64 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

circumstance aroused, he has then a far clearer consciousness

of it and of its nature than before. He can, indeed, thus

" make sure " by merely, as it were, tightening his sensuous

grasp of the object and carefully focussing his sense-perceptions

regarding it.

Thus perception is no process of inference from known

signs to a before unknown notion of an object, but is a

spontaneous interpretation of signs (which themselves are by

no means expressly adverted to) by a natural power the

mind possesses, and which is rapidly perfected by exercise.

By it we gain an immediate assurance (and, by attention, can

gain an augmented assurance) that a perception is certain

and needs no proof.

But there remains one supremely important point to

consider. If our perceptions were " inferences," our in-

tellect would necessarily be thereby altogether stultified.

For no "inference" can be certain which does not repose

on perceptions previously acquired and known to be true.

If, therefore, every perception were an inference, we should

get a regressus ad infinitum, and be incapable of ever ac-

quiring a perception of any truth whatever. Anterior to all

possible proof, we must know truths which are not inferences,

which require no proofs but are evident in themselves.

The fact that we have a direct and immediate knowledge

of objects which are made present to the mind through our

sensations, is a fact fatal to Idealism. It alike justifies the

spontaneous and reflective declarations of our own minds,

when once we have clearly understood the great difference

which exists between (i) intellectual conceptions and per-

ceptions, and (2) their merely sensuous accompaniments.

The conviction, then, that science is really concerned not

alone with thoughts but also with external, independent, and

extended realities, is so far justified.

It only now remains for us to consider the various objec-

circumstance aroused, he has then a far clearer consciousness

of it and of its nature than before. He can, indeed, thus

" make sure " by merely, as it were, tightening his sensuous

grasp of the object and carefully focussing his sense-perceptions

regarding it.

Thus perception is no process of inference from known

signs to a before unknown notion of an object, but is a

spontaneous interpretation of signs (which themselves are by

no means expressly adverted to) by a natural power the

mind possesses, and which is rapidly perfected by exercise.

By it we gain an immediate assurance (and, by attention, can

gain an augmented assurance) that a perception is certain

and needs no proof.

But there remains one supremely important point to

consider. If our perceptions were " inferences," our in-

tellect would necessarily be thereby altogether stultified.

For no "inference" can be certain which does not repose

on perceptions previously acquired and known to be true.

If, therefore, every perception were an inference, we should

get a regressus ad infinitum, and be incapable of ever ac-

quiring a perception of any truth whatever. Anterior to all

possible proof, we must know truths which are not inferences,

which require no proofs but are evident in themselves.

The fact that we have a direct and immediate knowledge

of objects which are made present to the mind through our

sensations, is a fact fatal to Idealism. It alike justifies the

spontaneous and reflective declarations of our own minds,

when once we have clearly understood the great difference

which exists between (i) intellectual conceptions and per-

ceptions, and (2) their merely sensuous accompaniments.

The conviction, then, that science is really concerned not

alone with thoughts but also with external, independent, and

extended realities, is so far justified.

It only now remains for us to consider the various objec-