CAUSES Of SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 279

In the first place, we now desire to call attention to

the law and principle which Mr. Spencer has enunciated,

as specially his own, and as one extending from the founda-

tion of his whole philosophical construction to its highest

pinnacle.

This great law and principle propounded by him his

version of the process of evolution is the assertion that

all things in nature are proceeding "from an indefinite,

incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity?

It will be well for all readers who may be inclined to

defer to and reverence Mr. Herbert Spencer's doctrines,

to ponder a little over this, his first principle, which he

long ago chose as a starting-point, and which his very latest

writings profess to enforce and illustrate.

The process and procession of evolutionary changes are

thus declared by him to start from what is homogene-

ous, incoherent, and indefinite! Could any procession be

more unfortunate as to its starting-point, any process

more necessarily impotent, any philosophical structure more

baseless ?

Hegel has received far more than his share of ridicule

for saying that "being and not-being are identical." But

Hegel was dealing with abstract ideas, regarded in a certain

way, while Mr. Spencer is busy about concrete things. As

to them he, in effect, makes an assertion which is utterly

self-contradictory. The "starting-point of his procession lies

nowhere, the fulcrum for his process is nonentity, and the

foundation of his system is an absolute vacuum.

For according to him, everything depends for its origin on

the " indefinite," and, most unfortunately for Mr. Spencer,

the " indefinite " is just what does not, never did, and never

can exist.

It is absolutely impossible for any concrete entity to be

" indefinite." Whatever is, is necessarily a thing of some

In the first place, we now desire to call attention to

the law and principle which Mr. Spencer has enunciated,

as specially his own, and as one extending from the founda-

tion of his whole philosophical construction to its highest

pinnacle.

This great law and principle propounded by him his

version of the process of evolution is the assertion that

all things in nature are proceeding "from an indefinite,

incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity?

It will be well for all readers who may be inclined to

defer to and reverence Mr. Herbert Spencer's doctrines,

to ponder a little over this, his first principle, which he

long ago chose as a starting-point, and which his very latest

writings profess to enforce and illustrate.

The process and procession of evolutionary changes are

thus declared by him to start from what is homogene-

ous, incoherent, and indefinite! Could any procession be

more unfortunate as to its starting-point, any process

more necessarily impotent, any philosophical structure more

baseless ?

Hegel has received far more than his share of ridicule

for saying that "being and not-being are identical." But

Hegel was dealing with abstract ideas, regarded in a certain

way, while Mr. Spencer is busy about concrete things. As

to them he, in effect, makes an assertion which is utterly

self-contradictory. The "starting-point of his procession lies

nowhere, the fulcrum for his process is nonentity, and the

foundation of his system is an absolute vacuum.

For according to him, everything depends for its origin on

the " indefinite," and, most unfortunately for Mr. Spencer,

the " indefinite " is just what does not, never did, and never

can exist.

It is absolutely impossible for any concrete entity to be

" indefinite." Whatever is, is necessarily a thing of some