THE METHODS OF SCIENCE 99

certainty, not to perceive the force of which is illegitimate

doubt.

The first conviction, then, to which we desire in this

chapter to call attention as being implicit in all pursuit

of science, is the conviction that there is such a thing

as certainty, and that there are at least some things which

we can ascertain to be certainly true. In a later chapter

we will consider the justification of this conviction, and the

other convictions implied in the pursuit of science.

But what does the assertion that anything can be "cer-

tainly true" imply?

" Truth " has sometimes been said to be a mere subjective

feeling of the mind truth for each man being just that

which each man troweth and no more. But the objectivity

of truth is easily shown, since the sceptic who would deny

it, in denying it, refutes himself. For if the statement

" Truth is merely an individual feeling " were true, then

that very statement, as a fact, would itself be an objective

truth, and, therefore, more than a mere individual feeling.

But, as John Stuart Mill long ago pointed out, the recog-

nition of the truth of any judgment is not only an essential

part, but the essential part, of it as a judgment. Leave that

out, and it remains a mere play of thought in which no

judgment is passed. No follower of any branch of physical

science can doubt that truth is more than a mere quality

of a feeling, or that it has a real relation to things external

to his mind. Were not such the case, science, once more,

could make no progress. We do not base our scientific

inductions and deductions on what we regard as so man}'

individual feelings, but upon what we regard as facts

real relations between real events and things without a

foundation in which our conclusions would be worthless.

The truth of physical science consists, and must consist, in

the agreement of " thought " with " things," of the world

certainty, not to perceive the force of which is illegitimate

doubt.

The first conviction, then, to which we desire in this

chapter to call attention as being implicit in all pursuit

of science, is the conviction that there is such a thing

as certainty, and that there are at least some things which

we can ascertain to be certainly true. In a later chapter

we will consider the justification of this conviction, and the

other convictions implied in the pursuit of science.

But what does the assertion that anything can be "cer-

tainly true" imply?

" Truth " has sometimes been said to be a mere subjective

feeling of the mind truth for each man being just that

which each man troweth and no more. But the objectivity

of truth is easily shown, since the sceptic who would deny

it, in denying it, refutes himself. For if the statement

" Truth is merely an individual feeling " were true, then

that very statement, as a fact, would itself be an objective

truth, and, therefore, more than a mere individual feeling.

But, as John Stuart Mill long ago pointed out, the recog-

nition of the truth of any judgment is not only an essential

part, but the essential part, of it as a judgment. Leave that

out, and it remains a mere play of thought in which no

judgment is passed. No follower of any branch of physical

science can doubt that truth is more than a mere quality

of a feeling, or that it has a real relation to things external

to his mind. Were not such the case, science, once more,

could make no progress. We do not base our scientific

inductions and deductions on what we regard as so man}'

individual feelings, but upon what we regard as facts

real relations between real events and things without a

foundation in which our conclusions would be worthless.

The truth of physical science consists, and must consist, in

the agreement of " thought " with " things," of the world