152 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

termed "sensuous cognitions," or "sense-perceptions," since

they may produce practical results resembling those of

intellectual cognitions and perceptions in any creature

capable of feeling them but devoid of consciousness.

If we reflect on these sensuous cognitions with the

associations which may be established between feelings, as

evidenced by the effects of merely sensuous memory, we shall

see that merely sensuous mental states may bear a notable

resemblance, practically, to true inference.

When different groups of feelings have become intimately

associated, then, on the occurrence of one group, an imagin-

ation of the other group will arise in the mind, and we have

an " expectant feeling " of their proximate actual recurrence

as we may have an expectant feeling of orange pulp when

cutting the artificial orange.

This expectant imagination of feelings yet to come, has a

decided analogy with reasoning and inference, although quite

distinct and unlike them essentially. Very noticeable also is

that feeling of wondering expectancy which will arise when

some strange sound is heard, or some startling movement

seen, followed by a feeling of complacency when an inno-

cent cause of either comes in view.

Such feelings are the sensuous accompaniments of an

intellectual search for a cause followed by its satisfactory

detection.

Strong feelings, and especially strong emotions, tend to

manifest themselves externally, not only without our know-

ledge and intention, but against our utmost efforts, when we

become conscious of such manifestation. Thus terror and

anger show themselves by external signs, which express

feelings not ideas, and so may be said to constitute a

" language of emotion."

Such unintellectual language manifests itself, as we have

just sad, "by external signs." This is quite true in one

termed "sensuous cognitions," or "sense-perceptions," since

they may produce practical results resembling those of

intellectual cognitions and perceptions in any creature

capable of feeling them but devoid of consciousness.

If we reflect on these sensuous cognitions with the

associations which may be established between feelings, as

evidenced by the effects of merely sensuous memory, we shall

see that merely sensuous mental states may bear a notable

resemblance, practically, to true inference.

When different groups of feelings have become intimately

associated, then, on the occurrence of one group, an imagin-

ation of the other group will arise in the mind, and we have

an " expectant feeling " of their proximate actual recurrence

as we may have an expectant feeling of orange pulp when

cutting the artificial orange.

This expectant imagination of feelings yet to come, has a

decided analogy with reasoning and inference, although quite

distinct and unlike them essentially. Very noticeable also is

that feeling of wondering expectancy which will arise when

some strange sound is heard, or some startling movement

seen, followed by a feeling of complacency when an inno-

cent cause of either comes in view.

Such feelings are the sensuous accompaniments of an

intellectual search for a cause followed by its satisfactory

detection.

Strong feelings, and especially strong emotions, tend to

manifest themselves externally, not only without our know-

ledge and intention, but against our utmost efforts, when we

become conscious of such manifestation. Thus terror and

anger show themselves by external signs, which express

feelings not ideas, and so may be said to constitute a

" language of emotion."

Such unintellectual language manifests itself, as we have

just sad, "by external signs." This is quite true in one