x THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

but with an implied perception of substantial existences

underlying and utterly different from any plexuses of feelings.

If we shall be compelled to admit that Idealism is true, we

shall have also to admit that the groundwork of science is

indeed mental, in a very different sense from that in which we

and most other men have taken it to be. Moreover, for our

own part, we should then feel that the authority and certainty

of other seemingly self-evident truths were gravely com-

promised, especially if a truth apparently so self-evident as

the existence of our own body (as we and most men under-

stand that body to exist) were but a delusion and self-

deception of the mind. But although, even then, the most

fundamental truths of all would still, for us, remain evident

and unimpaired in their certainty, it nevertheless appears to

us to be incumbent on anyone who desires to study epis-

temology, to enter upon a serious inquiry as to the truth of

Idealism.

An inquiry respecting a system which has been adopted, and

is maintained, by so many men of eminence, not alone in

philosophy but in physical science also, can evidently be no

light task ; yet it must be undertaken and Idealism accepted

or rejected before further progress is possible. If such an

inquiry were neglected the groundwork of science would, we

think, have to remain for the student a problem unsolved and

(till this has been finally decided one way or the other)

insoluble.

The inquirer, having become once convinced of the real

existence of an external independent world of "things in

themselves " should, we think, have his attention next

called to the modes and methods wherewith science deals

with the objects it investigates, in order to ascertain, as far

as he may, what assumptions and convictions are implied

in, and by, and are necessary for, all and any scientific

research. This appears to us a desirable, if not an absolutely

but with an implied perception of substantial existences

underlying and utterly different from any plexuses of feelings.

If we shall be compelled to admit that Idealism is true, we

shall have also to admit that the groundwork of science is

indeed mental, in a very different sense from that in which we

and most other men have taken it to be. Moreover, for our

own part, we should then feel that the authority and certainty

of other seemingly self-evident truths were gravely com-

promised, especially if a truth apparently so self-evident as

the existence of our own body (as we and most men under-

stand that body to exist) were but a delusion and self-

deception of the mind. But although, even then, the most

fundamental truths of all would still, for us, remain evident

and unimpaired in their certainty, it nevertheless appears to

us to be incumbent on anyone who desires to study epis-

temology, to enter upon a serious inquiry as to the truth of

Idealism.

An inquiry respecting a system which has been adopted, and

is maintained, by so many men of eminence, not alone in

philosophy but in physical science also, can evidently be no

light task ; yet it must be undertaken and Idealism accepted

or rejected before further progress is possible. If such an

inquiry were neglected the groundwork of science would, we

think, have to remain for the student a problem unsolved and

(till this has been finally decided one way or the other)

insoluble.

The inquirer, having become once convinced of the real

existence of an external independent world of "things in

themselves " should, we think, have his attention next

called to the modes and methods wherewith science deals

with the objects it investigates, in order to ascertain, as far

as he may, what assumptions and convictions are implied

in, and by, and are necessary for, all and any scientific

research. This appears to us a desirable, if not an absolutely