conceiving how any being can become aware of reality other than

itself, which is not encountered when we contemplate the possi

bility of a being becoming aware of the reality which is itself.

But reflection will show this latent assumption to be groundless ;

for after all, the identity of a being with itself throws no light on

the ultimate how and why of the fact of conscious cognition or

awareness. The question, How can a being become aware of the

reality which is itself, or become the known object of itself as

conscious subject ? is just as unanswerable as the question, How

can a being become aware of reality other than itself? (19).

For the general question, How can a being become aware of

anything? brings us up against a fact which we must simply

accept as ultimate and unanalysable.

To the observation that a stick or a stone or a tree or a plant is identical

with itself, and yet not therefore aware of itself, so that identity throws no

light on the fact of cognition (19), the subjective idealist would probably

reply (a) that perhaps these things are, for all we know, aware of themselves ;

and (b) that from our present (epistemological) standpoint, inquiring as we

are into the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, we must start with

the conscious events of the individual mind, and therefore do not yet know

whether such things as a stick, or a stone, etc., are substantive and indepen

dent realities, and consequently cannot put them on the same level as the

conscious Ego, or reason about them as we may about the latter, when

exploring the conditions involved in awareness : wherefore it is idle to take

such things as these, which are supposed to be exclusively objects of aware-

VOL. II. 4

50 THEOR Y OF KNO IVLEDGE

ness, as helping us in any way to determine the conditions of the possibility

of this peculiar phenomenon or fact of awareness in a reality (such as the

conscious Ego} which is known to be subject as well as object of aware

ness.

In reply to (a), which the idealist urges merely as a defensive tactic, we

need only observe that at least until such philosophical theories as panlog-

ism or idealistic monism, which maintain consciousness or cognition to be

essential to all reality, are proved, it is certainly the more reasonable course

to accept as true the spontaneous conviction of mankind that such things as

sticks and stones, trees and plants, are not endowed with consciousness or

awareness.

It is, however, the second line of reasoning, (l>), that reveals the real

position of the idealist, and it is interesting to see whither it leads him. For

if the idealist really starts, as he professes to start, merely with the conscious

current or series of objects of awareness, and with no assumption whatsoever,

except, perhaps, that of a hypothetical subject aware of such objects, then we

have a right to ask him with what sort of "being" or "esse" he conceives

this hypothetical subject to be endowed. If he says that the only "being"

or "esse" he can legitimately ascribe to anything is the "being" or "esse"

which consists in " percipi" in " being perceived " in " being object of

awareness," then he cannot endow his hypothetical conscious subject or Ego

with anyjbeing other than this, i.e. the "perceived being" of the intermittent

current of objects of awareness ; and so he has not yet gained any legitimate

knowledge of the conscious subject or Ego as a real, substantial, permanent,

abiding being, with an " esse " or existence that is real in the sense of being

other than and independent of the "perceived being" or "per cipi" of

objects of awareness : the only "conscious subject " or Ego to which he has

attained is the ever-changing, intermittent flow of " perceived " or " percept "-

entities ; and this does not help him. Such is the nihilistic impasse of the

" logical idealism " of Remade and Weber, to which Kant s subjectivism, and

indeed all subjectivisms, ultimately lead. 1

If, on the other hand, our idealist ascribes to his hypothetical "conscious

subject " or Ego a being which as to its. own reality is beyond and indepen

dent of the intermittent modes of " perceived being " which he supposes it to

assume as object of its own awareness, then after all he is recognizing the

possibility of a being having real existence independent of the " presence " or

" perceived being " which it may also acquire by becoming an object of

awareness. And if he accords such an absolute or mind-independent mode

of existence to the reality which he thinks of as the conscious subject or Ego,

is he not eo ipso claiming for himself the power of " transcending " the

" conscious presence " or " perceived being," and attaining to the " absolute "

or "mind-independent " being, of a reality, -viz. the reality which is the Ego,

no less than the realist does when he claims for the mind the power of

" transcending " the " conscious presence " and attaining to the " absolute "

or "mind-independent" being of a reality, viz. the reality which is the non-

Ego?

l Cf. JEANNIERE, op. cit., p. 447; MERCiER, op. cit., 147-8; Ortgines de

la Psychologic contemporaine, chap. v.

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 51

Nevertheless idealists cling to their postulate that the mind

can know only what is " relative " to it in the sense of being

mind-dependent, as if this were a self-evident axiom ; and they

try to make it plausible by confounding it with the really self-

evident truth that whatever is known by the mind must be "in "

the mind or " relative " to the mind in the sense of being cog-

nitively related or present to the mind. It is only in virtue of

such a confusion that they can confront realism with the specious

difficulty we have been examining. The worthlessness of such

a line of argument is clearly exposed by Prichard in the following

passage : *

" At first sight it seems a refutation of the plain man s view to argue thus :

The plain man believes the spatial world to exist whether any one knows it

or not. Consequently, he allows the world is outside the mind. But to be

known a reality must be inside the mind. Therefore the plain man s view

renders knowledge impossible. But as soon as it is realized that inside the

mind and outside the mind are metaphors, and, therefore, must take their

meaning from the context, it is easy to see that the argument either rests on

an equivocation or assumes the point at issue. The assertion that the world

is outside the mind, being only a metaphorical expression of the plain man s

view, should only mean that the world is something independent of the mind,

as opposed to something inside the mind, in the sense of dependent upon it,

or mental. But the assertion that to be known, a reality must be inside the

mind, if it is to be incontestably true, should only mean that a reality, to

be apprehended, must really be object of apprehension. And in this case

being inside the mind, since it only means being object of apprehension,

is not the opposite of being outside the mind in the previous assertion.

Hence, on this interpretation the second assertion is connected with the first

only apparently and by an equivocation ; there is really no argument at all.

If, however, the equivocation is to be avoided, inside the mind in the

second assertion must be the opposite of outside the mind in the first, and

consequently the second must mean that a reality, to be known, must be de

pendent on the mind, or mental. But in this case the objection to the plain

man s view is a petitio principii, and not an argument."