230 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

Let the reader test this assertion by his own experience.

As, for example, let him examine what his mind is occupied

about while sitting and attentively reading these pages.

He will find his mind is not occupied about the feelings

occasioned by his sitting in the chair which supports him,

or the book he holds in his hand, any more than it is

occupied about his own continuous existence, but about

the contents of this book. Yet he can at will make himself

explicitly aware either of his feelings or his perception of

his own self-existence. After thus turning his mind back

upon itself he will then be able to say either " I have the

feelings which attend holding and reading a book on the

Groundwork of Science," or he may say to himself, " It is

I who have these feelings." But, as before said, this is not

a natural, primary act, but an act of reflexion that is, a

secondary act. No one, when he begins to think, adverts

either to his " present feelings " or to his " continuous

personal existence." No one begins by perceiving his act

of perception a bit more than he begins by expressly

adverting to the fact that it is he himself who perceives it.

Only by reflecting on the direct spontaneous perception

of the mind is it that we can explicitly see (by such a

secondary act) that our perceptions and feelings are percep-

tions and feelings, or that it is truly we who perceive and

feel. When a man playing cricket is having his innings, he

has all the "perceptions" and "states of consciousness"

which attend the assumption of the fit postures for the

reception and striking of the ball, and for gaining such

runs as his address may make possible. He knows very

well all the time what he is about during his play. But he

never directs his mind upon "his states of consciousness,"

or " the persistence of his being." What he directly regards

is what he is doing and what is being done to him the

defence of his wicket from the attack of the bowler. If he

Let the reader test this assertion by his own experience.

As, for example, let him examine what his mind is occupied

about while sitting and attentively reading these pages.

He will find his mind is not occupied about the feelings

occasioned by his sitting in the chair which supports him,

or the book he holds in his hand, any more than it is

occupied about his own continuous existence, but about

the contents of this book. Yet he can at will make himself

explicitly aware either of his feelings or his perception of

his own self-existence. After thus turning his mind back

upon itself he will then be able to say either " I have the

feelings which attend holding and reading a book on the

Groundwork of Science," or he may say to himself, " It is

I who have these feelings." But, as before said, this is not

a natural, primary act, but an act of reflexion that is, a

secondary act. No one, when he begins to think, adverts

either to his " present feelings " or to his " continuous

personal existence." No one begins by perceiving his act

of perception a bit more than he begins by expressly

adverting to the fact that it is he himself who perceives it.

Only by reflecting on the direct spontaneous perception

of the mind is it that we can explicitly see (by such a

secondary act) that our perceptions and feelings are percep-

tions and feelings, or that it is truly we who perceive and

feel. When a man playing cricket is having his innings, he

has all the "perceptions" and "states of consciousness"

which attend the assumption of the fit postures for the

reception and striking of the ball, and for gaining such

runs as his address may make possible. He knows very

well all the time what he is about during his play. But he

never directs his mind upon "his states of consciousness,"

or " the persistence of his being." What he directly regards

is what he is doing and what is being done to him the

defence of his wicket from the attack of the bowler. If he