5o THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

therefore, to do not only with our perceptions themselves,

but also with the causes of our perceptions.

Although, as before said, we do not question the eminence

or the services of men of science who are Idealists, never-

theless we believe Idealism to be fundamentally out of

harmony with physical science. We strongly suspect that

the intellectual nature of idealistic physicists is too much

for them ; and that, though they may be ever ready to

represent the objects of their study and experience as so

many complex groups of feelings, they really regard them

(in common with other people) as independent objects with

special qualities and powers. We think thus because, though

(as we have just observed) it is easy enough to translate

mere objects perceived, into groups of feelings and relations

between them, it is much more difficult to investigate and

describe the reciprocal actions of objects (as, e.g., of the

sun and moon on the tidal wave) as only relations

between ideas and not as activities of external, absolutely

independent extended things which really affect each other.

There can be no question about the fact that observations

and experiments are accepted by scientific men as real objec-

tive facts and occurrences, and the whole of physical science,

understood as men of science themselves understand it, is

based upon that way of regarding them. It would be

ridiculous to pretend that when astronomers, chemists, and

anatomists are tracing the motions of the heavenly bodies, or

analyzing minerals, or ascertaining the course followed by a

nerve or an artery, they remain all the time convinced that

they are really investigating the relations borne by groups of

past and present feelings to other such groups, and nothing

more!

It is very certain that, but for their conviction they were

dealing with independent realities and discovering really

objective truths, the physical sciences would never have

therefore, to do not only with our perceptions themselves,

but also with the causes of our perceptions.

Although, as before said, we do not question the eminence

or the services of men of science who are Idealists, never-

theless we believe Idealism to be fundamentally out of

harmony with physical science. We strongly suspect that

the intellectual nature of idealistic physicists is too much

for them ; and that, though they may be ever ready to

represent the objects of their study and experience as so

many complex groups of feelings, they really regard them

(in common with other people) as independent objects with

special qualities and powers. We think thus because, though

(as we have just observed) it is easy enough to translate

mere objects perceived, into groups of feelings and relations

between them, it is much more difficult to investigate and

describe the reciprocal actions of objects (as, e.g., of the

sun and moon on the tidal wave) as only relations

between ideas and not as activities of external, absolutely

independent extended things which really affect each other.

There can be no question about the fact that observations

and experiments are accepted by scientific men as real objec-

tive facts and occurrences, and the whole of physical science,

understood as men of science themselves understand it, is

based upon that way of regarding them. It would be

ridiculous to pretend that when astronomers, chemists, and

anatomists are tracing the motions of the heavenly bodies, or

analyzing minerals, or ascertaining the course followed by a

nerve or an artery, they remain all the time convinced that

they are really investigating the relations borne by groups of

past and present feelings to other such groups, and nothing

more!

It is very certain that, but for their conviction they were

dealing with independent realities and discovering really

objective truths, the physical sciences would never have