156 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

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340 

 

own sake in a work such as this, but for the sake of its

indirect bearing on Epistemology.

 

Many persons who have accepted the Darwinian hypo-

thesis as to evolution are inclined to distrust their own

reason, as being but the intelligence of a more highly de-

veloped ape. If, therefore, the study of animal intelligence

should convince our readers that there is a difference of

kind between the psychical nature of man and that of

animals, such reason for distrust must disappear. But, on

the other hand, should we become convinced that there is no

difference of kind, the distrust referred to need not thereby

be strengthened. For animals would then be seen to be

of a much higher nature than has been usually supposed,

since (as we shall see) there can be no doubt as to our

own rationality. If animals are also rational, though but

potentially so, we may suppose that their environment and

some incompleteness of internal development has prevented

them from hitherto manifesting their latent rationality. It

must have remained hidden, as that of the human infant

is concealed by the co-existence of internal and external

conditions, which make its external manifestation impossible.

There would, therefore, be no more reason to distrust the

dictates of human reason, because developed from that of

an unconscious animal, than because developed (as that of

all men has been) from that of an unconscious infant.

 

We can, therefore, address ourselves cequo ammo to the

question of animal intelligence and study it with the most

complete impartiality, since the absolute value of the

dictates of our own intelligence cannot be affected thereby.

Nevertheless, the question is most interesting, as bearing

on the problem of nature's continuity, and as being one to

which many excellent persons have (we believe most

mistakenly) attached an extreme importance.

 

In dealing with this matter, great confusion and numerous

 

 

own sake in a work such as this, but for the sake of its

indirect bearing on Epistemology.

 

Many persons who have accepted the Darwinian hypo-

thesis as to evolution are inclined to distrust their own

reason, as being but the intelligence of a more highly de-

veloped ape. If, therefore, the study of animal intelligence

should convince our readers that there is a difference of

kind between the psychical nature of man and that of

animals, such reason for distrust must disappear. But, on

the other hand, should we become convinced that there is no

difference of kind, the distrust referred to need not thereby

be strengthened. For animals would then be seen to be

of a much higher nature than has been usually supposed,

since (as we shall see) there can be no doubt as to our

own rationality. If animals are also rational, though but

potentially so, we may suppose that their environment and

some incompleteness of internal development has prevented

them from hitherto manifesting their latent rationality. It

must have remained hidden, as that of the human infant

is concealed by the co-existence of internal and external

conditions, which make its external manifestation impossible.

There would, therefore, be no more reason to distrust the

dictates of human reason, because developed from that of

an unconscious animal, than because developed (as that of

all men has been) from that of an unconscious infant.

 

We can, therefore, address ourselves cequo ammo to the

question of animal intelligence and study it with the most

complete impartiality, since the absolute value of the

dictates of our own intelligence cannot be affected thereby.

Nevertheless, the question is most interesting, as bearing

on the problem of nature's continuity, and as being one to

which many excellent persons have (we believe most

mistakenly) attached an extreme importance.

 

In dealing with this matter, great confusion and numerous