INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF SCIENCE 237

its performance, it appears to us that the reflex act which

recognizes " I am I," or " My feeling is now being felt,"

must be one that occupies a portion of time, however

minute, and that therefore the existence, or act, thus reflexly

cognized, must be an existence or act of the moment past.

That our faculties, with our bodily organization, may fail

to seize on this minute and momentary state of succession,

is no more wonderful than that an iron bar, red-hot at

one end, should, when very rapidly twirled, give our eyes

the impression of a circle of light.

But, however this matter may be, though mistakes of

various kinds are possible, we are none the less all of us

certain as to some past events in our lives. It may be

an event of childhood ; it may be one when leaving school ;

it may be our marriage ; or it may be the last thing

those who are now reading this did before they began to

read it. As to some portions of the past, memory gives

us as much certainty as we can have with respect to

some portions of the present if we can have reflex

knowledge of anything absolutely present.

If we could not trust our faculty of memory, not only

would all history be impossible, but we could never order

our future conduct according to the lessons our experiences

of life ought, and is supposed, to give us.

But the veracity of the faculty of memory can never

be proved, and is, manifestly, a self-evident truth carrying

with it its own certainty. There can be no possible proof

of it, because we cannot argue at all unless we already

trust it. How could we ever reach the conclusion of a

syllogism if we could not trust our memory as to what

.the assertions of the major and minor premisses were?

Yet, marvellous to relate, an eminent physicist once

declared that we may trust our memory because we learn

its trustworthiness by experience ! Surely never was fallacy

its performance, it appears to us that the reflex act which

recognizes " I am I," or " My feeling is now being felt,"

must be one that occupies a portion of time, however

minute, and that therefore the existence, or act, thus reflexly

cognized, must be an existence or act of the moment past.

That our faculties, with our bodily organization, may fail

to seize on this minute and momentary state of succession,

is no more wonderful than that an iron bar, red-hot at

one end, should, when very rapidly twirled, give our eyes

the impression of a circle of light.

But, however this matter may be, though mistakes of

various kinds are possible, we are none the less all of us

certain as to some past events in our lives. It may be

an event of childhood ; it may be one when leaving school ;

it may be our marriage ; or it may be the last thing

those who are now reading this did before they began to

read it. As to some portions of the past, memory gives

us as much certainty as we can have with respect to

some portions of the present if we can have reflex

knowledge of anything absolutely present.

If we could not trust our faculty of memory, not only

would all history be impossible, but we could never order

our future conduct according to the lessons our experiences

of life ought, and is supposed, to give us.

But the veracity of the faculty of memory can never

be proved, and is, manifestly, a self-evident truth carrying

with it its own certainty. There can be no possible proof

of it, because we cannot argue at all unless we already

trust it. How could we ever reach the conclusion of a

syllogism if we could not trust our memory as to what

.the assertions of the major and minor premisses were?

Yet, marvellous to relate, an eminent physicist once

declared that we may trust our memory because we learn

its trustworthiness by experience ! Surely never was fallacy