THE OBJECTS OF SCIENCE 41

Many of our readers may think Idealism so unreasonable

as to feel unwilling to pursue any further the question of

its truth or possible validity. If, however, they are really

interested in the inquiry to which this volume is devoted,

they can hardly rest satisfied without coming to some

decision as to whether the groundwork of science has to

do with " thoughts '' only, or whether it has necessarily also

to do with " things."

It is easy to laugh at Idealism, but unless it contained

some important truth, it would never have spread as it has

done, and captivated so many men exceptionally gifted.

Its propagation, moreover, is a remarkable and interesting

example of the vitality and influence of the English mind.

For the whole of the Philosophy of Germany and Holland,

from Spinoza to Hartmann, has been a result of the mental

seed first sown in men's minds by Berkeley, who explicitly

produced what was implicitly contained in Locke. When

we call to mind that Berkeley begot his parricidal child,

Hume ; that Hume set going the partially antagonistic,

yet largely similar, system of Kant ; that Kant begot Fichte,

and Fichte produced Schelling and Hegel, and these again,

by a revulsion, Schopenhauer and Hartmann it seems im-

possible to deny that English thought, from Locke through

Berkeley, has been far more influential than aught else in

the domain of Philosophy, save the Greek mind as mani-

fested in Aristotle.

It is easy also to be unjust to Idealism in the following

way : Because Idealises affirm that perceptions consist

of plexuses of feelings of various kinds actual feelings and

grouped images of past feelings it may be represented

that they (Idealists) occupy themselves exclusively about

their own feelings, and thus treat as the objects of perception

what are merely the means of perception. But Idealists no

more especially observe their own sensations and feelings

Many of our readers may think Idealism so unreasonable

as to feel unwilling to pursue any further the question of

its truth or possible validity. If, however, they are really

interested in the inquiry to which this volume is devoted,

they can hardly rest satisfied without coming to some

decision as to whether the groundwork of science has to

do with " thoughts '' only, or whether it has necessarily also

to do with " things."

It is easy to laugh at Idealism, but unless it contained

some important truth, it would never have spread as it has

done, and captivated so many men exceptionally gifted.

Its propagation, moreover, is a remarkable and interesting

example of the vitality and influence of the English mind.

For the whole of the Philosophy of Germany and Holland,

from Spinoza to Hartmann, has been a result of the mental

seed first sown in men's minds by Berkeley, who explicitly

produced what was implicitly contained in Locke. When

we call to mind that Berkeley begot his parricidal child,

Hume ; that Hume set going the partially antagonistic,

yet largely similar, system of Kant ; that Kant begot Fichte,

and Fichte produced Schelling and Hegel, and these again,

by a revulsion, Schopenhauer and Hartmann it seems im-

possible to deny that English thought, from Locke through

Berkeley, has been far more influential than aught else in

the domain of Philosophy, save the Greek mind as mani-

fested in Aristotle.

It is easy also to be unjust to Idealism in the following

way : Because Idealises affirm that perceptions consist

of plexuses of feelings of various kinds actual feelings and

grouped images of past feelings it may be represented

that they (Idealists) occupy themselves exclusively about

their own feelings, and thus treat as the objects of perception

what are merely the means of perception. But Idealists no

more especially observe their own sensations and feelings