NATURE OF THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE 315

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essential kind of matter with intrinsic motion, animals

having merely the appearance of being sensitive organisms,

while in truth literally nothing more than mere machines.

The possibility of this cannot be denied for two reasons :

 

(1) We can only know our own sensations and emotions

through the intellect, so that we cannot be absolutely sure

that our higher estimate of animals (as being really sensitive

organisms) may not be due to the fact that we know them

only intellectually, and so may unconsciously transfigure

them.

 

(2) We cannot know with certainty what the emotions

and sensations of animals really are. They are probably

like what our sensations and emotions might be apart from

the intellect. But it can never be absolutely evident to us

that they are so, or what they are in themselves, or even

what our own sensations and emotions may be, apart from

our intellect, though, as we have endeavoured to show,* our

intellect enables us to obtain a high degree of probability

in the matter.

 

Secondly, it is not evident that the universe may not

consist of one kind of matter (the parent of all the combi-

nations we know), and one physical energy (the root of

the physical energies of our experience), together with an

intelligent energy.

 

Thirdly, it may consist of one matter and several or many

energies, essentially distinct from all eternity, together with

intelligent energy.

 

Fourthly, it is not evident that it may not be composed of

several, or many, essentially distinct matters (true elements)

with a physical energy essentially one, together with in-

telligent energy.

 

Fifthly, it may consist of several or a multitude of distinct

 

* See ante, p. 216.

 

 

essential kind of matter with intrinsic motion, animals

having merely the appearance of being sensitive organisms,

while in truth literally nothing more than mere machines.

The possibility of this cannot be denied for two reasons :

 

(1) We can only know our own sensations and emotions

through the intellect, so that we cannot be absolutely sure

that our higher estimate of animals (as being really sensitive

organisms) may not be due to the fact that we know them

only intellectually, and so may unconsciously transfigure

them.

 

(2) We cannot know with certainty what the emotions

and sensations of animals really are. They are probably

like what our sensations and emotions might be apart from

the intellect. But it can never be absolutely evident to us

that they are so, or what they are in themselves, or even

what our own sensations and emotions may be, apart from

our intellect, though, as we have endeavoured to show,* our

intellect enables us to obtain a high degree of probability

in the matter.

 

Secondly, it is not evident that the universe may not

consist of one kind of matter (the parent of all the combi-

nations we know), and one physical energy (the root of

the physical energies of our experience), together with an

intelligent energy.

 

Thirdly, it may consist of one matter and several or many

energies, essentially distinct from all eternity, together with

intelligent energy.

 

Fourthly, it is not evident that it may not be composed of

several, or many, essentially distinct matters (true elements)

with a physical energy essentially one, together with in-

telligent energy.

 

Fifthly, it may consist of several or a multitude of distinct

 

* See ante, p. 216.