THE OBJECTS OF SCIENCE 35

inferences, or apprehensions, and amongst the latter are

apprehensions of such object's relations : both its relations

to other things and its relations within its own being its

external and internal relations. Every object, therefore,

looked at as regards our apprehension of it />., merely

subjectively may be said to consist of a plexus of such

mental states or " states of consciousness."

It is also true that not only can we know nothing about

any object except by means of some mental state of our own

being, but that were it possible to preserve such mental states

in their entirety while the object they referred to was annihi-

lated, our mind, and therefore our knowledge, might remain

unaffected thereby. It is notorious that under abnormal

conditions, things may seem to be perceived which do not

in fact exist, as also that there may be existences which,

to exceptional individuals, remain unperceived as the odour

of the rose to one congenitally devoid of all olfactory power,

its red hue to one who is colour-blind, and the cry of the bat

to very many persons.

May it not then be that no independent external world

really exists at all, and may not the " esse " of every seem-

ingly independent thing be "fiercipi"? We know with

absolute certainty (with the certainty of reflex consciousness)

that we have ideas ; may they not be the only real existences?

This, as the reader well knows, is Idealism. But Idealism

has much to say for itself.

Such could not fail to be the case seeing how many illus-

trious men of a very high order of intellect have professed

and do profess Idealism, and it is far indeed from being

confined to pure Metaphysicians. Many distinguished culti-

vators and teachers of physical science declare themselves to

be Idealists.

Its advocates ask : " What possible ground can anyone

have for not being an Idealist? If we examine any object,

inferences, or apprehensions, and amongst the latter are

apprehensions of such object's relations : both its relations

to other things and its relations within its own being its

external and internal relations. Every object, therefore,

looked at as regards our apprehension of it />., merely

subjectively may be said to consist of a plexus of such

mental states or " states of consciousness."

It is also true that not only can we know nothing about

any object except by means of some mental state of our own

being, but that were it possible to preserve such mental states

in their entirety while the object they referred to was annihi-

lated, our mind, and therefore our knowledge, might remain

unaffected thereby. It is notorious that under abnormal

conditions, things may seem to be perceived which do not

in fact exist, as also that there may be existences which,

to exceptional individuals, remain unperceived as the odour

of the rose to one congenitally devoid of all olfactory power,

its red hue to one who is colour-blind, and the cry of the bat

to very many persons.

May it not then be that no independent external world

really exists at all, and may not the " esse " of every seem-

ingly independent thing be "fiercipi"? We know with

absolute certainty (with the certainty of reflex consciousness)

that we have ideas ; may they not be the only real existences?

This, as the reader well knows, is Idealism. But Idealism

has much to say for itself.

Such could not fail to be the case seeing how many illus-

trious men of a very high order of intellect have professed

and do profess Idealism, and it is far indeed from being

confined to pure Metaphysicians. Many distinguished culti-

vators and teachers of physical science declare themselves to

be Idealists.

Its advocates ask : " What possible ground can anyone

have for not being an Idealist? If we examine any object,