INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF SCIENCE 241

the psychical being of mere animals has as yet, to our

knowledge, shown itself capable. No one pretends that

brutes possess this marvellous intuition, while it is and

must be present, however unrecognized, in any savage who

has but one recollection of anything he has done or has

had done to him.

It is thus alone that we can unite the past with the

present and say " I am." These two words have an

immense significance for anyone who will carefully ponder

over them. They signify that he who utters them intelli-

gently recognizes certain past acts as his own acts, .and

that a continuous unity (himself) has persisted, essentially

the same, for a longer or shorter time and has had more or

less varied experiences. He who utters them, also thereby

indicates that he has the power of knowing at least one

objective existence which his senses cannot perceive.

Such must be the case, because our senses can only feel

what is present to them ; they can never feel the past. The

very fact of our feeling anything shows, with certainty, that

something is actually present which occasions that feeling.

But it is clear to everyone that his intellect can, by the help

of memory, know with certainty something which is far from

being present here and now, namely, some event of his past

life. Similarly, he is thus able to perceive his own continuous

existence, which is most certainly a thing which cannot be felt.

Our body can, of course, be felt as often as we like, in several

ways at the same time, and as long as we choose to feel it.

Nevertheless, each time we feel it we can but experience the

present feeling, and without memory and without reflex acts

of the intellect, we cannot know that our own body has, and

.has had, a continuous enduring existence. It can never be

felt as " enduring," although by the aid of repeated sensations

it can be intellectually perceived to be enduring. But the

intellect, aided by memory, can know very well, by itself and

the psychical being of mere animals has as yet, to our

knowledge, shown itself capable. No one pretends that

brutes possess this marvellous intuition, while it is and

must be present, however unrecognized, in any savage who

has but one recollection of anything he has done or has

had done to him.

It is thus alone that we can unite the past with the

present and say " I am." These two words have an

immense significance for anyone who will carefully ponder

over them. They signify that he who utters them intelli-

gently recognizes certain past acts as his own acts, .and

that a continuous unity (himself) has persisted, essentially

the same, for a longer or shorter time and has had more or

less varied experiences. He who utters them, also thereby

indicates that he has the power of knowing at least one

objective existence which his senses cannot perceive.

Such must be the case, because our senses can only feel

what is present to them ; they can never feel the past. The

very fact of our feeling anything shows, with certainty, that

something is actually present which occasions that feeling.

But it is clear to everyone that his intellect can, by the help

of memory, know with certainty something which is far from

being present here and now, namely, some event of his past

life. Similarly, he is thus able to perceive his own continuous

existence, which is most certainly a thing which cannot be felt.

Our body can, of course, be felt as often as we like, in several

ways at the same time, and as long as we choose to feel it.

Nevertheless, each time we feel it we can but experience the

present feeling, and without memory and without reflex acts

of the intellect, we cannot know that our own body has, and

.has had, a continuous enduring existence. It can never be

felt as " enduring," although by the aid of repeated sensations

it can be intellectually perceived to be enduring. But the

intellect, aided by memory, can know very well, by itself and