xiv THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

from whence they believe it to have had its origin, it will,

we think, be most advisable to consider carefully the

question whether there seems to be, or not, a difference

of kind between the highest psychical energy found present

in the brute and the intellect of man. This is simply a

question of fact.

Now, since man certainly possesses, besides his intellect,

the sensitivity, faculty of sense-association, desires, emotions,

instincts, and powers of emotional manifestation with which

the higher animals are endowed, it will be incumbent on us

to ascertain whether man's lower mental faculties, without

the exercise of conscious intellect, will not suffice to explain

all the various more or less intelligent actions which mere

animals display. Should such turn out to be the case, and

should both the positive and negative evidence concerning

rationality concur in affirming that there is no need to

attribute intellect to animals, then it must be admitted

that a difference of kind is thereby demonstrated to exist

between them and ourselves. But there is one other ques-

tion which requires very special care in its examination.

It is plain that, as a rule, all men speak while animals are

dumb. A special consideration is therefore demanded for

language. If it should prove that we have two sets of

faculties (higher and lower), have we also two corresponding

modes of expression? It is plain that we and animals

make signs. It will be necessary, therefore, carefully to

inquire and distinguish as to what a sign really is, and,

if there are different kinds of signs, what relation they

bear to the intellect? It will be further most necessary

to examine the relations which exist between gestures and

vocal expressions, and, above all, the relations which both

of these bear to thought and to the faculty of forming

and communicating abstract ideas, and the perception of

relations as such. But that we may not, through neglect,

from whence they believe it to have had its origin, it will,

we think, be most advisable to consider carefully the

question whether there seems to be, or not, a difference

of kind between the highest psychical energy found present

in the brute and the intellect of man. This is simply a

question of fact.

Now, since man certainly possesses, besides his intellect,

the sensitivity, faculty of sense-association, desires, emotions,

instincts, and powers of emotional manifestation with which

the higher animals are endowed, it will be incumbent on us

to ascertain whether man's lower mental faculties, without

the exercise of conscious intellect, will not suffice to explain

all the various more or less intelligent actions which mere

animals display. Should such turn out to be the case, and

should both the positive and negative evidence concerning

rationality concur in affirming that there is no need to

attribute intellect to animals, then it must be admitted

that a difference of kind is thereby demonstrated to exist

between them and ourselves. But there is one other ques-

tion which requires very special care in its examination.

It is plain that, as a rule, all men speak while animals are

dumb. A special consideration is therefore demanded for

language. If it should prove that we have two sets of

faculties (higher and lower), have we also two corresponding

modes of expression? It is plain that we and animals

make signs. It will be necessary, therefore, carefully to

inquire and distinguish as to what a sign really is, and,

if there are different kinds of signs, what relation they

bear to the intellect? It will be further most necessary

to examine the relations which exist between gestures and

vocal expressions, and, above all, the relations which both

of these bear to thought and to the faculty of forming

and communicating abstract ideas, and the perception of

relations as such. But that we may not, through neglect,