160 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

have occasion to note only one relation as the relation of

right and left we must, to be conscious of it, turn our

attention to both these conditions successively, and then

simultaneously have regard to both terms, or we could not

apprehend the relation.

We think there is no need to credit animals with such

complex psychical acts in order to explain even their most

startling performances. It seems to us their consentience

affords them practically sufficient sensuous perceptions of

the relations in which objects and events stand to each

other as well as of the objects themselves.

Similarly, it is plain that animals have a practical sense of

their existence, and run no risk of mistaking another creature

for themselves. But for such a sensitive synthesis there is no

need of consciousness, as we know by purely human experi-

ence. All that is needed is consentience, and this no one

can doubt that they possess, and probably exert this

faculty with greater energy than we do, on account of the

absence in them of a truly intellectual, conscious self-

perception, such as that which enables us to perceive that

" I am I, and not another."

As to the possession by animals of "ideas," no one can

deny them such psychical activities as are often so termed

namely, the faint revival of complex groups of past sensa-

tions and imaginations previously experienced, and varied

associations of groups of groups of such psychical states.

But this is by no means what we understand by "ideas."

An " idea " is a " psychical " entity, which spontaneously

starts forth in our mind, upon the reception of certain

sensuous experiences (sensations and imaginations), like

Athene from the head of Zeus. Thus one of our earliest

ideas is also the most ultimate and most abstract, namely,

the idea of being. For the rest we must refer our

readers to what we have said about " ideas " in our first

have occasion to note only one relation as the relation of

right and left we must, to be conscious of it, turn our

attention to both these conditions successively, and then

simultaneously have regard to both terms, or we could not

apprehend the relation.

We think there is no need to credit animals with such

complex psychical acts in order to explain even their most

startling performances. It seems to us their consentience

affords them practically sufficient sensuous perceptions of

the relations in which objects and events stand to each

other as well as of the objects themselves.

Similarly, it is plain that animals have a practical sense of

their existence, and run no risk of mistaking another creature

for themselves. But for such a sensitive synthesis there is no

need of consciousness, as we know by purely human experi-

ence. All that is needed is consentience, and this no one

can doubt that they possess, and probably exert this

faculty with greater energy than we do, on account of the

absence in them of a truly intellectual, conscious self-

perception, such as that which enables us to perceive that

" I am I, and not another."

As to the possession by animals of "ideas," no one can

deny them such psychical activities as are often so termed

namely, the faint revival of complex groups of past sensa-

tions and imaginations previously experienced, and varied

associations of groups of groups of such psychical states.

But this is by no means what we understand by "ideas."

An " idea " is a " psychical " entity, which spontaneously

starts forth in our mind, upon the reception of certain

sensuous experiences (sensations and imaginations), like

Athene from the head of Zeus. Thus one of our earliest

ideas is also the most ultimate and most abstract, namely,

the idea of being. For the rest we must refer our

readers to what we have said about " ideas " in our first