CAUSES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 281

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340 

 

and which if not (as they should be) expressly accepted, must

at least be unconsciously assumed when pursuing science.

 

The ultimate result of that system is necessarily self-

destructive, ending (when consistently carried out to its

consequences) in a scepticism which amounts to intellectual

paralysis.

 

The system to which we here specially refer is that which

affirms the essential relativity of knowledge.

 

Now that all human knowledge is relative is, in one sense,

of course, a most obvious truth. Our knowledge plainly

depends upon and is relative to our powers of discernment

and reasoning our senses and our intellect. Had we more

senses we should doubtless know many things which we now

cannot even conceive of because the imaginations necessary

for such conceptions are lacking. Had we deeper powers

of intuition and a greater capacity for ratiocination our

knowledge would be indefinitely increased thereby. In such

senses as these our knowledge is truly relative. But though

we can thus know only in part, we can know many truths

with absolute certainty and complete adequacy, and we can

and do see the self-evident certainty and completeness of

such knowledge.

 

Even omniscience could not know with an essentially

greater certainty than we do the fact of our own existence,

the fact that one moon and .not two circles round our planet,

the truth of the principles of contradiction and causality, etc.

About such knowledge there can be no uncertainty on the

ground of its relativity or on any other ground. It is

absolute knowledge. But this is what the upholders of the

doctrine of its relativity deny. They deny that being relative

it can ever at the same time be absolutely and perfectly

true.

 

This system became, a short time ago, widely popular, and

its doctrines may be conveniently summed up as follows :

 

 

and which if not (as they should be) expressly accepted, must

at least be unconsciously assumed when pursuing science.

 

The ultimate result of that system is necessarily self-

destructive, ending (when consistently carried out to its

consequences) in a scepticism which amounts to intellectual

paralysis.

 

The system to which we here specially refer is that which

affirms the essential relativity of knowledge.

 

Now that all human knowledge is relative is, in one sense,

of course, a most obvious truth. Our knowledge plainly

depends upon and is relative to our powers of discernment

and reasoning our senses and our intellect. Had we more

senses we should doubtless know many things which we now

cannot even conceive of because the imaginations necessary

for such conceptions are lacking. Had we deeper powers

of intuition and a greater capacity for ratiocination our

knowledge would be indefinitely increased thereby. In such

senses as these our knowledge is truly relative. But though

we can thus know only in part, we can know many truths

with absolute certainty and complete adequacy, and we can

and do see the self-evident certainty and completeness of

such knowledge.

 

Even omniscience could not know with an essentially

greater certainty than we do the fact of our own existence,

the fact that one moon and .not two circles round our planet,

the truth of the principles of contradiction and causality, etc.

About such knowledge there can be no uncertainty on the

ground of its relativity or on any other ground. It is

absolute knowledge. But this is what the upholders of the

doctrine of its relativity deny. They deny that being relative

it can ever at the same time be absolutely and perfectly

true.

 

This system became, a short time ago, widely popular, and

its doctrines may be conveniently summed up as follows :