xvi THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

apprehension of such truths could never have been gained

by " Natural Selection," but must be altogether independent

thereof.

But it is evidently necessary, in order to decide this ques-

tion, that we should be acquainted with those of our powers

which we might expect to be least dependent on " Natural

Selection," and for this it will be necessary to revert (once

more, and more fully) to the questions of certainty and of

what must be, if anything can be, its criterion. This again

will necessarily lead us to examine more carefully the pos-

sible self-evidence of propositions, the knowledge of our own

existence, and the trustworthiness of memory as vouching

for such existence in the past.

Then, also, if we conclude it to be true that we can

know objects of knowledge as they exist objectively (or

in themselves) the problem of the special relation which

must, in that case, exist between " subject " and " object,"

will have to be investigated. The decision of this question

will naturally lead us to a further investigation of first

principles underlying all our reasoning, what they are,

and whether we can attain to an evident and logical

adjustment of truths. Amongst the most important of

such principles, and one about which the most vigorous

disputations have taken place, is the principle of causation.

The truth and validity of this principle, if it can once be

established, have evidently most important consequences

bearing upon the cause and origin of our own intuitions,

and upon the existence, qualities, and powers of the

entire cosmos. Here the theory of " Natural Selection "

again courts our notice ; and its bearing on the living

world will have to be considered in the light derived from

that far larger and more enduring world, which is inorganic

and lifeless. The question concerning the significance of

human faculty as a part of the universe will come next, and

apprehension of such truths could never have been gained

by " Natural Selection," but must be altogether independent

thereof.

But it is evidently necessary, in order to decide this ques-

tion, that we should be acquainted with those of our powers

which we might expect to be least dependent on " Natural

Selection," and for this it will be necessary to revert (once

more, and more fully) to the questions of certainty and of

what must be, if anything can be, its criterion. This again

will necessarily lead us to examine more carefully the pos-

sible self-evidence of propositions, the knowledge of our own

existence, and the trustworthiness of memory as vouching

for such existence in the past.

Then, also, if we conclude it to be true that we can

know objects of knowledge as they exist objectively (or

in themselves) the problem of the special relation which

must, in that case, exist between " subject " and " object,"

will have to be investigated. The decision of this question

will naturally lead us to a further investigation of first

principles underlying all our reasoning, what they are,

and whether we can attain to an evident and logical

adjustment of truths. Amongst the most important of

such principles, and one about which the most vigorous

disputations have taken place, is the principle of causation.

The truth and validity of this principle, if it can once be

established, have evidently most important consequences

bearing upon the cause and origin of our own intuitions,

and upon the existence, qualities, and powers of the

entire cosmos. Here the theory of " Natural Selection "

again courts our notice ; and its bearing on the living

world will have to be considered in the light derived from

that far larger and more enduring world, which is inorganic

and lifeless. The question concerning the significance of

human faculty as a part of the universe will come next, and