PSYCHICAL ANTECEDENTS OF SCIENCE 167

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340 

 

a proposition which, however mistaken it may be in fact,

yet is one which, in its mistaken way, affirms the very

principle, the rule of " right and wrong," which it was

designed to oppose.

 

But persons who say that the morality of any action depends

on its results can always be refuted simply by examining

into the assertions about duty which they themselves make.

Thus that eminent utilitarian philosopher, the late John

Stuart Mill, declared that he would rather go to hell than

consent to call " good " a God who should violate the laws of

the highest human morality, and in so saying he, of course,

implied that other men ought to do the same.

 

The sentiment was a very admirable one, yet singularly

inconsistent in the mouth of a utilitarian. For on the one

hand, as a utilitarian, he taught that men in all cases should

seek the greatest happiness for all, while on the other he

declared, in the case supposed, that in so pursuing happiness

they should all voluntarily plunge into the greatest possible

misery.

 

But without having recourse to any such extreme suppo-

sition, the simplest facts suffice to show that it is not the

consequences of an act but the intention wherewith it is

performed which makes the action " good " or " bad."

 

Let us suppose that two men have each a sick wife, and

that the doctor has left with each man two bottles : one a

valuable internal remedy, the other a poisonous lotion. One

of these men, who is devoted to his wife, gives her by pure

mistake the lotion to drink, and kills her. The other man

desires to poison his wife, but, by also making a mistake as

to the bottles, gives her unintentionally the right medicine

and cures her. Can there be any doubt as to who is the

truly guilty man ? Who would venture to assert that the act

of the second man was really a " good " action because, in

spite of his evil intention, it had a good result ?

 

 

a proposition which, however mistaken it may be in fact,

yet is one which, in its mistaken way, affirms the very

principle, the rule of " right and wrong," which it was

designed to oppose.

 

But persons who say that the morality of any action depends

on its results can always be refuted simply by examining

into the assertions about duty which they themselves make.

Thus that eminent utilitarian philosopher, the late John

Stuart Mill, declared that he would rather go to hell than

consent to call " good " a God who should violate the laws of

the highest human morality, and in so saying he, of course,

implied that other men ought to do the same.

 

The sentiment was a very admirable one, yet singularly

inconsistent in the mouth of a utilitarian. For on the one

hand, as a utilitarian, he taught that men in all cases should

seek the greatest happiness for all, while on the other he

declared, in the case supposed, that in so pursuing happiness

they should all voluntarily plunge into the greatest possible

misery.

 

But without having recourse to any such extreme suppo-

sition, the simplest facts suffice to show that it is not the

consequences of an act but the intention wherewith it is

performed which makes the action " good " or " bad."

 

Let us suppose that two men have each a sick wife, and

that the doctor has left with each man two bottles : one a

valuable internal remedy, the other a poisonous lotion. One

of these men, who is devoted to his wife, gives her by pure

mistake the lotion to drink, and kills her. The other man

desires to poison his wife, but, by also making a mistake as

to the bottles, gives her unintentionally the right medicine

and cures her. Can there be any doubt as to who is the

truly guilty man ? Who would venture to assert that the act

of the second man was really a " good " action because, in

spite of his evil intention, it had a good result ?