t Introduction to Comparative Psychology.

readers will find a very painstaking examination of the

evidence both for and against the rationality of animals.

Although his opinion favours the non-existence of a differ-

ence of kind between human and animal intelligence, he is

nevertheless of opinion that animals can neither perceive

relations nor reason, and that with the advent of the latter

power a breach of continuity and a fresh departure really

took place. The book also contains a careful criticism of

a variety of tales concerning animal intelligence.

He is also of opinion that animals are entirely devoid

of ethical perceptions ; but other persons are not wanting

who do credit them with moral perception !

That dogs will not only love their master but readily obey

his commands, and feel pain if they have yielded to a temp-

tation to transgress them, may be very true. That dogs and

other animals may sometimes feel impelled to assist their

fellows in distress on witnessing their sufferings, we should

not care to dispute, and it is possible that to some migrating

bird, which has left its young behind, an imagination of its

deserted brood may arise and cause it a painful emotion.

But such feelings have really nothing to do with ethical

perception. " Conscience " is the exercise of judgment in a

particular direction. It is a particular kind of judgment

namely, a judgment about " right " and " wrong," and nothing

else. Acting rightly is often pleasurable, but it is also not

unfrequently very painful, for it may tell us we are bound

to give up something which is for us the very joy of life, or

to take upon us a task as irksome as it is dutiful.

It is plain that we may feel pleasure in doing things which

are wrong, for certainly otherwise they would never be done.

On the other hand, there may be much painful regret on

account of quite innocent actions, such as some trifling breach

of etiquette. Keen remorse also may be felt on account of

having neglected some excellent opportunity of pushing our

readers will find a very painstaking examination of the

evidence both for and against the rationality of animals.

Although his opinion favours the non-existence of a differ-

ence of kind between human and animal intelligence, he is

nevertheless of opinion that animals can neither perceive

relations nor reason, and that with the advent of the latter

power a breach of continuity and a fresh departure really

took place. The book also contains a careful criticism of

a variety of tales concerning animal intelligence.

He is also of opinion that animals are entirely devoid

of ethical perceptions ; but other persons are not wanting

who do credit them with moral perception !

That dogs will not only love their master but readily obey

his commands, and feel pain if they have yielded to a temp-

tation to transgress them, may be very true. That dogs and

other animals may sometimes feel impelled to assist their

fellows in distress on witnessing their sufferings, we should

not care to dispute, and it is possible that to some migrating

bird, which has left its young behind, an imagination of its

deserted brood may arise and cause it a painful emotion.

But such feelings have really nothing to do with ethical

perception. " Conscience " is the exercise of judgment in a

particular direction. It is a particular kind of judgment

namely, a judgment about " right " and " wrong," and nothing

else. Acting rightly is often pleasurable, but it is also not

unfrequently very painful, for it may tell us we are bound

to give up something which is for us the very joy of life, or

to take upon us a task as irksome as it is dutiful.

It is plain that we may feel pleasure in doing things which

are wrong, for certainly otherwise they would never be done.

On the other hand, there may be much painful regret on

account of quite innocent actions, such as some trifling breach

of etiquette. Keen remorse also may be felt on account of

having neglected some excellent opportunity of pushing our