THE OBJECTS OF SCIENCE 47
К оглавлению1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101
102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118
119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135
136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152
153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169
170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 181 182 183 184 185 186
187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203
204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220
221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237
238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254
255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271
272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288
289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305
306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322
323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339
340
which has, independently of such Selection, produced our
highest and most certain perceptions, applicable to all ages
and every part of the universe, a fortiori it could have also
independently produced the very minor effect of enabling us
to become aware of the present state of the world about us.
We shall here contend that such awareness is of an intuitive
character, and that we possess a direct intuition of "the
extended " i.e., of the various extended bodies which make
up the material world. Nevertheless, all intuitions do not
stand on the same level, and, as we have just implied, our
intuition about " extension " does not stand on the highest
level but on one below that upon which rest those ultimate
first principles of knowledge with which Epistemology
directly deals, and which will be carefully considered in our
last two chapters. Had it this highest degree of certainty
it would be impossible for us even to entertain about it that
sort of fictitious doubt which Idealists possess, nor could any
dispute take place as to whether the inevitable character of
our notion about the external world is either an inference or
a delusion.
But before proceeding to argue in favour of the reality
as well as the inevitableness of our conviction as to an
external world, it may be well to state, as clearly as we
can, what that reality according to us is. It may be
expressed as follows :
" All the different bodies and substances of the universe
about us really exist independent of the mind, and with
equal reality, whether they be perceived or not. Through
our senses our intellect becomes directly aware of their
existence, as ' things of themselves,' and of some of their
objective qualities. Those qualities, however, are unlike
the sensations external bodies excite in us ; though our
perceptions, aroused by our sensations, do correspond to
such objective qualities. External material bodies exist
which has, independently of such Selection, produced our
highest and most certain perceptions, applicable to all ages
and every part of the universe, a fortiori it could have also
independently produced the very minor effect of enabling us
to become aware of the present state of the world about us.
We shall here contend that such awareness is of an intuitive
character, and that we possess a direct intuition of "the
extended " i.e., of the various extended bodies which make
up the material world. Nevertheless, all intuitions do not
stand on the same level, and, as we have just implied, our
intuition about " extension " does not stand on the highest
level but on one below that upon which rest those ultimate
first principles of knowledge with which Epistemology
directly deals, and which will be carefully considered in our
last two chapters. Had it this highest degree of certainty
it would be impossible for us even to entertain about it that
sort of fictitious doubt which Idealists possess, nor could any
dispute take place as to whether the inevitable character of
our notion about the external world is either an inference or
a delusion.
But before proceeding to argue in favour of the reality
as well as the inevitableness of our conviction as to an
external world, it may be well to state, as clearly as we
can, what that reality according to us is. It may be
expressed as follows :
" All the different bodies and substances of the universe
about us really exist independent of the mind, and with
equal reality, whether they be perceived or not. Through
our senses our intellect becomes directly aware of their
existence, as ' things of themselves,' and of some of their
objective qualities. Those qualities, however, are unlike
the sensations external bodies excite in us ; though our
perceptions, aroused by our sensations, do correspond to
such objective qualities. External material bodies exist