THE OBJECTS OF SCIENCE 39

of them all the time. To show, or even to know, that any-

thing was existing independently of the mind, it would be

necessary to perceive it while it remained unperceived, or to

think of it while at the same time it remained unthought of,

which would manifestly be an absurd contradiction and a

downright impossibility. Idealism, therefore, does not con-

tradict the assertions of common sense, or cause any practical

inconvenience to him who maintains it, seeing that it only

denies what is but a figment of perverse Metaphysicians a

groundless and utterly irrational belief in a necessarily

unknown and unimaginable entity, about which no one of

our senses can tell us anything whatever."

Such is Idealism as put forward and defended by its

ingenious and estimable author, Bishop Berkeley, whose

piety led him to explain our ideas and perceptions as

the result of the direct action of God upon our minds ;

the whole visible, audible, and tangible universe being

the product of the energy of the divine mind so acting

upon us.

This explanation, could we accept it, would indeed enable

us to know at once what is the groundwork of science.

But we by no means see how to reach our goal by so short

a journey. We need not even linger over this pious

hypothesis, since, so far as we know, no one now adheres

to it.

Nor has Idealism remained unmodified in other respects.

It began with the assertion that we can know nothing but

sensations and ideas the latter being generally interpreted

as plexuses of faintly revived sensations. Still it must

always have been manifest to anyone who would carefully

examine his own mental states, that his sensations were

very rarely noted or attended to as such, but that his mind

was almost always occupied, not about " feelings," but about

" things." Even Berkeley himself allowed that we might

of them all the time. To show, or even to know, that any-

thing was existing independently of the mind, it would be

necessary to perceive it while it remained unperceived, or to

think of it while at the same time it remained unthought of,

which would manifestly be an absurd contradiction and a

downright impossibility. Idealism, therefore, does not con-

tradict the assertions of common sense, or cause any practical

inconvenience to him who maintains it, seeing that it only

denies what is but a figment of perverse Metaphysicians a

groundless and utterly irrational belief in a necessarily

unknown and unimaginable entity, about which no one of

our senses can tell us anything whatever."

Such is Idealism as put forward and defended by its

ingenious and estimable author, Bishop Berkeley, whose

piety led him to explain our ideas and perceptions as

the result of the direct action of God upon our minds ;

the whole visible, audible, and tangible universe being

the product of the energy of the divine mind so acting

upon us.

This explanation, could we accept it, would indeed enable

us to know at once what is the groundwork of science.

But we by no means see how to reach our goal by so short

a journey. We need not even linger over this pious

hypothesis, since, so far as we know, no one now adheres

to it.

Nor has Idealism remained unmodified in other respects.

It began with the assertion that we can know nothing but

sensations and ideas the latter being generally interpreted

as plexuses of faintly revived sensations. Still it must

always have been manifest to anyone who would carefully

examine his own mental states, that his sensations were

very rarely noted or attended to as such, but that his mind

was almost always occupied, not about " feelings," but about

" things." Even Berkeley himself allowed that we might