1 82 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

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340 

 

Montaigne sought to explain instinct by intelligence, but

it is surely obvious that the acts of chicks newly hatched,

or of young snakes, who from their mother's womb have

been untimely ripped, cannot be due to intelligent purpose.

It is impossible to suppose that any form of knowledge

guides the actions of the emperor moth, the excavations of

the grub of the stag-beetle in proportion to its jaws which

are yet to be, or the actions of the beetle sitaris. Intelligence,

therefore, is a quite unsatisfactory explanation of the nature

of the instinctive faculty. Not less unreasonable is Condillac's

hypothesis that instinct is the result of the experience of the

individual animal which exhibits it. It is manifest that

experience could never lead a creature to perform acts with

reference to conditions quite different from all those it has

ever had any experience of. Yet such are the acts of the

insects before described, and the human infant is certainly

not less destitute of experience.

 

Another explanation was offered by Lamarck, who de-

clared instinct to be "habit which has become hereditary."

Of course, this implies, as all Lamarckism necessarily

implies, that acquired habits may become hereditary ; but

granted, for argument's sake, that such is the case, there

remains a radical difference between instinct and habit.

"Habit" enables an agent to repeat with facility and pre-

cision an act which has been done before ; but " instinct "

determines with precision the first performance of the act.

 

It is impossible to believe that any of the progenitors of

an infant acquired a habit of sucking, or that the insects

before referred to acquired a habit of performing their

purposive actions unless they were compelled by their

organization so to do, in which case they would already be

instinctive.

 

But an attempt has also been made to explain instinctive

action as "lapsed intelligence" as consisting of acts which

 

 

Montaigne sought to explain instinct by intelligence, but

it is surely obvious that the acts of chicks newly hatched,

or of young snakes, who from their mother's womb have

been untimely ripped, cannot be due to intelligent purpose.

It is impossible to suppose that any form of knowledge

guides the actions of the emperor moth, the excavations of

the grub of the stag-beetle in proportion to its jaws which

are yet to be, or the actions of the beetle sitaris. Intelligence,

therefore, is a quite unsatisfactory explanation of the nature

of the instinctive faculty. Not less unreasonable is Condillac's

hypothesis that instinct is the result of the experience of the

individual animal which exhibits it. It is manifest that

experience could never lead a creature to perform acts with

reference to conditions quite different from all those it has

ever had any experience of. Yet such are the acts of the

insects before described, and the human infant is certainly

not less destitute of experience.

 

Another explanation was offered by Lamarck, who de-

clared instinct to be "habit which has become hereditary."

Of course, this implies, as all Lamarckism necessarily

implies, that acquired habits may become hereditary ; but

granted, for argument's sake, that such is the case, there

remains a radical difference between instinct and habit.

"Habit" enables an agent to repeat with facility and pre-

cision an act which has been done before ; but " instinct "

determines with precision the first performance of the act.

 

It is impossible to believe that any of the progenitors of

an infant acquired a habit of sucking, or that the insects

before referred to acquired a habit of performing their

purposive actions unless they were compelled by their

organization so to do, in which case they would already be

instinctive.

 

But an attempt has also been made to explain instinctive

action as "lapsed intelligence" as consisting of acts which