172 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

К оглавлению1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 
102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 
119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 
136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 
153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 
170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179  181 182 183 184 185 186 
187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 
204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 
221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 
238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 
255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 
272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 
289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 
306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 
323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 
340 

 

about looking in all directions and even up into trees ; and

he considered that these actions clearly showed that the

dog entertained " a general idea that some animal was to

be discovered and hunted." Now, of course, such sounds

uttered in an eager voice excited the dog's emotions and

awoke in its consentience reminiscences of before-experi-

enced groups of smells, sounds, colours, and motions and

relations of various kinds, between them previously connected

with pleasurable activities and feelings of cravings satisfied,

etc., etc. But such groups of feelings, vivid and faint, are,

as we have seen before, something very different from " a

general idea."

 

Wolves have both a fear of man and a suspicious feeling

with respect to traps and snares, on which account they have

been credited with possessing an "abstract idea of danger."

But the lower human unconscious activities we have passed

in review are amply sufficient to account for such pheno-

mena, especially as the smell of man may often lead a wolf

not to touch a bait which a man has set for him.

 

In order to correctly appreciate the limits of the emotional

language of animals, we must understand how much they

can do by mere consentience, and that actions on their part, at

which most ignorant wonder is often expressed, do not imply

either self-consciousness or the possession of any abstract

ideas. All the actions of the most intelligent animal can

we think be fully understood as results of powers similar

to our own lower faculties described in the last chapter.

For such actions on the part of animals, it is necessary,

indeed, that they should sensibly cognize things, but not

that they should perceive them intellectually ; that they

should feel themselves as existing, but not recognize their

own existence ; that they should feel relations between

objects, but not perceive them as relations ; that they should

remember, but not seek to recollect or know that what

 

 

about looking in all directions and even up into trees ; and

he considered that these actions clearly showed that the

dog entertained " a general idea that some animal was to

be discovered and hunted." Now, of course, such sounds

uttered in an eager voice excited the dog's emotions and

awoke in its consentience reminiscences of before-experi-

enced groups of smells, sounds, colours, and motions and

relations of various kinds, between them previously connected

with pleasurable activities and feelings of cravings satisfied,

etc., etc. But such groups of feelings, vivid and faint, are,

as we have seen before, something very different from " a

general idea."

 

Wolves have both a fear of man and a suspicious feeling

with respect to traps and snares, on which account they have

been credited with possessing an "abstract idea of danger."

But the lower human unconscious activities we have passed

in review are amply sufficient to account for such pheno-

mena, especially as the smell of man may often lead a wolf

not to touch a bait which a man has set for him.

 

In order to correctly appreciate the limits of the emotional

language of animals, we must understand how much they

can do by mere consentience, and that actions on their part, at

which most ignorant wonder is often expressed, do not imply

either self-consciousness or the possession of any abstract

ideas. All the actions of the most intelligent animal can

we think be fully understood as results of powers similar

to our own lower faculties described in the last chapter.

For such actions on the part of animals, it is necessary,

indeed, that they should sensibly cognize things, but not

that they should perceive them intellectually ; that they

should feel themselves as existing, but not recognize their

own existence ; that they should feel relations between

objects, but not perceive them as relations ; that they should

remember, but not seek to recollect or know that what