INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF SCIENCE 235

a momentary existence, but a substantial and continuous

existence, the certainty of which we have been affirming is

both so fundamental and supreme.

Our knowledge of our continuous existence carries with

it the conviction of the validity of our faculty of memory*

It is, of course, obvious that by asserting the validity of this

faculty we do not and cannot mean that our memory is

always to be trusted. For everyone knows, and generally

reerets. that there are things he is certain he once knew but

o

which he can no longer recollect As age advances, the

recollection of the facts of the recent past becomes gradually

less, and there are many instances of exceptionally defective

memory, sometimes of a whole subject-matter, sometimes

of particular parts thereof. But all these exceptional

phenomena do not affect the assertion of the general

trustworthiness of memory the assertion that what most

people remember clearly and distinctly, and which they are

certain really was as they remember it, did in fact occur

as they remember it. Putting aside exceptional persons,

in pathological conditions, it is certain that everyone can

recollect a portion of his past experience either what has

just occurred or what happened at a somewhat earlier, or

very much earlier, date.

It is also obvious that the trustworthiness of memory is

implied in our knowledge of our own existence, since we

could never know either what our most recently experienced

feelings or our direct perceptions of the empirical Ego have

been save by the aid of memory. Therefore the certainty

we have as to the one or other of these carries with it a

certainty that our memory can inform us truly as to the past

As we have before pointed out, in order that memory

should exist, it is necessary that whatever is remembered

should be recognized by him who remembers it as having

* See ante, p. 100

a momentary existence, but a substantial and continuous

existence, the certainty of which we have been affirming is

both so fundamental and supreme.

Our knowledge of our continuous existence carries with

it the conviction of the validity of our faculty of memory*

It is, of course, obvious that by asserting the validity of this

faculty we do not and cannot mean that our memory is

always to be trusted. For everyone knows, and generally

reerets. that there are things he is certain he once knew but

o

which he can no longer recollect As age advances, the

recollection of the facts of the recent past becomes gradually

less, and there are many instances of exceptionally defective

memory, sometimes of a whole subject-matter, sometimes

of particular parts thereof. But all these exceptional

phenomena do not affect the assertion of the general

trustworthiness of memory the assertion that what most

people remember clearly and distinctly, and which they are

certain really was as they remember it, did in fact occur

as they remember it. Putting aside exceptional persons,

in pathological conditions, it is certain that everyone can

recollect a portion of his past experience either what has

just occurred or what happened at a somewhat earlier, or

very much earlier, date.

It is also obvious that the trustworthiness of memory is

implied in our knowledge of our own existence, since we

could never know either what our most recently experienced

feelings or our direct perceptions of the empirical Ego have

been save by the aid of memory. Therefore the certainty

we have as to the one or other of these carries with it a

certainty that our memory can inform us truly as to the past

As we have before pointed out, in order that memory

should exist, it is necessary that whatever is remembered

should be recognized by him who remembers it as having

* See ante, p. 100