1 66 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

tion of " right and wrong " ; for how could a mere habit of

obeying society have ever led a moral hero to denounce that

habit and defy society ?

It has, again, been often affirmed that there is no real

distinction between "virtue" and "pleasure." Instead of

there being any absolute distinction between them it is

said that " good actions " are merely actions pleasurable

or useful to the individual who performs them, or are ad-

vantageous to his fellow -men. They say, also, that it is

the pleasurable or useful results which cause actions to be

good actions, not the intentions with which the doer may

perform them.

It is true we say " that is a ' good ' knife " because it cuts

well, and any weapon or any other useful article is said to be

a " good " one if it well serves the purpose it was intended to

serve. But a very little consideration will show that such a

use of the word does not bring home to us the fundamental

meaning of the term. For " conformity to an end " will not

make an action good unless the end aimed at is itself good

and agreeable to duty unless by conforming to it we " follow

the right order." If a young person, carefully instructed by

a thief, conforms to the end aimed at so completely as to pick

pockets with extraordinary deftness, such "conformity" will

not make his action a " good " one.

But if the end aimed at is really a good end, and one which

is for us a " duty," if we ask, " why should we do our duty ?

why should we follow the right order ? " the only possible final

answer is, " it is right so to do."

If it be urged in opposition that " we should follow the

right order because it is our true interest to do so," he who so

urges must either mean "we should always follow our own

interest," which is abandoning the rule of " right and wrong "

altogether, or he must mean " we should follow our interest,

not because it is our interest, but because it is right"-

tion of " right and wrong " ; for how could a mere habit of

obeying society have ever led a moral hero to denounce that

habit and defy society ?

It has, again, been often affirmed that there is no real

distinction between "virtue" and "pleasure." Instead of

there being any absolute distinction between them it is

said that " good actions " are merely actions pleasurable

or useful to the individual who performs them, or are ad-

vantageous to his fellow -men. They say, also, that it is

the pleasurable or useful results which cause actions to be

good actions, not the intentions with which the doer may

perform them.

It is true we say " that is a ' good ' knife " because it cuts

well, and any weapon or any other useful article is said to be

a " good " one if it well serves the purpose it was intended to

serve. But a very little consideration will show that such a

use of the word does not bring home to us the fundamental

meaning of the term. For " conformity to an end " will not

make an action good unless the end aimed at is itself good

and agreeable to duty unless by conforming to it we " follow

the right order." If a young person, carefully instructed by

a thief, conforms to the end aimed at so completely as to pick

pockets with extraordinary deftness, such "conformity" will

not make his action a " good " one.

But if the end aimed at is really a good end, and one which

is for us a " duty," if we ask, " why should we do our duty ?

why should we follow the right order ? " the only possible final

answer is, " it is right so to do."

If it be urged in opposition that " we should follow the

right order because it is our true interest to do so," he who so

urges must either mean "we should always follow our own

interest," which is abandoning the rule of " right and wrong "

altogether, or he must mean " we should follow our interest,

not because it is our interest, but because it is right"-