PSYCHICAL ANTECEDENTS OF SCIENCE 145
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each of these two kinds of mental affection. Those which
are allied to feelings and imaginations constitute our lower
mental faculties ; while those allied to our intellectual
perceptions are our higher ones. No one, probably, will
question that a process of conscious reasoning and a
perception of the truth of an axiom are higher mental
processes than mere feelings of colour, warmth, or sweet-
ness.
This distinction between our higher and lower mental
powers, though it has been so long and so generally
neglected, we believe to be one of the most profound and
important truths in Psychology, and one the recognition
of which is absolutely necessary for everyone who would
attain to a sound and reasonable philosophy.
But as we are intellectual and conscious beings, we should
expect that every lower mental process would, in us, be more
or less modified by our higher nature, through the existence
of which alone we can (through reflexion) ever become
aware of the existence of any such lower mental process.
As to animals, we can have no psychical experience of any
creature's mind but our own. Nevertheless, observation,
experiment, and inference, in combination, may suffice to
give us a trustworthy assurance that faculties like our lower
psychical powers exist in them, and that they are, or are not,
sufficient to account for all their actions, however rational
such actions may, at first sight, appear to be.
As a familiar illustration of this distinction we refer to
as existing in ourselves, may be mentioned a circumstance
which has, perhaps, happened to many of our readers as it
has repeatedly happened to ourselves. In walking along a
street with consciousness absorbed by some train of thought,
it may suddenly strike us that we had passed a house over
the shop-window of which there was a remarkable, or a
familiar, name, and then, turning back, find that our suspicion
L
each of these two kinds of mental affection. Those which
are allied to feelings and imaginations constitute our lower
mental faculties ; while those allied to our intellectual
perceptions are our higher ones. No one, probably, will
question that a process of conscious reasoning and a
perception of the truth of an axiom are higher mental
processes than mere feelings of colour, warmth, or sweet-
ness.
This distinction between our higher and lower mental
powers, though it has been so long and so generally
neglected, we believe to be one of the most profound and
important truths in Psychology, and one the recognition
of which is absolutely necessary for everyone who would
attain to a sound and reasonable philosophy.
But as we are intellectual and conscious beings, we should
expect that every lower mental process would, in us, be more
or less modified by our higher nature, through the existence
of which alone we can (through reflexion) ever become
aware of the existence of any such lower mental process.
As to animals, we can have no psychical experience of any
creature's mind but our own. Nevertheless, observation,
experiment, and inference, in combination, may suffice to
give us a trustworthy assurance that faculties like our lower
psychical powers exist in them, and that they are, or are not,
sufficient to account for all their actions, however rational
such actions may, at first sight, appear to be.
As a familiar illustration of this distinction we refer to
as existing in ourselves, may be mentioned a circumstance
which has, perhaps, happened to many of our readers as it
has repeatedly happened to ourselves. In walking along a
street with consciousness absorbed by some train of thought,
it may suddenly strike us that we had passed a house over
the shop-window of which there was a remarkable, or a
familiar, name, and then, turning back, find that our suspicion
L