THE OBJECTS OF SCIENCE 45

Some of our readers, influenced by such representations,

may be inclined to say to us : " Why, if these so-called

'facts' bodies and their activities can be conveniently

dealt with as so many ' bundles of feelings,' and if we may

speak of such 'bundles of stably associated feelings' as

' objects ' and ' things,' why should we not be content so to

call them ? Why should we not leave all disputes about the

truths of Idealism on one side, concern ourselves only with

what both parties thus agree to term ' things ' and ' objects,'

and to treat them as if they were really independent entities

quite external to the mind " ?

Certainly we do not for one moment seek or wish to deny

that Idealists may be very good scientific men, and do

excellent scientific work ; nor, for the purposes of physical

science, are the conceptions of such scientific Idealists

unserviceable for the scientific ends to which they are

directed, though (as will be shortly urged) their scientific

conceptions are not really idealistic, but are like those of

ordinary persons.

Nevertheless, as we have before observed, for our present

purpose (namely, the exploration of the groundwork of

science) it is necessary to determine whether the foundation

of science is entirely mental or partly mental and partly

material ; and there is a yet graver consideration which

forbids us to rest contented with a philosophical concordat,

and compels us to do our best to arrive at a satisfying

solution as to the system of Idealism.

This yet graver consideration refers to the nature of our

intellectual faculties. No man can get behind human reason,

and no rational man will make any attempt so to do. A

belief in a real, external and independent world of things

in themselves appears to most men to be an absolutely certain

and self-evident truth. But if Idealism is true, then " abso-

lutely certain self-evidence" can be no sufficient guarantee

Some of our readers, influenced by such representations,

may be inclined to say to us : " Why, if these so-called

'facts' bodies and their activities can be conveniently

dealt with as so many ' bundles of feelings,' and if we may

speak of such 'bundles of stably associated feelings' as

' objects ' and ' things,' why should we not be content so to

call them ? Why should we not leave all disputes about the

truths of Idealism on one side, concern ourselves only with

what both parties thus agree to term ' things ' and ' objects,'

and to treat them as if they were really independent entities

quite external to the mind " ?

Certainly we do not for one moment seek or wish to deny

that Idealists may be very good scientific men, and do

excellent scientific work ; nor, for the purposes of physical

science, are the conceptions of such scientific Idealists

unserviceable for the scientific ends to which they are

directed, though (as will be shortly urged) their scientific

conceptions are not really idealistic, but are like those of

ordinary persons.

Nevertheless, as we have before observed, for our present

purpose (namely, the exploration of the groundwork of

science) it is necessary to determine whether the foundation

of science is entirely mental or partly mental and partly

material ; and there is a yet graver consideration which

forbids us to rest contented with a philosophical concordat,

and compels us to do our best to arrive at a satisfying

solution as to the system of Idealism.

This yet graver consideration refers to the nature of our

intellectual faculties. No man can get behind human reason,

and no rational man will make any attempt so to do. A

belief in a real, external and independent world of things

in themselves appears to most men to be an absolutely certain

and self-evident truth. But if Idealism is true, then " abso-

lutely certain self-evidence" can be no sufficient guarantee