268 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

in the world. This fancy, it seems to us, also must be the

ground upon which other men have declared that what we

should most trust, and may entirely trust, are ideas which are

a priori, and have never been gained by experience. For

why otherwise could anyone think we should attach less

importance and validity to impressions and conclusions

which have been gained by the most patient and pains-

taking efforts, when large stores of knowledge have been

acquired in many different ways, than to others (did any

really exist), for the possession of which antecedent ex-

periences were in no way necessary?

Obviously, the only ground upon which the latter could

make any special claim on our acceptance would be that

they had been implanted in human nature by " an All-

wise Creator."

Yet it is no less obvious that such a conviction could never

serve as a basis for our knowledge, because it would first be

requisite to prove that "an All-wise Creator" exists.

That his existence is not known by any intuition is

manifest from the fact that so many books have been written

to prove that existence, as well as from the circumstance

that so many persons doubt or positively disbelieve it.

But to prove any such theistic doctrine it is manifestly

necessary to antecedently possess a sufficient knowledge of

truths apt to serve as premisses for so important a conclusion.

Now there is one assertion as to the cause of our convictions

especially about our confidence in the real existence of the

external world and the inevitableness of that confidence

which deserves special notice, not so much on its own account

as because it harmonises with a fashion of the day. A strong

tendency exists to try and account for everything by the

action of " Natural Selection," and that cause has been

specially invoked to account for the inevitable character of

our convictions about the reality of the external world.

in the world. This fancy, it seems to us, also must be the

ground upon which other men have declared that what we

should most trust, and may entirely trust, are ideas which are

a priori, and have never been gained by experience. For

why otherwise could anyone think we should attach less

importance and validity to impressions and conclusions

which have been gained by the most patient and pains-

taking efforts, when large stores of knowledge have been

acquired in many different ways, than to others (did any

really exist), for the possession of which antecedent ex-

periences were in no way necessary?

Obviously, the only ground upon which the latter could

make any special claim on our acceptance would be that

they had been implanted in human nature by " an All-

wise Creator."

Yet it is no less obvious that such a conviction could never

serve as a basis for our knowledge, because it would first be

requisite to prove that "an All-wise Creator" exists.

That his existence is not known by any intuition is

manifest from the fact that so many books have been written

to prove that existence, as well as from the circumstance

that so many persons doubt or positively disbelieve it.

But to prove any such theistic doctrine it is manifestly

necessary to antecedently possess a sufficient knowledge of

truths apt to serve as premisses for so important a conclusion.

Now there is one assertion as to the cause of our convictions

especially about our confidence in the real existence of the

external world and the inevitableness of that confidence

which deserves special notice, not so much on its own account

as because it harmonises with a fashion of the day. A strong

tendency exists to try and account for everything by the

action of " Natural Selection," and that cause has been

specially invoked to account for the inevitable character of

our convictions about the reality of the external world.