to THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

Nevertheless, it would (in our opinion) be the greatest

mistake possible to affirm that there is absolutely nothing

in the intellect save what previously existed in our sensations.

To say this would be to deny the essential distinctness which

exists between " ideas " and " feelings," whether the latter are

" sensations " or " mental images." As to the signification of

the word " idea," our definition would be " an intellectual

representation of an object either actually existing or merely

possible."

One or two examples may suffice to show how, by the help

of sensations and mental images, the mind rises to the con-

ception of ideas beyond the power of mere feeling. Thus

we often refer to some past " experience," and the idea is a

sufficiently familiar one, yet that idea cannot possibly be

a faint reproduction of past feelings, for " experience " is an

abstract term, and, therefore, denotes something which never

could have been felt at all. By receiving or obtaining over

and over again feelings of the same or of different kinds, we

may feel them more easily, more pleasurably, or (as is too

often the case) more painfully. But to undergo such changes

of feeling, and to obtain the idea " experience," are two very

different things.

Again, we can all form an idea of the action of our eyes in

seeing (our act of sight), yet that act of seeing was never

itself felt, nor can the idea be decomposed into mere feelings

it contains much more. We may have certain feelings in

our eyeballs while looking, but even if we could feel (which

we cannot) every minute action of every part of the eyes and

of the brain's complex mechanism, such feelings would be no

"idea of the act of seeing." Among the constant experiences

of our daily life are our perceptions of different shades of

colour, and different feelings have accompanied such percep-

tions. But of "colour" we have never once had a feeling;

yet we have a clear idea of it and often speak of it.

Nevertheless, it would (in our opinion) be the greatest

mistake possible to affirm that there is absolutely nothing

in the intellect save what previously existed in our sensations.

To say this would be to deny the essential distinctness which

exists between " ideas " and " feelings," whether the latter are

" sensations " or " mental images." As to the signification of

the word " idea," our definition would be " an intellectual

representation of an object either actually existing or merely

possible."

One or two examples may suffice to show how, by the help

of sensations and mental images, the mind rises to the con-

ception of ideas beyond the power of mere feeling. Thus

we often refer to some past " experience," and the idea is a

sufficiently familiar one, yet that idea cannot possibly be

a faint reproduction of past feelings, for " experience " is an

abstract term, and, therefore, denotes something which never

could have been felt at all. By receiving or obtaining over

and over again feelings of the same or of different kinds, we

may feel them more easily, more pleasurably, or (as is too

often the case) more painfully. But to undergo such changes

of feeling, and to obtain the idea " experience," are two very

different things.

Again, we can all form an idea of the action of our eyes in

seeing (our act of sight), yet that act of seeing was never

itself felt, nor can the idea be decomposed into mere feelings

it contains much more. We may have certain feelings in

our eyeballs while looking, but even if we could feel (which

we cannot) every minute action of every part of the eyes and

of the brain's complex mechanism, such feelings would be no

"idea of the act of seeing." Among the constant experiences

of our daily life are our perceptions of different shades of

colour, and different feelings have accompanied such percep-

tions. But of "colour" we have never once had a feeling;

yet we have a clear idea of it and often speak of it.