THE OBJECTS OF SCIENCE 79

the truth of the extension of our own body because we

can only perceive it by the action of one part of it upon

another ?

Dr. Bradley says : * " That we have no miraculous intuition

of our own body as spatial reality is perfectly certain."

The word " miraculous " should not have been used by him

in this context, as it tends to excite an initial prejudice

against the view he opposes. Nobody pretends that we

have such an intuition, but that our possession of an evident

natural intuition is certain, we do not hesitate to affirm. Of

course we cannot think till after we have begun to feel, and

our intuition of the body's extension is not gained without

experience and without multitudinous antecedent movements

between its various parts. But that intuition once gained

is not on that account a bit less clear and distinct at a very

early date.

There is no difficulty in the fact that nothing extended

can be perceived except in relation to thought which is

unextended. Who would expect that two extended but

thoughtless things could perceive each other? What doubt

is cast upon our intellectual intuitions from the fact that

they cannot do so?

That extended objects may be real in themselves, with

various relations to our percipience, is opposed by Dr.

Bradley on the ground that, " if a thing is known to have

a quality only under a certain condition, there is no process

of reasoning from this which will justify the conclusion that

the thing, if unconditioned, is still the same."

But here the use of the term " unconditioned " seems

quite unwarrantable. Because the conditions which accom-

pany perception may be absent, it by no means follows

that all conditions are absent. Indeed, it is clear and

manifest that no extended object can exist devoid of all

* P . 15-

the truth of the extension of our own body because we

can only perceive it by the action of one part of it upon

another ?

Dr. Bradley says : * " That we have no miraculous intuition

of our own body as spatial reality is perfectly certain."

The word " miraculous " should not have been used by him

in this context, as it tends to excite an initial prejudice

against the view he opposes. Nobody pretends that we

have such an intuition, but that our possession of an evident

natural intuition is certain, we do not hesitate to affirm. Of

course we cannot think till after we have begun to feel, and

our intuition of the body's extension is not gained without

experience and without multitudinous antecedent movements

between its various parts. But that intuition once gained

is not on that account a bit less clear and distinct at a very

early date.

There is no difficulty in the fact that nothing extended

can be perceived except in relation to thought which is

unextended. Who would expect that two extended but

thoughtless things could perceive each other? What doubt

is cast upon our intellectual intuitions from the fact that

they cannot do so?

That extended objects may be real in themselves, with

various relations to our percipience, is opposed by Dr.

Bradley on the ground that, " if a thing is known to have

a quality only under a certain condition, there is no process

of reasoning from this which will justify the conclusion that

the thing, if unconditioned, is still the same."

But here the use of the term " unconditioned " seems

quite unwarrantable. Because the conditions which accom-

pany perception may be absent, it by no means follows

that all conditions are absent. Indeed, it is clear and

manifest that no extended object can exist devoid of all

* P . 15-