204 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

months, called first her brother, and then other children,

" Ilda," and then whenever she came upon a representation

of a sheep with lambs, she would point to the sheep and

say Mama Ba, while of the lambs she would say Ilda Ba.

Nevertheless, he affirms that in her case formal predication

had not begun. On the other hand, we regard these utter-

ances of the child as distinctly intelligent predications.

Similarly, he denies that a child two years old, who says

Dit ki (sister is crying) makes an intellectual assertion.

But in saying those two words the child really enunciates

a true judgment composed of two concepts and an implied

copula. If such were not the case, if the child did not

consciously perceive both his sister and her crying condition,

the statement would be mere meaningless babble. But,

of course, the child does not advert to such psychical facts

and recognize what it says with reflex conciousness. Such

a mental act is but rarely performed even by an adult.

But much simpler, merely monosyllabic, utterances may

be true implicit judgments. Thus when a child on seeing

a dog looks up at her nurse and, pointing, says " Bow-wow,"

or taking food exclaims " Ot " (hot), or letting fall a toy says

" dow " (down), it may thereby express what is truly a judg-

ment in each case. For in what respect does the utterance of

the monosyllable " Ot " differ from " Dit-ki " ? It merely differs

in the emission of two sounds instead of one. " Ot " really

means as much as do the two sounds " Dit ki " namely,

that the child's food is hot. In one case the meaning of a

sentence is conveyed by two articulate sounds, and in the

other by the utterance of a monosyllable. The latter mode

is in no way inferior except that it seems incapable of being

adapted to express the complex ideas of later life. But very

frequently the monosyllabic mode is made use of by adults

and fully understood. Suppose some men are watching,

at a distance, certain birds indistinctly seen, and that they

months, called first her brother, and then other children,

" Ilda," and then whenever she came upon a representation

of a sheep with lambs, she would point to the sheep and

say Mama Ba, while of the lambs she would say Ilda Ba.

Nevertheless, he affirms that in her case formal predication

had not begun. On the other hand, we regard these utter-

ances of the child as distinctly intelligent predications.

Similarly, he denies that a child two years old, who says

Dit ki (sister is crying) makes an intellectual assertion.

But in saying those two words the child really enunciates

a true judgment composed of two concepts and an implied

copula. If such were not the case, if the child did not

consciously perceive both his sister and her crying condition,

the statement would be mere meaningless babble. But,

of course, the child does not advert to such psychical facts

and recognize what it says with reflex conciousness. Such

a mental act is but rarely performed even by an adult.

But much simpler, merely monosyllabic, utterances may

be true implicit judgments. Thus when a child on seeing

a dog looks up at her nurse and, pointing, says " Bow-wow,"

or taking food exclaims " Ot " (hot), or letting fall a toy says

" dow " (down), it may thereby express what is truly a judg-

ment in each case. For in what respect does the utterance of

the monosyllable " Ot " differ from " Dit-ki " ? It merely differs

in the emission of two sounds instead of one. " Ot " really

means as much as do the two sounds " Dit ki " namely,

that the child's food is hot. In one case the meaning of a

sentence is conveyed by two articulate sounds, and in the

other by the utterance of a monosyllable. The latter mode

is in no way inferior except that it seems incapable of being

adapted to express the complex ideas of later life. But very

frequently the monosyllabic mode is made use of by adults

and fully understood. Suppose some men are watching,

at a distance, certain birds indistinctly seen, and that they