CAUSES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 269
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It is indeed a persuasion of many men of science that all
the characteristics, all the sense-organs, and all the intelli-
gence which any animal possesses, are and must have been
due to "Natural Selection," that is, to the preservation in
the struggle for life of the creatures possessing such sense-
organs and intelligence. Why then,* it is asked, may not
human reason be in the same case? Why may it not be
the mere result of a fortunate psychical variation which has
enabled the primitive brutal man to destroy and feed on
the brutal animal a trifle more easily than before? Is it
possible for us to trust and confide in a faculty which has
been attained slowly through the persistent endeavours of
our semi-simian forefathers to feed and breed? A faculty
so developed may be admirable as a weapon, but what
guarantee have we to regard it as suited for very different
purposes, namely, to reveal to us the true nature of the world
in which we find ourselves, and to show us what it is
reasonable for us to do in other directions?
This objection we have long before referred to,* stating
that it would be more fully considered later on. For such
fuller consideration the time has now come.
But we may here remind our readers of what we before
pointed outf If our conviction about the existence of an ex-
ternal world had been produced by " Natural Selection," that
would constitute a triumphant argument against Idealism.
For, unless an independent, extended, and external world
really existed, no sentient organisms would be destroyed by
contravening the laws and conditions thereof. If it had acted
so efficiently, it must have been a reality. But, though there
has been, and still is, a great deal of talking and writing
about " Natural Selection," it is surprising how many persons
talk and write about it without knowing what it really is.
It may be useful, therefore, to say here a few words upon
* See Chapter III., p. 56. t See ante, p. 48.
It is indeed a persuasion of many men of science that all
the characteristics, all the sense-organs, and all the intelli-
gence which any animal possesses, are and must have been
due to "Natural Selection," that is, to the preservation in
the struggle for life of the creatures possessing such sense-
organs and intelligence. Why then,* it is asked, may not
human reason be in the same case? Why may it not be
the mere result of a fortunate psychical variation which has
enabled the primitive brutal man to destroy and feed on
the brutal animal a trifle more easily than before? Is it
possible for us to trust and confide in a faculty which has
been attained slowly through the persistent endeavours of
our semi-simian forefathers to feed and breed? A faculty
so developed may be admirable as a weapon, but what
guarantee have we to regard it as suited for very different
purposes, namely, to reveal to us the true nature of the world
in which we find ourselves, and to show us what it is
reasonable for us to do in other directions?
This objection we have long before referred to,* stating
that it would be more fully considered later on. For such
fuller consideration the time has now come.
But we may here remind our readers of what we before
pointed outf If our conviction about the existence of an ex-
ternal world had been produced by " Natural Selection," that
would constitute a triumphant argument against Idealism.
For, unless an independent, extended, and external world
really existed, no sentient organisms would be destroyed by
contravening the laws and conditions thereof. If it had acted
so efficiently, it must have been a reality. But, though there
has been, and still is, a great deal of talking and writing
about " Natural Selection," it is surprising how many persons
talk and write about it without knowing what it really is.
It may be useful, therefore, to say here a few words upon
* See Chapter III., p. 56. t See ante, p. 48.