THE OBJECTS OF SCIENCE 61

in Notre Dame, as we progress, the pillars of the double row

of columns on either side of its nave successively change

their relative positions in our eyes. Yet they remain in

reality unchanging, and by the experiences thus received we

gain a clearer intellectual apprehension of their true relative

positions than we could do by remaining fixed to one spot.

Some opponents affirm that what is really different between

a mere sense-perception and an intellectual perception of an

object, is that to the latter a word is applied, and that apart

from this word there would be no difference. Such a view is,

of course, the teaching of the oft-refuted system known as

" Nominalism."

That the essence of intellectual perception and conception

does not lie in the word, is shown by the fact that the same

idea may be made known by different words, different modes

of speech, and even by gesture language.* But it is plain that

if the intellect had not universal ideas, then general terms,

such as " dog," " horse," etc., would be meaningless. It may

also be asked how general terms ever came to be, if the mind

knew nothing but individual things ? Again, even Nominalists

must profess to understand the meanings of certain words ; but

since almost all words are universals, it is plain that they could

not understand them unless they really possessed universal

ideas. If we can perceive the general nature of certain

words, why not of other things also? But Nominalists

agree with Idealists in one fundamental error. They confuse

the objects of cognition with the means of cognition, not, as

before said, because they pay any exceptional attention to

their feelings, but because they regard what are really, for

both Idealists and non-Idealists, "objects perceived" as being

mere plexuses of feelings, plexuses, therefore, of what are in

truth but " means of perception." Objects are known directly

by means of our mental affections. It is true that modern

* See below, Chapter VII.

in Notre Dame, as we progress, the pillars of the double row

of columns on either side of its nave successively change

their relative positions in our eyes. Yet they remain in

reality unchanging, and by the experiences thus received we

gain a clearer intellectual apprehension of their true relative

positions than we could do by remaining fixed to one spot.

Some opponents affirm that what is really different between

a mere sense-perception and an intellectual perception of an

object, is that to the latter a word is applied, and that apart

from this word there would be no difference. Such a view is,

of course, the teaching of the oft-refuted system known as

" Nominalism."

That the essence of intellectual perception and conception

does not lie in the word, is shown by the fact that the same

idea may be made known by different words, different modes

of speech, and even by gesture language.* But it is plain that

if the intellect had not universal ideas, then general terms,

such as " dog," " horse," etc., would be meaningless. It may

also be asked how general terms ever came to be, if the mind

knew nothing but individual things ? Again, even Nominalists

must profess to understand the meanings of certain words ; but

since almost all words are universals, it is plain that they could

not understand them unless they really possessed universal

ideas. If we can perceive the general nature of certain

words, why not of other things also? But Nominalists

agree with Idealists in one fundamental error. They confuse

the objects of cognition with the means of cognition, not, as

before said, because they pay any exceptional attention to

their feelings, but because they regard what are really, for

both Idealists and non-Idealists, "objects perceived" as being

mere plexuses of feelings, plexuses, therefore, of what are in

truth but " means of perception." Objects are known directly

by means of our mental affections. It is true that modern

* See below, Chapter VII.