THE OBJECTS OF SCIENCE 57

called forth, and we perceive what we know to be " external

objects." Through our own activities and by things done

to us we recognize our existence, our feelings, and our

actions. Nothing can be more wonderful than our faculty

of memory, which gives us absolutely certain knowledge

of a continuously existing being our own self the con-

tinuousness of which it is impossible for our senses to

perceive, for they can perceive nothing but what is present

to them. There is really no more difficulty in our per-

ception of the external world about us than in our

experiencing a sensation of azure or of sweetness. The

fact is so, and we perceive it to be so ; and the act by which

we do this is no more really marvellous in one case than

in the other ; or rather every act of knowledge is alike

marvellous. We know things, and we know that we know

them. How we know them is a mystery indeed, but one

about which it is idle to speculate, as it is absolutely in-

soluble. The oft-repeated question " How is knowledge

possible?" is therefore one of the most idle and futile

questions which can be asked.

It is an absurd question, because it leads to a regressus ad

infinitiun. To every possible reply to it, giving some

explanation of its possibility, it may be rejoined " but how

is our knowledge of that explanation possible ? " and so on

for ever. We cannot (once more) get behind the intellect, and

therefore no ultimate explanation of our intellectual power is

possible. No intellectual perception can be more than self-

evidently true. We are compelled to trust our intellect,

as we are compelled to trust that we are not mad ; and

that we are not altogether mad or deluded is shown us by

the fact of our seeing quite clearly that if we were deluded

our judgments could not be trustworthy.

The mystery of knowledge runs parallel, as we have just

said, to the mystery of sensation. We feel things savoury

called forth, and we perceive what we know to be " external

objects." Through our own activities and by things done

to us we recognize our existence, our feelings, and our

actions. Nothing can be more wonderful than our faculty

of memory, which gives us absolutely certain knowledge

of a continuously existing being our own self the con-

tinuousness of which it is impossible for our senses to

perceive, for they can perceive nothing but what is present

to them. There is really no more difficulty in our per-

ception of the external world about us than in our

experiencing a sensation of azure or of sweetness. The

fact is so, and we perceive it to be so ; and the act by which

we do this is no more really marvellous in one case than

in the other ; or rather every act of knowledge is alike

marvellous. We know things, and we know that we know

them. How we know them is a mystery indeed, but one

about which it is idle to speculate, as it is absolutely in-

soluble. The oft-repeated question " How is knowledge

possible?" is therefore one of the most idle and futile

questions which can be asked.

It is an absurd question, because it leads to a regressus ad

infinitiun. To every possible reply to it, giving some

explanation of its possibility, it may be rejoined " but how

is our knowledge of that explanation possible ? " and so on

for ever. We cannot (once more) get behind the intellect, and

therefore no ultimate explanation of our intellectual power is

possible. No intellectual perception can be more than self-

evidently true. We are compelled to trust our intellect,

as we are compelled to trust that we are not mad ; and

that we are not altogether mad or deluded is shown us by

the fact of our seeing quite clearly that if we were deluded

our judgments could not be trustworthy.

The mystery of knowledge runs parallel, as we have just

said, to the mystery of sensation. We feel things savoury