THE OBJECTS OF SCIENCE 67

mankind, from a Sussex cowherd to the greatest philosopher

of Greece ; and a spontaneous and universal human convic-

tion should be accepted and acquiesced in unless there are

valid reasons against our so doing.

\Ye must here revert to a point before noticed. In our

perception of any object it is made present to our mind by

feelings to which we do not advert. Its presence is a presence

in the mind's perception and not in the feelings (vivid and

faint) which accompany such perception. Moreover, though

" subjective feetings" cannot be like "objective qualities" there

may nevertheless be a true correspondence between our

subjective perception of an object and its objective mode of

existence. For, as we have before pointed out,* we can know

things which never were and never could be felt or imagined,

and there is the greatest possible difference between "feel-

ings" and "ideas."

Now let the reader examine what his own mind tells him,

and we are confident he will see that in perceiving any body

to be one body, or to be solid or to be extended or to be

moving, he has, in each separate case, one single and simple

idea and not an amalgam of feelings of " touch," " pressure,"

" effort," and " sight," however indispensable such feelings may

have been in order to call forth perceptions and ideas of unity,

solidity, extension, and motion.

Moreover, the idea of extension may exist apart from

visual feelings, for the blind have it, and apart from tactual

feelings, for it is given by sight alone especially with the

twofold grasp of objects our two eyes simultaneously afford

us. That an idea can persist unchanged amidst changing

sensuous experiences and remain single though revealed to

us by sensuous experiences of many and such diverse kinds,

we have already seen.t That feelings of different kinds are

required to arouse our idea of extension, does not show that

* See ante, pp. 10, 11. t See ante, pp. 60, 61.

mankind, from a Sussex cowherd to the greatest philosopher

of Greece ; and a spontaneous and universal human convic-

tion should be accepted and acquiesced in unless there are

valid reasons against our so doing.

\Ye must here revert to a point before noticed. In our

perception of any object it is made present to our mind by

feelings to which we do not advert. Its presence is a presence

in the mind's perception and not in the feelings (vivid and

faint) which accompany such perception. Moreover, though

" subjective feetings" cannot be like "objective qualities" there

may nevertheless be a true correspondence between our

subjective perception of an object and its objective mode of

existence. For, as we have before pointed out,* we can know

things which never were and never could be felt or imagined,

and there is the greatest possible difference between "feel-

ings" and "ideas."

Now let the reader examine what his own mind tells him,

and we are confident he will see that in perceiving any body

to be one body, or to be solid or to be extended or to be

moving, he has, in each separate case, one single and simple

idea and not an amalgam of feelings of " touch," " pressure,"

" effort," and " sight," however indispensable such feelings may

have been in order to call forth perceptions and ideas of unity,

solidity, extension, and motion.

Moreover, the idea of extension may exist apart from

visual feelings, for the blind have it, and apart from tactual

feelings, for it is given by sight alone especially with the

twofold grasp of objects our two eyes simultaneously afford

us. That an idea can persist unchanged amidst changing

sensuous experiences and remain single though revealed to

us by sensuous experiences of many and such diverse kinds,

we have already seen.t That feelings of different kinds are

required to arouse our idea of extension, does not show that

* See ante, pp. 10, 11. t See ante, pp. 60, 61.