158 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

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existing in ourselves. The tales told by the owners of

pet animals are often absolutely untrustworthy, so strong

is the tendency they have to unconsciously exaggerate the

performances of their favourites, and to naively interpret

them in terms of purely human psychology.

 

As to the highest psychical faculties of mere animals

generally those which are not pets many persons credit

them with powers (i) of perceiving objects ; (2) of perceiving

relations between objects ; (3) of perceiving their own

existence consciousness; (4) of having ideas; (5) of

reasoning ; (6) of perceiving moral quality ; (7) of ex-

pressing their ideas by sounds, and (8) by gestures.

 

Since the question of animal rationality is for us a sub-

ordinate question, with only an indirect bearing on our main

conclusions, we are compelled to consider the eight just

enumerated points but very briefly.

 

That animals in one sense perceive objects is, of course,

unquestionable. If they did not do so, coursing and hawking

would be impossible. But what is the nature of such per-

ceptions ? We have already seen how, by turning the mind

backwards and considering our experience, we may recognize

that we have had perceptions of which we were not conscious

at the time we experienced them. Such perceptions were

sufficient to guide our movements, as they serve to guide

those of the unconscious sleep-walker in our words, there

was not consciousness, but only consentience. Need we then

credit animals with more than this ? Such sense-perceptions

of theirs may be much more keen and more rapidly cognized

than are our own. We ourselves do not know of any animal

actions which we think cannot be explained by cognitions of

this lower kind. It will be said, however, that for a cat to

watch the movements of a mouse and to catch it, needs

not only that it should see the mouse, but the objects around

it, and the varying bearings of the running mouse thereto.

 

 

existing in ourselves. The tales told by the owners of

pet animals are often absolutely untrustworthy, so strong

is the tendency they have to unconsciously exaggerate the

performances of their favourites, and to naively interpret

them in terms of purely human psychology.

 

As to the highest psychical faculties of mere animals

generally those which are not pets many persons credit

them with powers (i) of perceiving objects ; (2) of perceiving

relations between objects ; (3) of perceiving their own

existence consciousness; (4) of having ideas; (5) of

reasoning ; (6) of perceiving moral quality ; (7) of ex-

pressing their ideas by sounds, and (8) by gestures.

 

Since the question of animal rationality is for us a sub-

ordinate question, with only an indirect bearing on our main

conclusions, we are compelled to consider the eight just

enumerated points but very briefly.

 

That animals in one sense perceive objects is, of course,

unquestionable. If they did not do so, coursing and hawking

would be impossible. But what is the nature of such per-

ceptions ? We have already seen how, by turning the mind

backwards and considering our experience, we may recognize

that we have had perceptions of which we were not conscious

at the time we experienced them. Such perceptions were

sufficient to guide our movements, as they serve to guide

those of the unconscious sleep-walker in our words, there

was not consciousness, but only consentience. Need we then

credit animals with more than this ? Such sense-perceptions

of theirs may be much more keen and more rapidly cognized

than are our own. We ourselves do not know of any animal

actions which we think cannot be explained by cognitions of

this lower kind. It will be said, however, that for a cat to

watch the movements of a mouse and to catch it, needs

not only that it should see the mouse, but the objects around

it, and the varying bearings of the running mouse thereto.