44 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

the case. We, however, most willingly acknowledge the

merits and the intellectual gifts of its supporters. But those

supporters are nevertheless relatively very few in number,

in spite of the great temptations and the two special

attractions which Idealism holds out to inquirers about,

and students of, philosophy.

Its first attraction for them consists in the fact that the

system is exceedingly easy of comprehension. No difficult

and sustained acts of mental introspection are needed to

understand it. All that is required is to see clearly the

difference between "things" and their "qualities," to recog-

nize that no " things " can become known to us except

through their "qualities," and to recollect that all the

experience we have of these consists in our own sensations,

imaginations, and perceptions.

The second attraction which Idealism presents is due to

the fact that it seems to carry the novice in philosophy

into a region very much above that of ordinary men. For

him a wonderful change has taken place. What common

persons regard as the most stubborn and solid realities

he is enabled to transform into an airy pageant consisting

of nothing more substantial than a ceaseless series of feel-

ings and ideas ; yet all the time his elevated position causes

him no practical inconvenience, because it is the boast of

his philosophy that it in no way contradicts the assertions

of common sense, but only denies the existence of what

no one ever did or ever can perceive, namely, " material

substance."

He may also assert though, as we shall shortly see, in

this he is mistaken that Idealism is not out of harmony

with " science " any more than it is irreconcilable with

"common sense"; and he can certainly appeal (as before

said) to distinguished men of science who affirm that they

are Idealists.

the case. We, however, most willingly acknowledge the

merits and the intellectual gifts of its supporters. But those

supporters are nevertheless relatively very few in number,

in spite of the great temptations and the two special

attractions which Idealism holds out to inquirers about,

and students of, philosophy.

Its first attraction for them consists in the fact that the

system is exceedingly easy of comprehension. No difficult

and sustained acts of mental introspection are needed to

understand it. All that is required is to see clearly the

difference between "things" and their "qualities," to recog-

nize that no " things " can become known to us except

through their "qualities," and to recollect that all the

experience we have of these consists in our own sensations,

imaginations, and perceptions.

The second attraction which Idealism presents is due to

the fact that it seems to carry the novice in philosophy

into a region very much above that of ordinary men. For

him a wonderful change has taken place. What common

persons regard as the most stubborn and solid realities

he is enabled to transform into an airy pageant consisting

of nothing more substantial than a ceaseless series of feel-

ings and ideas ; yet all the time his elevated position causes

him no practical inconvenience, because it is the boast of

his philosophy that it in no way contradicts the assertions

of common sense, but only denies the existence of what

no one ever did or ever can perceive, namely, " material

substance."

He may also assert though, as we shall shortly see, in

this he is mistaken that Idealism is not out of harmony

with " science " any more than it is irreconcilable with

"common sense"; and he can certainly appeal (as before

said) to distinguished men of science who affirm that they

are Idealists.