76 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

again, a thing perceived by us does not exist in a state

of " being perceived by us " when we do not perceive it. But

our perceiving it or not perceiving it is (as we have more than

once urged) a mere accident of its existence, which exist-

ence continues on essentially the same, whether perceived or

not Who has perceived the mountains on the other side of

the moon ; but are they the less real because no one can

perceive them ? Who perceived for untold ages the many

palaeozoic fossils which have been in modern times dis-

entombed ; but have they been less persistently existent

on that account ? Does want of being perceived impair the

reality of the thousands of fossils which as yet remain

undiscovered ?

Surely here, as in the former instances we noted,* phy-

sical science is fatal to Idealism.

Before finally concluding this chapter it may be well to

consider some special objections made by one of our most

esteemed Idealists! against a non- idealistic conception of

the universe as being self- contradictory and replete with

illusion.

After the usual objections founded on the divergence be-

tween our sensations induced by the secondary qualities of

objects and the objective nature of the latter, he endeavours

to raise difficulties as to our perception of the extended

on the ground that the mode of inherence of its secondary

qualities and the relations holding between themj ("how

the qualities stand to the relations which have to hold

between them "), are, on any non-idealistic system, inexplic-

able.

We have already protested against the question, "How

is knowledge possible?" as a necessarily idle one. Our

* See ante, pp. 5 1 to 53.

t Dr. F. H. BRADLEY in his work entitled Appearance and Reality, 1893.

t pp. 14, 15. See ante, p. 57.

again, a thing perceived by us does not exist in a state

of " being perceived by us " when we do not perceive it. But

our perceiving it or not perceiving it is (as we have more than

once urged) a mere accident of its existence, which exist-

ence continues on essentially the same, whether perceived or

not Who has perceived the mountains on the other side of

the moon ; but are they the less real because no one can

perceive them ? Who perceived for untold ages the many

palaeozoic fossils which have been in modern times dis-

entombed ; but have they been less persistently existent

on that account ? Does want of being perceived impair the

reality of the thousands of fossils which as yet remain

undiscovered ?

Surely here, as in the former instances we noted,* phy-

sical science is fatal to Idealism.

Before finally concluding this chapter it may be well to

consider some special objections made by one of our most

esteemed Idealists! against a non- idealistic conception of

the universe as being self- contradictory and replete with

illusion.

After the usual objections founded on the divergence be-

tween our sensations induced by the secondary qualities of

objects and the objective nature of the latter, he endeavours

to raise difficulties as to our perception of the extended

on the ground that the mode of inherence of its secondary

qualities and the relations holding between themj ("how

the qualities stand to the relations which have to hold

between them "), are, on any non-idealistic system, inexplic-

able.

We have already protested against the question, "How

is knowledge possible?" as a necessarily idle one. Our

* See ante, pp. 5 1 to 53.

t Dr. F. H. BRADLEY in his work entitled Appearance and Reality, 1893.

t pp. 14, 15. See ante, p. 57.