3 8 THE GROUNDWORK OF

something external to and independent of the mind which

supports all the ' qualities,' the existence of which the mind

recognizes, then Idealism may be accused of taking it away,

if one may be said to take away a thing which never has

been or can be perceived to exist or be even imagined so to

do. Far from inculcating any disbelief in the senses or in

what the senses tell us, Idealism attaches the very highest

value to the senses and to their teaching. It no more doubts

the existence of what is seen, heard, or felt, than it doubts

the existence of the mind which sees, hears, or feels.

Nothing, therefore, can be more absurd than the criticisms

of those persons who say that Idealists, to be consistent,

ought to run up against lamp-posts, fall into ditches, and

commit other similar absurdities. Idealism is not only a

thoroughly logical system, but also one quite in harmony with

every-day life, its perceptions and its duties. It is obvious

that we can never get outside ourselves, or feel the feelings of

anyone else. We can only know our own sensations and

ideas. The existence of these sensations and ideas is suffi-

cient to explain our whole experience, and we are not idly to

suppose that other things exist when such ' other things ' are

altogether superfluous for explaining any of the phenomena

we are or can become acquainted with. As we cannot know

anything beyond our own ideas, why should we affirm that

there is anything beyond them ? It is impossible for us to

even imagine anything existing unperceived. We cannot

imagine matter existing in the absence of mind, for in the

very act of imagining it we are compelled to imagine some-

one perceiving it. It is, of course, easy enough to imagine

trees in a park or books in a library, and nobody by to

perceive them. But so to do is only to form in the mind

certain ideas which we call books and trees, and at the same

time to omit to form the idea of anyone perceiving them.

But the person so imagining them must himself be thinking

something external to and independent of the mind which

supports all the ' qualities,' the existence of which the mind

recognizes, then Idealism may be accused of taking it away,

if one may be said to take away a thing which never has

been or can be perceived to exist or be even imagined so to

do. Far from inculcating any disbelief in the senses or in

what the senses tell us, Idealism attaches the very highest

value to the senses and to their teaching. It no more doubts

the existence of what is seen, heard, or felt, than it doubts

the existence of the mind which sees, hears, or feels.

Nothing, therefore, can be more absurd than the criticisms

of those persons who say that Idealists, to be consistent,

ought to run up against lamp-posts, fall into ditches, and

commit other similar absurdities. Idealism is not only a

thoroughly logical system, but also one quite in harmony with

every-day life, its perceptions and its duties. It is obvious

that we can never get outside ourselves, or feel the feelings of

anyone else. We can only know our own sensations and

ideas. The existence of these sensations and ideas is suffi-

cient to explain our whole experience, and we are not idly to

suppose that other things exist when such ' other things ' are

altogether superfluous for explaining any of the phenomena

we are or can become acquainted with. As we cannot know

anything beyond our own ideas, why should we affirm that

there is anything beyond them ? It is impossible for us to

even imagine anything existing unperceived. We cannot

imagine matter existing in the absence of mind, for in the

very act of imagining it we are compelled to imagine some-

one perceiving it. It is, of course, easy enough to imagine

trees in a park or books in a library, and nobody by to

perceive them. But so to do is only to form in the mind

certain ideas which we call books and trees, and at the same

time to omit to form the idea of anyone perceiving them.

But the person so imagining them must himself be thinking