40 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

reasonably speak of " things " and habitually employ our

notions of what we so spoke about as if they were what

he said they were not, namely, absolute external existences

independent of the mind. Things were for him, as they are

for modern Idealists, stably associated groups of sensuous

experiences, and not by any means mere passing feelings of

the moment. Berkeley denied, and Idealists deny, that

we can have any notion of an object save in terms of

sense-perception, and this is so far true that, as before

pointed out,* we can have no conception of anything,

however abstract, save by the said mental images or

imaginations.

As our readers know, Berkeley's denial of the existence

of material substance was followed by Hume's denial of

the existence of any substance of mind, and his represen-

tation of our own being as only made up of a succession of

fleeting feelings, their mode of succession being modified by

custom. According to Fichte, all that exists is the self,

or subjective Ego, the thoughts of which constitute the

universe (the system of Solipsism). According to others

there is an objective Ego, of which our own existence is

but a thought. For modern transcendental Idealists, a

"thinking subject" is the source of relations and of the

world they constitute ; for, as we before said, nothing

exists unrelated.

It would be beside the purpose of this book to enter

upon a description of the different forms of Idealism. What

concerns us is not their various affirmations but the denial

in which they all agree the denial, namely, that we do, or

can, know and perceive an independent external world,

consisting of objects known to us as things in themselves,

and possessing a number of objective qualities which are

revealed to us through our subjective sensations.

* See ante, p. 9.

reasonably speak of " things " and habitually employ our

notions of what we so spoke about as if they were what

he said they were not, namely, absolute external existences

independent of the mind. Things were for him, as they are

for modern Idealists, stably associated groups of sensuous

experiences, and not by any means mere passing feelings of

the moment. Berkeley denied, and Idealists deny, that

we can have any notion of an object save in terms of

sense-perception, and this is so far true that, as before

pointed out,* we can have no conception of anything,

however abstract, save by the said mental images or

imaginations.

As our readers know, Berkeley's denial of the existence

of material substance was followed by Hume's denial of

the existence of any substance of mind, and his represen-

tation of our own being as only made up of a succession of

fleeting feelings, their mode of succession being modified by

custom. According to Fichte, all that exists is the self,

or subjective Ego, the thoughts of which constitute the

universe (the system of Solipsism). According to others

there is an objective Ego, of which our own existence is

but a thought. For modern transcendental Idealists, a

"thinking subject" is the source of relations and of the

world they constitute ; for, as we before said, nothing

exists unrelated.

It would be beside the purpose of this book to enter

upon a description of the different forms of Idealism. What

concerns us is not their various affirmations but the denial

in which they all agree the denial, namely, that we do, or

can, know and perceive an independent external world,

consisting of objects known to us as things in themselves,

and possessing a number of objective qualities which are

revealed to us through our subjective sensations.

* See ante, p. 9.