MINANT OF "EXTERNAL" SENSE QUALITIES.

When we have

justified our certitude regarding the real existence of an external,

extended, material universe ; and of an extended, material organ

ism or body which, though an object of perception, is felt and

known to be subjectively allied with the conscious principle, and

identical with the perceiving subject ; and when, finally, it is

realized that the perception of qualitatively distinct and mutually

irreducible sense data or objects is inseparably allied with, and

absolutely dependent on, the functioning of the distinct bodily

organs called "sense organs," the important bearing of these

latter on the character of our insight into the qualities and nature

of the external material universe, and the peculiar role of the

individual perceiver s body as the medium and connecting link

between the individual mind or consciousness on the one hand

and the "external" universe on the other, ought to be at once

apparent. For on the one>hand since the universe perceived as

external is really external to and other than the perceiver, and

since the latter is not always actually perceiving it, his percep

tions of it must be determined in him by the active influence of

this external universe on his mind or consciousness (112). But

on the other hand, the medium through which this influence is

conveyed to the perceiver s mind or consciousness, viz. his own

body, with its brain and nervous system and definitely differenti

ated "external" sense organs, is itself an extended, material

reality, and is therefore itself endowed with whatever sense

qualities we may find ourselves justified in attributing to matter

as existing in the external universe independently of our actual

perception of them. And furthermore, the specifically distinct

and mutually irreducible qualities which we consciously appre

hend through the functioning of the various "external" sense

89

90 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

organs present themselves as they do in consciousness de-

pendently on the specific structure and functioning of those

sense organs. That is to say, if our consciously apprehended

sense data are not determined as to their qualities, or quoad

specificationem, by the self as conscious, or by the mind or con

scious principle of the perceiver, or by any subconscious factors

of the perceiver s mind, and all this we take as already duly

established ; if these qualitative differences, therefore, are in the

presented data or objects, and are therefore determined, not by

consciousness, but for consciousness, it is nevertheless clear on

the other hand that these qualities and qualitative differences are

not in the external universe, and determined by the latter, to the

total exclusion of the perceiver s sense organs, or in total independ

ence of these. For, manifestly, whatever e.g. " redness " may be

in the external universe, it can be what it actually is as present

to sense consciousness only because it is presented to sense con

sciousness by the sense organ we call the eye ; nor could the

sentient subject become aware of it at all in the total absence of

this organ and its functioning. Nor, whatever "sound" may be

as a real property of the external material universe, could he

ever become aware of sound, or have this datum or object pre

sented to consciousness, without the organ and function of hear

ing. And even if "sound" and "colour" are different, as they

exist in the external universe independently of his actual per

ception of them, at all events the proximate reason why he

apprehends them as different, and a conditio sine qua non for his

perception of them as different, is that they are brought into

cognitive union with his consciousness through differently con

structed and differently functioning bodily sense organs, viz. the

ears and the eyes. And the same is true of the other " proper

sensibles," or proper objects of the other external senses, those

of taste, smell, temperature, passive touch, impenetrability or

resistance to muscular effort, and organic states or conditions.

Furthermore, since the perceived qualities of extended,

material, external things are perceived dependency on the

functioning of the perceiver s own extended, material, or bodily

sense organs, since their perception is conditioned by the latter,

these qualities will be determined to be what they are as pre

sented in the concrete to the perceiver, not alone by the actual

material conditions of the "external things" themselves, but

also by the actual material conditions of the sense organs

RELATIVITY OF SENSE QUALITIES TO PERCEIVER 91

through which the external data are made present to the con

scious perceiver. Thus, to take a few familiar examples, if the

perceiver s own hand is cold he will experience the water into

which he plunges it as "warm," whereas if his hand be hot he

will experience the same water as " cold ". If his palate be in

its normal physiological condition he will experience the taste of

sugar as " sweet," whereas if through illness it be in an abnormal

or diseased condition he may experience the taste of sugar as

" bitter ". If his eyes be in a normal condition he will see the

colour of a field of poppies as "red," whereas if his eyes happen

to be affected with that not very uncommon condition known as

"colour-blindness" or "Daltonism," he will see it as "grey" or

" green" ; or, if he press the corner of one eye with the finger,

he will see two objects where normally he would see only one.

Again, in certain conditions of the brain and nervous system and

sense organs, conditions which occur very commonly during

sleep, or during feverish illness, he may apprehend what he spon

taneously judges to be external things, but what as a matter

of fact are mere mental images resulting from the activity of

the imagination : such erroneous interpretations of imagination-

images as real (external) percepts, occurring in dreams, fevers,

delirium tremens, and all conditions of insanity, being known

as hallucinations. Or he may think that what he perceives in

the fog is a policeman when it is only a lamp-post : such errone

ous interpretations of real (external) perceptions being known as

illusions}

When we have

justified our certitude regarding the real existence of an external,

extended, material universe ; and of an extended, material organ

ism or body which, though an object of perception, is felt and

known to be subjectively allied with the conscious principle, and

identical with the perceiving subject ; and when, finally, it is

realized that the perception of qualitatively distinct and mutually

irreducible sense data or objects is inseparably allied with, and

absolutely dependent on, the functioning of the distinct bodily

organs called "sense organs," the important bearing of these

latter on the character of our insight into the qualities and nature

of the external material universe, and the peculiar role of the

individual perceiver s body as the medium and connecting link

between the individual mind or consciousness on the one hand

and the "external" universe on the other, ought to be at once

apparent. For on the one>hand since the universe perceived as

external is really external to and other than the perceiver, and

since the latter is not always actually perceiving it, his percep

tions of it must be determined in him by the active influence of

this external universe on his mind or consciousness (112). But

on the other hand, the medium through which this influence is

conveyed to the perceiver s mind or consciousness, viz. his own

body, with its brain and nervous system and definitely differenti

ated "external" sense organs, is itself an extended, material

reality, and is therefore itself endowed with whatever sense

qualities we may find ourselves justified in attributing to matter

as existing in the external universe independently of our actual

perception of them. And furthermore, the specifically distinct

and mutually irreducible qualities which we consciously appre

hend through the functioning of the various "external" sense

89

90 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

organs present themselves as they do in consciousness de-

pendently on the specific structure and functioning of those

sense organs. That is to say, if our consciously apprehended

sense data are not determined as to their qualities, or quoad

specificationem, by the self as conscious, or by the mind or con

scious principle of the perceiver, or by any subconscious factors

of the perceiver s mind, and all this we take as already duly

established ; if these qualitative differences, therefore, are in the

presented data or objects, and are therefore determined, not by

consciousness, but for consciousness, it is nevertheless clear on

the other hand that these qualities and qualitative differences are

not in the external universe, and determined by the latter, to the

total exclusion of the perceiver s sense organs, or in total independ

ence of these. For, manifestly, whatever e.g. " redness " may be

in the external universe, it can be what it actually is as present

to sense consciousness only because it is presented to sense con

sciousness by the sense organ we call the eye ; nor could the

sentient subject become aware of it at all in the total absence of

this organ and its functioning. Nor, whatever "sound" may be

as a real property of the external material universe, could he

ever become aware of sound, or have this datum or object pre

sented to consciousness, without the organ and function of hear

ing. And even if "sound" and "colour" are different, as they

exist in the external universe independently of his actual per

ception of them, at all events the proximate reason why he

apprehends them as different, and a conditio sine qua non for his

perception of them as different, is that they are brought into

cognitive union with his consciousness through differently con

structed and differently functioning bodily sense organs, viz. the

ears and the eyes. And the same is true of the other " proper

sensibles," or proper objects of the other external senses, those

of taste, smell, temperature, passive touch, impenetrability or

resistance to muscular effort, and organic states or conditions.

Furthermore, since the perceived qualities of extended,

material, external things are perceived dependency on the

functioning of the perceiver s own extended, material, or bodily

sense organs, since their perception is conditioned by the latter,

these qualities will be determined to be what they are as pre

sented in the concrete to the perceiver, not alone by the actual

material conditions of the "external things" themselves, but

also by the actual material conditions of the sense organs

RELATIVITY OF SENSE QUALITIES TO PERCEIVER 91

through which the external data are made present to the con

scious perceiver. Thus, to take a few familiar examples, if the

perceiver s own hand is cold he will experience the water into

which he plunges it as "warm," whereas if his hand be hot he

will experience the same water as " cold ". If his palate be in

its normal physiological condition he will experience the taste of

sugar as " sweet," whereas if through illness it be in an abnormal

or diseased condition he may experience the taste of sugar as

" bitter ". If his eyes be in a normal condition he will see the

colour of a field of poppies as "red," whereas if his eyes happen

to be affected with that not very uncommon condition known as

"colour-blindness" or "Daltonism," he will see it as "grey" or

" green" ; or, if he press the corner of one eye with the finger,

he will see two objects where normally he would see only one.

Again, in certain conditions of the brain and nervous system and

sense organs, conditions which occur very commonly during

sleep, or during feverish illness, he may apprehend what he spon

taneously judges to be external things, but what as a matter

of fact are mere mental images resulting from the activity of

the imagination : such erroneous interpretations of imagination-

images as real (external) percepts, occurring in dreams, fevers,

delirium tremens, and all conditions of insanity, being known

as hallucinations. Or he may think that what he perceives in

the fog is a policeman when it is only a lamp-post : such errone

ous interpretations of real (external) perceptions being known as

illusions}