14 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

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340 

 

experiment are always, of course, to be made use of, when

possible, for verifying our inferences. Nevertheless, in the

last resource, when we have done experimenting, how do

we know, with absolute certainty, that we have obtained

such results as we may have obtained? Manifestly by the

intellect. How otherwise are we to judge between what

may seem to be the conflicting indications of different sense-

impressions ? Nothing could be more foolish than to

undervalue the testimony of the senses, which are both tests

and causes of certainty. They are not, however, the test of

it. Certainty does not pertain to sensation, but to thought

alone. Self - conscious, reflective thought, then, is our

ultimate and absolute criterion. It is by thought only

by the self-conscious intellect that we know we have

" feelings " at all. Without that we might indeed feel, but

we could not have complete certainty as to our feeling and

know assuredly that we possessed it. Our ultimate court

of appeal and supreme criterion is the intellect and not

sense, and our act of intellectual perception which is thus

ultimate, which both knows what it knows and knows that

it knows it, with absolute certainty, which is above any

possibility of proof and is self-evident in and to itself, is

called "intellectual intuition."

 

The matters thus put forward in a simple elementary way

in this introductory chapter will be treated of more fully and

scientifically when we begin to grapple with the most funda-

mental questions concerning human knowledge. We have

here somewhat anticipated what we shall have to say in our

eighth chapter. We have, however, felt ourselves forced so

to do, as otherwise we could hardly make clear matters we

must deal with almost immediately.

 

Here, at the outset, we take for granted that a world

of material, independent objects, possessing various powers

and activities, exists about us ; also that we possess a

 

 

experiment are always, of course, to be made use of, when

possible, for verifying our inferences. Nevertheless, in the

last resource, when we have done experimenting, how do

we know, with absolute certainty, that we have obtained

such results as we may have obtained? Manifestly by the

intellect. How otherwise are we to judge between what

may seem to be the conflicting indications of different sense-

impressions ? Nothing could be more foolish than to

undervalue the testimony of the senses, which are both tests

and causes of certainty. They are not, however, the test of

it. Certainty does not pertain to sensation, but to thought

alone. Self - conscious, reflective thought, then, is our

ultimate and absolute criterion. It is by thought only

by the self-conscious intellect that we know we have

" feelings " at all. Without that we might indeed feel, but

we could not have complete certainty as to our feeling and

know assuredly that we possessed it. Our ultimate court

of appeal and supreme criterion is the intellect and not

sense, and our act of intellectual perception which is thus

ultimate, which both knows what it knows and knows that

it knows it, with absolute certainty, which is above any

possibility of proof and is self-evident in and to itself, is

called "intellectual intuition."

 

The matters thus put forward in a simple elementary way

in this introductory chapter will be treated of more fully and

scientifically when we begin to grapple with the most funda-

mental questions concerning human knowledge. We have

here somewhat anticipated what we shall have to say in our

eighth chapter. We have, however, felt ourselves forced so

to do, as otherwise we could hardly make clear matters we

must deal with almost immediately.

 

Here, at the outset, we take for granted that a world

of material, independent objects, possessing various powers

and activities, exists about us ; also that we possess a