THE OBJECTS OF SCIEXCE 63

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340 

 

because its truth is implicitly contained in other things is

surely a much more complex and involved mental process

than is the direct perception of an object. For this reason,

then, if for no other, we should not conclude that we have

made use of a process of " inference " when nothing in our

minds assures us that we have really done so.

 

What probably has caused some persons to mistake

" perception " for " inference " is the fact that every perception

is the result of a number of psychical processes sensations

and imaginations associated in complex groups and a variety

of unconscious* affections also. This process of complex

sensuous association it is which seems to have been denoted

under the self-contradictory term, " unconscious inference."

 

Yet if our perceptions of objects were " inferences," then,

since no inference can exist without data, the data of such

perceptions must be the feelings which objects occasion in us.

But if that were the case, then such feelings must be primarily

observed, or else no consequence could be deduced from them.

In that case it would be quite true to charge Idealists with

mistaking the means for the objects of perception, and in spite

of all their denials, we should have to affirm that they do

direct their attention upon their sensations and feelings in

an exceptional and most misleading manner.

 

But that " perception " is not " inference " is very plainly

shown by the fact that we can and do obtain a reflective

assurance of the truth of our perceptions when we clearly do

not employ inference to obtain it.

 

No one can deny that there is a plain distinction between

" attention " and " inference," and we may gain an increased

certainty for our perceptions by acts of attention alone. The

reader will, we think, readily admit that he sometimes per-

ceives an object consciously, but without paying particular

attention to it ; and that when his attention to it is by some

* As to this see below, Chapter VI.

 

 

because its truth is implicitly contained in other things is

surely a much more complex and involved mental process

than is the direct perception of an object. For this reason,

then, if for no other, we should not conclude that we have

made use of a process of " inference " when nothing in our

minds assures us that we have really done so.

 

What probably has caused some persons to mistake

" perception " for " inference " is the fact that every perception

is the result of a number of psychical processes sensations

and imaginations associated in complex groups and a variety

of unconscious* affections also. This process of complex

sensuous association it is which seems to have been denoted

under the self-contradictory term, " unconscious inference."

 

Yet if our perceptions of objects were " inferences," then,

since no inference can exist without data, the data of such

perceptions must be the feelings which objects occasion in us.

But if that were the case, then such feelings must be primarily

observed, or else no consequence could be deduced from them.

In that case it would be quite true to charge Idealists with

mistaking the means for the objects of perception, and in spite

of all their denials, we should have to affirm that they do

direct their attention upon their sensations and feelings in

an exceptional and most misleading manner.

 

But that " perception " is not " inference " is very plainly

shown by the fact that we can and do obtain a reflective

assurance of the truth of our perceptions when we clearly do

not employ inference to obtain it.

 

No one can deny that there is a plain distinction between

" attention " and " inference," and we may gain an increased

certainty for our perceptions by acts of attention alone. The

reader will, we think, readily admit that he sometimes per-

ceives an object consciously, but without paying particular

attention to it ; and that when his attention to it is by some

* As to this see below, Chapter VI.