THE OBJECTS OF SCIENCE 83

its two attributes, thought and extension. All these for the

consistent Idealist would be so many pleasant or unpleasant

dreams, with no more body or coherence in any one of them

than in the mist of the morning. For such an Idealist there

is but one firm reality his own sentient being, and of all

else he is evidently the creator (since everything he knows

is a plexus of feelings which his being has caused to exist),

though as to how he created the universe he need neither

know nor care to inquire. It is enough for him that he has,

in fact, produced it, and that its being depends absolutely

on his own. The divine mind, the material world, the

absolute, the uncogitable unity of the Monists, and the

substance of Spinoza, will by him be courteously bowed out

or unceremoniously kicked out, according to his idealistic

temperament, and he can logically remain, like the Indian

sage in peaceful contemplation of the plexus of feelings he

calls his own navel, as a symbol of that first cause and

immanent upholder, from which all things have proceeded,

and in which all things have their only being.

This logical development of Idealism finds small favour

with existing Idealists. Solipsism is looked askance at

with evident dread by some, and vain attempts at its

refutation have been made by others. But it remains

none the less invincible on its rock of " nothing-known-but-

feelings." It was, as our readers know, first developed and

upheld by Fichte, though he ultimately abandoned it ;

and thus the logical outcome of the system of Idealism

has been practically condemned by its own disciples. To

the other idealistic extreme, that by Hume, we will sacri-

fice no space, for, in spite of its author's acuteness and great

ability, it does not really admit of logical statement, so

utterly incoherent is it, and so confident are we that its

ingenious author had no belief in it himself, but was laughing

in his sleeve at his inept admirers and disciples.

its two attributes, thought and extension. All these for the

consistent Idealist would be so many pleasant or unpleasant

dreams, with no more body or coherence in any one of them

than in the mist of the morning. For such an Idealist there

is but one firm reality his own sentient being, and of all

else he is evidently the creator (since everything he knows

is a plexus of feelings which his being has caused to exist),

though as to how he created the universe he need neither

know nor care to inquire. It is enough for him that he has,

in fact, produced it, and that its being depends absolutely

on his own. The divine mind, the material world, the

absolute, the uncogitable unity of the Monists, and the

substance of Spinoza, will by him be courteously bowed out

or unceremoniously kicked out, according to his idealistic

temperament, and he can logically remain, like the Indian

sage in peaceful contemplation of the plexus of feelings he

calls his own navel, as a symbol of that first cause and

immanent upholder, from which all things have proceeded,

and in which all things have their only being.

This logical development of Idealism finds small favour

with existing Idealists. Solipsism is looked askance at

with evident dread by some, and vain attempts at its

refutation have been made by others. But it remains

none the less invincible on its rock of " nothing-known-but-

feelings." It was, as our readers know, first developed and

upheld by Fichte, though he ultimately abandoned it ;

and thus the logical outcome of the system of Idealism

has been practically condemned by its own disciples. To

the other idealistic extreme, that by Hume, we will sacri-

fice no space, for, in spite of its author's acuteness and great

ability, it does not really admit of logical statement, so

utterly incoherent is it, and so confident are we that its

ingenious author had no belief in it himself, but was laughing

in his sleeve at his inept admirers and disciples.